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INTRODUCTION 
Alice opened the door cuid found that it led into a small passage, 
not much larger than a rat hole: she knelt down and looked along 
the passage into the loveliest garden you ever saw. How she 
longed to get out of that dark hall, and wander about among those 
beds of bright flowers and those cool fountains, but she could not 
even get her head through the doorway.^ 
The story of the Great Korthern Railway and its president, James J. Hill, 
is inextricedDly linked to social and cultural upheaval at the turn of the 
century. The Great Northern spanned a vast territory from St. Paul to 
Seattle, and Hill believed that the land needed to be densely settled and 
agrarian to profit his corporation and to save the nation from the ills of 
industrialization. Like Alice, Hill dreamed of an Eden and, like her, his 
vision was confined—not by the walls of a passage—but by the needs of his 
railroad. Unlike Alice, however. Hill had no magic to help him reach his 
garden. 
In his struggle. Hill and his railroad became embroiled in issues of 
agricultural development. This involvement propelled him and his 
associates headlong into debates about methods of education and definitions 
of expertise which, in turn, reflected a culture in flux and a society 
wrestling to determine the nation's future. Constantly stymied by forces 
which he only partly understood. Hill's aim never faltered. 
Confining our vision by the needs of the Great Northern we can gain a 
unique perspective on one of America's most significant cultural 
transitions, the move to a rationally motivated, centralized, consumer 
society, ushered in by the Progressives. But, unlike Hill, our line of 
sight is not confined to the railroad. By expemding our field of vision, 
the agricultural struggles of the Great Northern offer us broader insights 
into, and clearer explanations for. Hill's failure to create an agrarian 
wonderland. 
1. Lewis Ccirroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the 
Looking Glass (1889; reprint, Maihwah, N.J.: Watermill Press, 1983), 9. 
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Hill's interest in agriculture was inextricably linked to the nature 
of western railroads. Shortly after the Mexiccm Wsu:, Americans recognized 
the need for transcontinental lines. Only railways could unify their newly 
expcinded nation, created by purchase, war, and conquest. They also 
recognized the inherent problems in building these lines. Railroad 
construction in the settled South emd East had been financed by haulage. A 
company would connect two towns 2md the revenue generated by travel between 
them would float the line's extension to the next population center. 
Municipalities sometimes provided cash incentives to run the road to 
certain towns, but these had little effect on the basic fincincial 
structure. The unsettled nature of the West made this financial strategy 
inapplicable. Few towns existed, potential for haulage was small, and 
disteinces prohibitive. ^ 
Thus, despite the political necessity of linking the nation's coasts 
it appeared economically unfeasible. Laying tracks across the Great Plains 
and Rocky Mountains, with no hope of business-generated revenue until 
reaching the Pacific, required an unimaginable reserve of money. As eeurly 
as 1845 Asa Whitney proposed that the federal government subsidize 
transcontinental lines. By the 1850s most national politicians, led by 
Jefferson Davis, acknowledged the necessity of government support. 
However, a cash-poor government was not in the position to offer monetary 
incentives to railroad builders. Instead it offered land which, since the 
Louisiana Purchase of 1803, it had held in abundance.^ 
Early efforts of the federal government to subsidize railroads 
through land grants faltered due to sectional conflict. In 1850 midwestern 
states received public domain with a mandate to sell the land and use 
profits to subsidize construction of the Illinois Central. The all-
encompassing sectional strife of the 1850s, including South and North 
fighting for the first transcontinental road, delayed further allocation of 
land and construction of railroads. In 1862, freed from sectional 
2. Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (1931; reprint, Lincoln; 
University of Nebraska Press, 1959), 197, 273-90. 
3. Ibid, 197; Lloyd J. Mercer, Railroads and Land Gramt Policy; A 
Studv in Government Intervention (New York: Academic Press, 1982), 4. 
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congressional conflict by the Civil Weir, Lincoln approved the first greuit 
of land for transcontinental railroad construction to the Union Pacific.'^ 
Land subsidies resulted in tremscontinental lines gaining tremendous 
power in the Plains cind Far West. Federal land grauits, designed to prevent 
the acquisition of huge, uninterrupted acreages, offered alternating 
sections of land on either side of the tracks. Additionally, state 
governments courted railroads with land, resulting in vast, often 
untraceeible, holdings. Frequently consolidating their grants, the railway 
corporations utilized their landed wealth and transportation domincince to 
spur migration, determine town sites, control local and state politics, and 
direct economic development-
Many Americans opposed this federal allocation of land to leirge 
corporations as it represented a distinct break with traditionally accepted 
land policies. The role of the public domain had been debated since its 
creation in 1781. Vaguely defined as the possession of all citizens, the 
leind was seen variously as a source of federal income, cin opportunity for 
individual profit through speculation, and a solution to the "Indian 
problem." However, until the advent of the conservation movement at the 
end of the nineteenth century and, with it, the concept that the government 
should administer the public domain in perpetuity for the benefit of the 
populace, few questioned that the fundamental federal land policy hinged on 
distribution and settlement. Rather, the ideological debate, raging since 
the Land Ordinance of 1785, centered on whether the federal government was 
entitled to medce a profit from lemd sales or should just administer leind 
transferal to individuals. In 1862, with the Homestead Act, the government 
finally assumed the meintle of altruistic guaurdianship.^ 
From 1781 on, therefore, Americans generally viewed the public domain 
as being held in trust for future generations of Jeffersoniam yeomen. They 
4. Benjamin Horace Hibbeird, A History of the Public Lcind Policies 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 244; John Stover, American 
Railroads (1961; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 81-
83; Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune and None of Mv Own"; A New 
History of the American West (Norman: University of OkleJioma Press, 1991), 
247; Mercer, Railroads and Land Grant Policy. 3. 
5. Malcolm Rohrbough, The Land Office Business; The Settlement and 
Administration of American Pnhlic! Lctnds. 1789-1837 (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 1-25. 
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rcirely questioned the ultimate destiny of the land, arguing instead about 
methods of distribution and cost. Thus, the innovation of railroad land 
grants, met with considerable resistance. Despite frequent use of the 
public domain to benefit large corporations, steurting with the sale of one 
million acres to the Ohio Company in 1787, the federal government had never 
given Icmd to a private corporation until the railroad grants of the 
nineteenth century. Public dissatisfaction grew, especially in light of 
farmer opposition to railroad monopolies. In 1871, the Texas and Pacific 
Act ended federal land gremts to railways.® 
As with all companies, the early transcontinental railroads aimed 
primarily to make profits for their shareholders. They only differed from 
eastern lines in their methods of producing revenue. With little to haul 
in the unsettled Great Plains and mountain states, the railroads could not 
depend on freight. The vast land grants—the Northern Pacific received an 
area the size of New England in 1870—required considerable effort to 
convert into cash, and so the lines initially adopted other tactics. They 
generated income and profit through over-subscription of stock, creating 
dummy corporations to siphon off money, and through cutting corners in the 
construction of the lines. These methods proved very successful and made 
several large fortunes in the first phase of transcontinental railroad 
construction. The boom ended in 1873 with the failure of Jay Cooke's 
banking house, resulting directly from an over-issucuice of stock for the 
Northern Pacific Railway, and the subsequent national financial 
depression.^ 
After 1873, surviving transcontinental lines had to rethink 
operations. Those with land grsmts, like the Northern Pacific, focused on 
selling their land. Railroads founded after 1871, received no public 
domain cmd needed to find new and different methods of generating revenue. 
Inheritor of these complexities of western transportation was a young 
Canadiem, James Jerome Hill. Born in Ontario in 1838, Hill moved to the 
United States in 1856. After drifting around the East for a few months, he 
6. Ibid; Hibbeurd, A History of Public Lcmd Policies. 249-52; White, 
"It's Your Misfortune." 248-49. 
7. Julius Grodinsky, Transcontinental Railway Strategy. 1869-1893; 
A Study of Businessmen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1962. 
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settled in St. Paul, Minnesota Territory. St. Paul, a small entrepot on 
the Mississippi River, supplied army posts in the region and carted furs to 
market. Arriving in this growing center. Hill started work as a shipping 
clerk on the Mississippi levee. He accumulated knowledge and capital which 
he used to invest in a variety of enterprises from coal shipments to the 
fur trade.® 
By 1878 Hill had made a considerable fortune and was positioned to 
benefit from the bankruptcies resulting from the crash. That year he 
purchased the St. Paul & Pacific, which had land grants in Minnesota cind 
stretching west into eastern North Dakota. But when he reorganized the 
line as the Great Northern Railway in 1889 and pushed westweird across the 
Plains, the line received no additional government land. 
Bcmkers, wary of investing money in transportation ventures that had 
proven so capital intensive, required proof that the Great Northern would 
pay its way. Consequently, and unlike so many of the other 
treinscontinental lines, the Great Northern had to be a successful railroad 
from the start. Thus Hill built a durable line over the flattest grades 
and worked hard to promote commerce in both directions. The Great Northern 
reached Puget Sound in 1893 and remained Hill's prime focus for the rest of 
his life. In 1907 when he resigned as the company's first president to 
assume the chairmanship of the board of directors, the Great Northern had 
grown from 3,284 miles in 1889 to 7,050 miles. In addition, from 1901 he 
directed the Northern Pacific and held considerable sway over other 
railroads, collectively known as the Hill Lines. Retiring in 1912, he 
maintained active involvement in the lines, working regularly in his office 
until a month before his death in 1916.^ 
Like the older eastern lines, the Great Northern relied on freight to 
generate much of its revenue. In the East this strategy had Icirgely relied 
on extant industries. Lacking these. Hill and his line had to adopt more 
8. For general information on the life of James J. Hill and his 
railroads, see Michael P. Malone, James J. Hill; Rmpire Builder of the 
Northwest (Norman: University of Okleihoma Press, 1996); Albro Mzirtin, 
.Tampg .T. Hill and tihft Opening of the Northwest (1976; reprint, St. Paul; 
Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1991). 
9. Ralph W. Hidy, Muriel E. Hidy, Roy V. Scott, and Don L. 
Hofsommer, The Great Northern Railwav; A History (Cambridge: Harvaurd 
Business School Press, 1988), Appendix A; Malone, .TamM .t. Hill. 204-225; 
Meurtin, .TamAa .T. Hill. 611-15. 
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diverse tactics. Given the geographical location of the railroad. Hill 
assumed that its territory would be mainly agricultural. The Great 
Northern, therefore, developed a program to settle the leind and promote 
types of agriculture which would result in maiximum railroad use- The 
marginal quality of much of the land in the northern tier exacerbated this 
challenge, with the environment shaping, and often contesting, the 
direction of development. 
Thus Hill's interest in agriculture related directly to profit for 
his line, a fact he never hid; "I know that in the first instance my great 
interest in the agricultural growth of the Northwest was purely selfish. 
If the farmer was not prosperous, we were poor." This symbiotic 
relationship embroiled him in agricultural development and education 
throughout his career.^® 
Hill tried many different tactics to convince the feirmers of what he 
saw as the most effective methods of agriculture. Working both by himself 
and through the railroad, he finauaced research and demonstration programs, 
affiliated his energies with other organizations which he perceived as 
moving in the right direction, and lobbied for appropriate action on the 
part of state and federal governments. 
Part of his approach to the intricacies of educating farmers involved 
the creation of a variety of personal images. In doing this, he 
consciously distanced himself from the usual portrayal of agricultural 
educators. He wanted to avoid appearing as a patronizing conveyor of 
elitist knowledge and, instead, sidled up to farmers as a peer rather than 
a superior. 
In modern-day business parlance, Hill developed a breind to msurket his 
agricultural product; he created the persona of "Jim Hill." Nobody 
referred to Hill directly as "Jim," not even in his personal 
correspondence, eind yet the brand became well established. Historians 
implicitly attest to the success of the bremd by unquestioningly accepting 
the persona, using "Jim Hill" euid talking about his success as em agrarian 
expert. 
The components of the brand were complex and interlocking. Hill 
needed to present himself as sympathetic to his identified audience, which 
10. Meurtin, James J. Hill. 301. 
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he did by stressing his backgrotxnd as a western pioneer and current status 
as a feirmer. His farming experience also gave him the reputation to talk 
knowledgeably about his product. He solidified his authority by stressing 
his business success and the links between the railroad and agriculture.^^ 
Hill's decision to promote farming as a mainstay of his railroad 
propelled him into late-nineteenth-century debates as varied as the 
problems facing rural America, the role of the federal government in 
western development, aind the nature of expertise. 
The rapid industrialization and urbeuiization of America precipitated 
a cultural crisis in the late nineteenth century. Relieved of the 
distractions of the Civil War and Reconstruction, Americsms focused their 
attention on the causes of the moral decay evident in their cities. They 
discovered a nation that had moved far from the agrarian vision of the 
founding fathers toward a decadence approximating that of the Old World. 
The solution was seen, almost universally, to lie in a return to older, 
rural values; a shoring-up of modern America through strengthening its 
democratic foundation: the Jeffersonian yeoman. Although all agreed on 
the aim, the mecuis provided occasion for considerable debate. 
This crisis spawned a number of reform movements. From the rural 
radicalism of the Populists to the patronizing moderation of the Country 
Life Movement, these culminated in the eeurly twentieth century with the 
birth of Progressivism. Each group sought to preserve the ideals seen as 
embodied in the Americcin fairmer and farming life. Their methods, however, 
varied considerably from the Populist conception of a paternalistic 
11. Jean-Noel Kappferer, Strategic Breind Management; New Approaches 
to Creating and Evaluating Brand Eguitv (New York; Free Press, 1992); 
Stanley M. Ulsuioff, Advertising in America: An Introduction to Persuasive 
Communication (New York; Hastings House, 1977), 21; T. Dillon in 
Advertising. Managoment, and Society; A Business Point of View, ed. 
Francesco M. Nicosia (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1974), 55-60; Malone, James 
J. Hill. 12, 195-198; John C. Hudson, "North Dakota's Railway War of 1905," 
Nor-th Dakota History 48 (Winter 1981): 7; Roy V. Scott, Railroad 
Development Programs in the Twentieth Century (Ames; Iowa State University 
Press, 1985), 7-8, 35, 38, 46. 
12. Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America; Culture and 
Society in the Gilded Age (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 7; David Noble, 
The Progressive Mind. 1890-1917 (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1970, 3-4; 
Robert C. McMath Jr., American Populism; A Social History. 1877-1898 (New 
York: Hill euad Wang, 1993), 3-7. 
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government to the Country Life Movement's proposal of improving the 
standards of rural living. 
The transition over time from grassroots-farmer movements through 
middle-class reformer groups to organized political cheinge on a state and 
federal level, mirrored a change in the conceptualization of the problems 
facing America- Increasingly, reformers focused on the redemption of 
America through cleansing the cities not through reinforcing rural life. 
The nation finally adopted a Progressive rather than reactionary response, 
finding ways to revitalize democracy which incorporated the structural 
changes brought about by industrialization and urbzmization. Despite this, 
for a period of about twenty years, the problems of rviral America moved to 
center stage, and in their solution was seen the salvation of the nation. 
The continued flight of rural dwellers to the cities embodied the 
peiradox facing those concerned with urban decadence. Farmers and reformers 
alike, wanted to maintain a rural population in order to uphold a 
Jeffersonian base of yeomen. They firmly believed that this would sustain 
vital democratic traditions and provide an uplifting example for urban 
America. Thus the reformers, such as the Country Life commissioners, aimed 
to improve the life on the family farm, economically, socially, and 
materially, thereby making it more attractive and stable. 
The debate that ensued raised the question of who could legitimately 
prescribe for rural America. Americans, like Hill himself, had 
traditionally viewed agriculture as, "the natural and most desirable 
occupation for man." As such, the concept of expertise in agriculture 
presented an anomaly. However, the societal definition of "feirmer" proved 
far from monolithic and inflexible. Although still seen in terms of moral 
virtues, the occupational diversification created by the industrial 
revolution encouraged a growing conception of agriculture as a profession 
and not solely a set of character traits. This self-conscious sense of 
unity and distinctiveness among feunners, led to a proliferation of farm 
13. McMath, American Populism. 167-70; Lawrence Goodwyn, The 
Populist Moment; A Short History of Agrarian Revolt in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978), 90-93; David B. Dcuibom, The Resisted 
Revolution; Urban America and the Industrialization of Agriculture. 1900-
1930. (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979), 61-65. 
14. Willieim Cronon, Nature's Metropolis; Chicago and the Great West 
(W. W. Norton & Co., 1991), 357-64; Danbom, The Resisted Revolution. 
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organizations. These movements, in turn, dovetailed with a growing 
professional consciousness in America which resulted in people defining 
themselves by occupation rather than location. 
Traditional cultural assumptions about feirming hindered this move 
toward the consolidation of an occupational identity. The perception of 
agriculture as innate and vital to hnmanity, together with the late-
nineteenth-century trend toweurd specialization and expertise, resulted in a 
variety of groups laying claim to the title of agricultural expert. 
Sociologists, college professors, scientists, federal officials, 
businessmen, and farmers contested the nature of agricultural expertise 
and, by implication, the right to chart the future of American 
agriculture. 
The expansion of tertiary education at the end of the nineteenth 
century offered the nation a standeirdized method of adjudicating expertise: 
academic credentials. The formation of societies eind the establishment of 
educational criteria for admission to particular professions reflected 
increasing occupational distinction. In many areas, such as the social 
sciences, those outside academe resisted this standardization. 
Agriculture proved most resistant to academic direction. Cultural 
assvunptions about farming questioned the need for einything more than innate 
knowledge. In addition, taking farmers to universities made them 
subordinate to a new group. Engineers taught engineers, economists trained 
more economists, but scientists were to teach the feirmer to farm.^^ 
Farmers clearly wanted to benefit from the scientific and educational 
advances of their day and supported the right of their profession to 
15. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order. 1877-1920 (New York; 
Hill amd Wemg, 1967), xiii, 1-5. 
16. James J. Hill, Highways of Progress (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, Page & Compeuiy, 1910), 40; Alan I Marcus, "The Wisdom of the 
Body Politic: The Chsmging Nature of Publicly Sponsored Americsua 
Agricultural Research Since the 1830s," Agricultural History 62 (Spring 
1988): 7-9; Danbom, The Resisted Revolution: Alan I Meurcus Agricultural 
Science and the Quest for T.<»aiFctrmers. Agricultural Colleges, and 
Experiment Stations. 1870-1890 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1985); 
Alan I Marcus, "The Ivory Silo: Feurmer-Agricultural College Tensions in 
the 1870s emd 1880s," Agricultural History 60 (Spring 1986): 22-36. 
17. Mary 0. Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity; A Crisis in the 
Professionalization of American Social Science. 1865-1905 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1975), xii. 
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academic standardization. However, they resented the attempted usurpation 
of their expertise by university scientists and others. 
By the 1890s most people saw the universities as institutions that 
could identify and refine the scientific principles of agriculture eind 
teach these to students cind fcunners, but little consensus was reached on 
the nature of these principles. Farming organizations and universities 
debated endlessly the content of the syllabi and the methodology of 
teaching. Feunners thought that the basic teaching tool should be the 
college feirm. There, people who had proven themselves as successful 
farmers could research euid instruct students using practical demonstration. 
University personnel disagreed. They believed feunners incapable of 
deriving fcirming principles and relied on expert scientists to conduct 
necessary research and teaching. These scientists usually abstained from 
teaching practical farming or its mechanics, which seemed beneath their 
dignity. One group of academicians went so fatr as to claim educating 
feunners as unnecessary; instead they saw their mission as training the next 
generation of scientific investigators. Thus collegiate agricultural 
education saw a growing sense of professionalism eUid a growing disdain for 
the dirt farmer, the amateur, and the dilettamte. The farming community, 
on the other hand, saw the land greint schools, ostensibly founded for their 
benefit, wasting time euid money on abstract, theoretical research while 
neglecting practical education and development. 
Thrown into this struggle through corporate necessity. Hill developed 
his own conception of agricultural expertise. He concurred with the 
Progressive belief that agriculture needed to be more scientific eind 
businesslike, and he supported the need for experts to establish 
fundamental agrarian principles. At the same time, as a self-made mam, he 
believed that expertise could be established through means other than 
formal education. Thus, he viewed himself as an agricultural expert 
because of his practical experience and business acumen. 
Hill agreed with the farmers' argument that demonstration farming 
provided em ideal method of agricultural education. Hill saw these farms 
18. Ceurl W. Thompson and G. P. Warber, Social etnd Economic Survev of 
a Rural Township in Southern Minnesota (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1913), 47; Meurcus, "The Wisdom of the Body Politic," 4-26; 
Marcus, "The Ivory Silo," 28-31. 
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serving two purposes: to demonstrate technological eind scientific 
agricultural advemces such as new machinery and new breeds, and to teach 
farmers better methods and techniques of farming and feunn mcinagement. 
Demonstration farming would, therefore, expose agriculturists both to 
scientific developments and improved farming systems. 
Hill, like most feirmers, believed firmly in the efficacy of 
demonstration farms for educational purposes, but he also partially 
concurred with academia's promotion of scientific expertise. He made a 
point of hiring university professors to r\in his various agricultural 
programs, just as he used dealers to buy his art work. Throughout his 
involvement in agriculture. Hill Ccirefully sought out academics who sheired 
his views to use as educators, lecturers, researchers, and demonstrators. 
These experts helped Hill expand the profitability of his railroad empire 
as well as build up his own private farming enterprises. 
Many of these men sheured a common background with Hill. From staff 
hired for his first farm on Lake Minnetonka in 1880 to advising his son on 
the choice of veterinarian for the Northcote farm in 1914, Hill frequently 
employed Canadians. More specifically, he hired men from Ontario. These 
agriculturists shared many of Hill's ideas edDout farming, but to assert 
that they subscribed to a distinctive Canadiein farming style would be 
overstating the case. Rather, they demonstrate the subjectivity of Hill's 
conceptualization of agricultural expertise eind his ultimate relisuice on a 
buddy network instead of on scientific rationale. 
The synchronicity of a widespread concern about the future of 
America, the desire to reinvigorate the family farm, and the building of 
the Great Northern with its need for agricultural haulage, lent Hill a 
philosophy to undergird business necessity. Not only did he promote 
agricultural development to make his line pay, but also as the salvation of 
the nation. Hill could not separate his agricultural ideals from railroad 
economics eind, in the promotional work he undertook, the two intertwined 
19. James J. Hill to Henry Wallace (Uncle Henry), 28 August 1911, 
Letterbooks, James J. Hill Papers, Jeunes J. Hill Library, St. Paul, Minn.; 
Harry McDeeui, "Professionalism in the Rural Social Sciences," in The 
History of Rural Life in America, ed. Barbara R. Cotton (Washington, D.C.: 
Agricultural History Society, 1986), 179-86. 
12 
inextricably. Hill's conception of the needs of the nation and the feLrm 
melded perfectly, although unconsciously, with the needs of his 
corporation. Thus, Hill's involvement in the debates over agricultural 
development euid education embodied a unique perspective. Not fully 
identifying with academics, farmers, or bureaucrats. Hill's endeavors were 
consistently colored by their corporate origins. 
The conflict over agricultural expertise was largely decided during 
the course of Hill's life. By 1916, university experts had clearly gained 
ascendancy. Farmer deference to this group had been forged sporadically 
and regionally, based on a wide number of varicibles that included 
personalities, location, and economics. Although some pockets of 
resistance remained, it was generally acknowledged that academics would 
dictate the future of American agriculture. In refusing to concede defeat. 
Hill was, by his death, em anachronism, succoring his claim to expertise 
with outmoded principles. 
13 
THE GREAT ADVENTURE, 1878-1893 
In 1878 a forty-yeair-old James Jerome Hill working with three other 
investors—the fur trader Norman Kittson and financiers George Stephen euid 
John S. Kennedy—purchased the bankrupt St. Paul & Pacific Railroad. This 
line, joining the Mississippi River with the Red River of the North, was 
Minnesota's oldest operating railroad. It had started operation in 1862 
using the engine winiam Crooks which Hill, as wheurf master, had met at the 
St. Paul dock. The purchase of this railroad, connecting a wide, flat, 
fertile river valley to the booming mill town of Minneapolis, necessarily 
embroiled Hill in issues of agricultural development.^ 
At the time of purchase of the St. Paul & Pacific, Hill and his 
associates contracted to complete the St. Vincent Extension to the Canadian 
border by the end of 1878 or forfeit the line's leuid grants which totaled 
upwards of 850,000 acres. The managers of the line completed this 
challenge. However, they realized that leuid sales would not necesscirily 
prevent the bankruptcy so common to railroads. To do this, they needed to 
focus on increasing haulage to euid from St. Paul.^ 
To maximize profits obtainable through haulage in both directions, 
the valley had to be settled and productive. Hill approached this in two 
ways. He exploited the extant bonanza farming boom, huge wheat acreages 
producing solely for market which foreshadowed twentieth-century 
agribusiness. And he developed a vision of a sustainable agricultural 
community which he attempted to convey to the fsunners and settlers using 
marketing and educational techniques. 
The timing and location of the purchase of the St. Paul eUid Pacific 
proved auspicious. The Red River Valley in the late 1870s was a 
flourishing grain basket. The valley floor had been formed by the huge 
1. Ralph W. Hidy, Muriel E. Hidy, Roy V. Scott, euid Don L. 
Hofsommer, The Great Northern Railwav; A History (Cambridge: Harvard 
Business School Press, 1988), 5, 31; Albro Martin, James J. Hill and the 
Ooenina of the Northwest (1976; reprint, St. Paul: Minnesota Historical 
Society Press, 1991), 39, 45-46. 
2. Hidy, The Great Northern Railway. 30, 16; Meirtin, Jcunes J. Hill. 
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post-ice age Lake Agassiz which had increased in size as glaciers retreated 
northweurds, finally spilling into Hudson Bay. As the lake drained it left 
two smaller Icikes: Meinitoba and Winnipeg, with the Red River emptying into 
the latter. The cvirrent valley extends sdsout 325 miles north to south 
between Lake Traverse and Lake Winnipeg, and is 75 miles across at its 
widest.^ 
The soil is fertile, glacial till overlain with a porous mixture of 
clay, sand, and gravel, providing an easily drained subsoil. Flowing 
through the old lake bed, the river meeinders over a wide flood plain, 
distributing its load of rich alluvium in between gravel ridges formed by 
the beaches of the old leJce. The land was perfect for agricultural 
development: flat, treeless, and stoneless, awaiting only a sedentary 
population, transportation, and markets.'^ 
Immigrants to the Selkirk settlement in Canada grew wheat in the 
valley as early as 1820, but without a large market and facilities to reach 
it, agrarian development stalled. Rather, the valley's economic 
development centered around the fur trade as oxcarts, steamboats, and 
finally railroads moved pelts down the river to St. Paul. By the 1850s the 
Hudson's Bay Company shipped furs out of the hinterland via St. Paul which 
became the second largest fur mcirket in the United States after St. Louis. 
Hill entered this trade in 1860 as a young freight agent working with the 
well-established fur trader, Norman Kittson. Later they extended their 
involvement through a monopoly of steaimboats on the Red River in the early 
1870s.5 
The domineince of furs in the economy of the Red River Valley ended 
dramatically in the 1870s with a fineincial disaster. In 1873 the 
3. Stanley Norman Murray, The Vallev Comes of Aoe; A Historv of 
Agriculture in the Vallev of the Red River of the North. 1812-1920 (Fargo; 
North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, 1967), 4-11. 
4. Ibid; Rhoda R. Gilmeui, Carolyn Gilmein, and Deborah M. Stulz, The 
Red River Trails; Oxcart Routes Between St. Paul and the Selkirk 
Siai-Homent. 1820-1870 (St. Paul; Minnesota Historical Society Press, 
1979), 16. 
5. Hiram M. Drache, The Dav of the Bonanza; A Historv of Bonanza 
Farming in the Red River Vallev of the North (Fargo; North Dakota 
Institute for Regional Studies, 1964), 19-20, 38; Murray, The Vallev Comes 
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overextended Northern Pacific Railway went into receivership, bringing down 
the beinking empire of Jay Cooke and precipitating a national panic, James 
Buell Power, the general agent of the leind department of the Northern 
Pacific, believed that the only way to salvage the line was to sell off its 
enormous leuid grant. Northern Pacific personnel had to demonstrate the 
fertility and potential of the leuid to maximize its profitaibility. In 1874 
Power convinced George W. Cass, the railroad's president, to purchase 
13,440 acres in the Red River Valley emd turn it into a model wheat fsunn 
for advertising and promotion. In addition, many Northern Pacific 
bondholders took advantage of their right to exchange their now-worthless 
securities for large acreages of railroad land. Power did his best to 
ensure that those who obtained land, at least adjacent to the railway, had 
some intention of working it. Most buyers were orgemized speculators who 
pooled their resources in order to secure large acreages and hire the men 
necessary to farm them.® 
These bonanza feirms, created by financiers and speculators, had the 
advantage of being capital intensive. They utilized newly introduced farm 
machinery such as double gang plow and steam powered engines, which could 
only be fully profitable in an economy of scale. And the scale was 
enormous. Bonanza farms varied in size from one thousand to sixty-one 
thouseind acres, with an average field size of one section. On these farms, 
usually run by managers, huge ledDor forces raised a vast crop of wheat.^ 
Thus Power's scheme worked. The synchronous meeting of the fertile 
plains of the river valley, the development of leirge-scale farm machinery 
and of new milling processes which made Minneapolis the milling capital of 
the nation, a high Europeeua demand for Americem wheat, and improved 
transportation, resulted in a massive land boom. Land sales in the valley 
skyrocketed. The capital gained refloated the Northern Pacific, 
construction resumed, and the line reached the West Coast in 1883.® 
6. Drache, The Dav of the Bonanza. 38-39, 43; Murray, The Vallev 
Comes of Aae. 104-106; Stanley N. Murray, "Railroads and the Agricultural 
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Historv 31 (October 1957): 60. 
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Hill's railroad profited from this land boom. In May 1879 the 
original four pairtners formed a new corporation, the St. Paul, Minneapolis 
& Manitoba. The St. Paul & Pacific provided the basis for this new company 
which also included other smaller railroads, some of which had been 
purchased at a foreclosure sale. The new line sold nearly 180,000 acres of 
the original St. Paul & Pacific land grant by mid-1879. James Hill, as 
general manager of the line, paid particular interest to settling the land. 
He sent immigration agents to Europe, targeting Scemdinavia and Great 
Britain, and arreinged for editors of foreign language newspapers to tour 
the valley. He was helped by Power himself who left the Northern Pacific 
and came to work for the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba in late 1880.^ 
At the same time Hill benefited personally from boneinza fcirming, 
buying lands grsuited to the St. Paul & Pacific to establish his Humboldt 
farm. Hill first purchased land in the valley in December 1881 and 
building on the property begjin in July 1882. Hill paid $2.75 per acre, 
which was high compared to that paid by ecirlier boneinza f£irmers such as 
Oliver Dalrymple, a farm manager who also bought leuad for §1.40 per acre. 
However, by 1881 improved Red River land regularly fetched $20 to $37 per 
acre, while unimproved land from the Northern Pacific land grant had a list 
price of $7 per acre. Managers ran Hill's land using the techniques common 
on the huge boneuiza feirms but with only about three thousand acres in 
cultivation, considerably less than most bonanza farms. 
The bonanza farm boom thus brought profits to Hill and the St. Paul, 
Minneapolis & Meuiitoba through land sales. In addition. Hill determined to 
maximize his railroad's share of the haulage of wheat to the Minneapolis 
mills. To do this he focused on interlacing the valley with branch lines. 
The Northern Pacific management viewed the Red River Valley as a temporary 
9. Michael P. Malone, -TaTTK^g .t. Hill; Empire Builder of the 
Northwest (Normzui: University of Oklsihoma Press, 1996), 57-58, 89; Robert 
F. Zeidel, "Peopling the Empire; The Great Northern Railroad euid the 
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10. How£u:d Leigh Dickman, "Jeimes Jerome Hill and the Agricultural 
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source of finance through land sales, focusing on completing its 
treinscontinental line. Hill, on the other hand, viewed the valley as vital 
in the developing what historian Russell Kirby calls a "city-hinterland 
symbiosis." The St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba aimed to estciblish 
permanent economic bonds with the valley and its communities that would 
provide a solid foundation for further expansion. Hill succeeded in 
estcUslishing branch lines throughout the valley and in maximizing haulage. 
By the eatrly 1880s the valley itself generated more traffic for the road 
thein the St. Paul-Winnipeg connection. In the crop year 1878-1879 the 
railroad handled just over two million bushels of wheat from the valley. 
In less them a decade, this increased to over thirty-seven million bushels. 
This rate of haulage provided the justification for the fineincial backing 
Hill received to push the railroad further west.^^ 
Despite the profits ensuing from his tactics. Hill believed that 
large corporate bonemza feirms would not maximize traffic from the valley 
permanently. American railroads had traditionally produced maximum income 
when operating in densely settled regions. Extensive land grants and 
company bankruptcies testified to the problems of financing railroad 
construction in the speursely settled West. Consequently, for security, 
most railmen wanted to create networks to mirror those in the East which 
often meant heavy investment in settlement promotion and town-building. 
In addition. Hill believed that monocrop agriculture, as exemplified 
in the bonanza farms, would prove vulnerable to climatic and economic 
vicissitudes. This reflected his Canadieui origin. In the late 1850s 
Ontario feirmers, suffering from the wheat midge amd winter desiccation of 
fall wheat, diversified by supplying animal products for the expanding 
urban market. Hill, witnessing this transition to ein apparently more 
sustainable, profitable agricultural system, became committed to the 
efficacy of diversified agriculture as opposed to monocropping. Throughout 
11. Murray, The Valley Comes of Aae. 124-5; Russell S. Kirby, 
"Nineteenth-Century Patterns of Railroad Development," Great Plains 
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"Minnesota Railroads," August 1993, Teacher Conference at the Minnesota 
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his life. Hill consistently drew his agricultural ideas from his Canadian 
background and from fellow Canadians. 
Hill fought against the tendency toweurd large, capital-intensive, 
single crop farms, constantly promoting the diversified, small-scale family 
farm. In this, he joined many contemporary agricultural experts, academic 
and otherwise, in America as well as Ccinada. Settlers, politicians, 
agricultural scientists, and businessmen wamted the plains states to 
emulate the small, diversified farms of Iowa eind Wisconsin amd thus, 
hopefully, achieve similar prosperity. Therefore, while completing the 
Great Northern Railway, the endeavor Hill saw as his "great adventure," to 
Puget Sound in Washington State, he focused his agricultural energies on 
trying to establish a series of small, diversified feunns in the Red River 
Valley. 
In order to promote his vision of agriculture Hill first tried to 
establish himself as an agricultural expert and then devise effective means 
of disseminating his ideas to the farming community along his railroad. 
For the first, he chose to forge an identity for himself as a traditional 
gentleman farmer. As this tactic proved ineffective he shifted to a more 
indirect approach; influencing farmers through promoting and sponsoring 
other groups eind institutions concerned with rural improvement. 
The gentleman farmer was a phenomenon most associated with the 
agricultural revolution in Engleuid. These feirmers, emerging in the early 
sixteenth century in southeastern England, held more land than they could 
personally farm and so used capital to employ leibor to work the land. 
Sometimes they acted as foremen and sometimes they refrained from manual 
leibor altogether. These leirge-scale feirmers sold their surplus to growing 
urbein markets, thus increasing the capital base of their operations. As 
various agricultural innovations were introduced in England during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the gentleman fcunner both had the 
money to implement them amd stood to profit most from those that favored 
economies of scale. The gentlemen farmers had the money and time to invest 
12. Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (1931; reprint, Lincoln; 
University of Nebraska Press, 1959), 273-74; Marvin Mclnnis, "The Chemging 
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in agricultiiral experimentation and the diffusion of new ideas. Thus, this 
class of farmers disseminated new crops such as sainfoin euid turnips, bred 
better fairm suiimals, and introduced technologies such as floating 
watermeadows. 
The gentlemem farmer crossed the Atlantic, becoming established 
especially in the South, where capital-intensive, commercial agriculture 
quickly became the dominant economy. In the late eighteenth century, the 
concept of agricultural development dovetailed with the messages of the 
Enlightenment. The faith in man's reason and in his ability to observe and 
understand the world around him, set a good ideological stage for rich 
southern farmers to experiment and improve their operations. These 
feunners, from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Ruff in, imported stock from 
Europe, tested soils and fertilizers, and experimented with different crop 
rotations. They also founded agricultural societies and newspapers, 
sponsoring private research confident that "the accumulated wisdom of 
American farmers would unfailingly produce definitive results in the 
future. 
To estsUalish his credentials as a practical and experimental fcunner. 
Hill followed this early lead. He established a number of farms throughout 
Minnesota on which he supervised breeding and cultivation experiments. 
Some of these farms supplied the family with supplies and acted as country 
estates, an important part of the gentleman farmer image. Hill also 
developed a network with other breeders and gentlemen farmers throughout 
the nation. 
James J. Hill had been closely connected to farms all his life, 
having been born on one in Ontcurio. Once in Minnesota, he cuid his family 
rented a farm for a few yesirs in the 1870s. In 1880 Hill bought his first 
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farm, Hillier, on Lake Minnetonka. The next year he purchased Humboldt in 
the Red River Valley, cuid in 1883 he started acquiring land north of St. 
Paul which would become North Oeiks. 
In 1871 James and his wife, Mary, moved with their two young children 
from their first house on Canada and Pearl in St. Paul's Lowertown to a 
cottage at the junction of Ninth cuid Cemada streets. In 1876 the family, 
complete with two more children, Louis and Clara, vacated the property for 
two years while a new house of white brick was built. During this time the 
family rented a seven-acre farm on Dayton's Bluff belonging to the Ycindis 
family. The feunn's stone house served as their main residence during these 
years and saw the birth of their sixth child, Charlotte (their fifth child, 
Katherine, having died in 1876). The house was, according to the Hills' 
daughter, Clcura, fairly primitive. "It was such a home as one could have 
found two hundred years ago. It stood on a street and had neighbors, but 
water was supplied by a well, and there was no plumbing or furnace or 
lighting system." In addition to serving as a residence, the feirm supplied 
the family with all its fruit and vegetable needs as well as with dairy 
produce. None of the Hills actually worked on the fcunn. Meiry Hill spent 
much time traveling in the East after Katherine's death. Hill commuted 
daily to St. Paul by wagon with the two eldest children and "often followed 
by a goat."^® 
In 1880, two yeeirs after the completion of his new house in St. Paul, 
Hill purchased 160 acres on Crystal Bay, Laike Minnetonka which he named 
"Hillier." In 1882 Samuel J. Wetherald, a railroad employee of Hill's and 
son of his old schoolteacher, William Wetherald, wrote to Alfred Spencer of 
Fonthill, Ontario, asking him to run the Hillier property.^' 
Despite his continuing claims to scientific agriculture. Hill's 
hiring processes reflected use of more subjective criteria. Throughout his 
Ccireer in America, Hill repeatedly hired men from Onteirio to help him with 
his agricultural endeavors. Wetherald eind Spencer may have been the first. 
Whatever information he absorbed as an adult, he never strayed feir from the 
16. Cleura Lindley, Unpublished Reminiscences, James J. Hill House, 
St. Paul, Minnesota (hereafter JJHH), 124. 
17. The property was also referred to as "Maryhill." 
21 
farming techniques he had observed as a boy, and he consistently hired men 
from the same background as himself. 
Hill originally intended the property on Lake Minnetonka as "a farm 
eind meirket garden." It provided the family with produce. It functioned as 
a country estate which tied into the creation of eui image as gentleman 
farmer. In Wetherald's letters to Spencer this became clear, "He [Hill] 
would want to send his children out there in summer . . . would probably 
weuit pet animals, garden plants emd flowerbeds. 
More importantly. Hill wanted "some competent person near by to take 
charge [of the] feirm . . . and raise the eeirly vegetables, small fruits, 
keep a dairy," to provision the new "magnificent" Layfayette Hotel which 
the St. Paul, Pacific & Msuiitoba was building on the lake. Hill intended 
that his railroad would bring the wealthy of the Twin Cities to this hotel, 
exploiting the position of Lake Minnetonka as a fashionaible resort and 
setting a precedent for railroad tourism which his son, Louis, would later 
explore to the full with his development of Glacier National Peirk. The 
farm would allow his family to mingle with the vacationing elite.^0 
At Hillier, Hill first launched a traditional gentlemein faurmer 
program of experimentation. Given his concern about the monocropping in 
the Red River Valley and his advocacy of diversification, he naturally 
inclined towsurd stock breeding. In 1882 Hill bought two ceirloads of "femcy 
breeding cattle and sheep" from Scotland including, "5 of the Prize animals 
of last year in Scotland including Lord Chancellor." At Hillier he 
experimented crossing Angus heifers with his new Shorthorn bulls. 
Ultimately he aimed at increasing the number and improving the quality of 
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cattle (with a lesser emphasis on sheep and hogs) along his line, thus 
maximizing revenue for both the farmers and the railroad. 
Hill Weinted to demonstrate the importance of quality stock. Most 
people interested in improving American agriculture agreed that maintaining 
blooded stock was more productive than raising native cattle. 
Unfortunately, many feirmers could not afford to buy purebred cattle. Hill 
and other agricultural educators countered that buying purebred stock was, 
in fact, cheaper than raising scrubs (native, unblooded cattle) because it 
maximized livestock profits. Hill backed this assertion with hcird figures. 
"An animal weighing 1600 or 1800 pounds, worth 6c a pound cein be raised for 
less money than one weighing 1300 pounds that will sell for 41/2c per 
pound."22 
Hill strayed from the conventional wisdom of the universities by 
stressing dual-purpose cattle as a supplement to grain income. He believed 
in the possibility of crossbreeding cattle to create an optimal strain 
whereby the cows would give leirge quantities of quality milk eind the steers 
would yield high quality beef. This would solve the problem of the high 
cost of beef cattle and the vulnerability of dairy herds to the extreme 
cold on the northern prairies and plains.23 
This emphasis on multiple-use cattle on the part of Hill was not 
totally eccentric. Generally, university personnel rarely advocated dual-
purpose cattle, favoring instead either a dairy or a beef focus. However, 
the scrub cattle often kept by farmers usually provided both milk and meat, 
and a strong minority of agricultural experts, including some at the 
universities, showed interest in dual-purpose stock. This idea of 
diversification through dual-purpose cattle represented one of the first 
identifiable components of Hill's agricultural philosophy, and all his 
later university friends espoused it. Professor Thomas Shaw, a fellow 
Canadian, head of animal husbeuidry at the University of Minnesota, and 
later agricultural expert for the Great Northern euid Northern Pacific, 
advocated dual-purpose cattle. Shaw's successor at the university, and 
21. Hill to Richeird Fitzgerald, railroad agent, 9 November 1882; to 
P. H. Tompkins, 19 December 1882, Letterpress Books, JJHP; Dickmaua, "Jaunes 
Jerome Hill," 77. 
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another of Hill's friends, Andrew Boss, experimented with a dual-purpose 
herd as late as 1930.^4 
Dual-purpose cattle had a pragmatic appeal. They required less time 
and Icibor than blooded stock, were cheaper, and involved less risk than 
launching a full-blown dairy or beef operation, and support for them 
continued long after Hill's death. During the Great Depression, when 
feunners struggled for some form of finsmcial security and had little 
capital to invest, the University of Minnesota's Agricultural Experiment 
Station produced a bulletin evaluating the variables involved in raising 
beef cattle and dual-purpose cattle. The authors concluded that: 
A milk-and-beef herd involves less risk than a beef herd, both 
because of the smaller investment and because of the production of 
both dairy products and cattle for sale. Less skill was used in 
the selection of the breeding stock and in the fattening of the 
cattle than in the beef herds. . . . However, they do not offer 
possibilities of as large profits as may be obtained with either a 
beef or a dairy herd. The milk-and-beef cows are not capable of 
producing large quantities of dairy products economically, nor of 
raising the highest quality beef calves."^5 
The central issue at stake in the debate over dual-purpose cattle 
really involved the promotion of two different systems of farming. Hill 
advocated the use of livestock in a program of diversification. Having 
witnessed the success of diversification in restoring agricultural 
productivity in Onteirio, Hill argued that the forage available in Minnesota 
could produce a "beef and dairy yield equal in value to the entire wheat 
crop of the state. 
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American agricultural scientists, such as Andrew Boss, supported this 
idea, arguing that dual-purpose stock did present the most efficient and 
profitable solution to farmers when seen in the context of a diversified 
agriculture. The proponents of dairy and beef cattle, such as Theophilus 
Haecker, represented early boosters for agricultural specialization. For 
them, a single agricultural focus was the ultimate method of maximize a 
farm's profit potential. 
Disagreement over dual-purpose cattle represented part of a Icurger 
argument concerning the role of science in agriculture and agricultural 
education. In the late nineteenth century scientists professionalized, 
creating specific educational requirements to maintain their elite 
position. Farmers met this elitism with disdain, seeing agricultural 
research as fundamentally based in practical skills. The conflict focused 
on the work of the agricultural experiment stations, where opposition from 
farmers and politicians often stymied attempts to conduct "pure" research. 
The same antagonism existed among the stations' faculty, as formally 
uneducated farm boys reached professorial positions and clashed with 
trained professionals. The former tended to stress practical research and 
educational outreach, the latter emphasized modes of ideal production, 
irrespective of cost, and resented the demands of fairmers on their time.^^ 
These problems of research emd education in agricultural science 
peuralleled Hill's career, influencing many of his decisions, as he 
consistently sided with the old-school farmers, researchers, and teachers. 
Reflected in his desire to establish small-scale diversified feirms and in 
his advocacy of practical farmer education through demonstration farms. 
Hill's alliance was also evident in his continual promotion of dual-purpose 
cattle. 
Thus as a gentleman farmer. Hill tried to estaiblish stock, bred from 
pure lines, where the bulls would provide quality beef and the cows a leurge 
quantity of good milk. Hill believed that improved production would meJce 
diversification more attractive to the farmer by increasing profitability. 
Hillier saw the birth of this program which later dominated much of the 
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work at the North Oaks and Northcote farms. Hillier also had sheep, with 
em estimated flock of forty head by the summer of 1883.28 
Hillier failed to serve Hill's purpose for very long. He soon 
recognized that the scope of his agricultural interests could not be 
accommodated on 160 acres. In addition, he lost interest in hotel 
management. Therefore, Hill rented the hotel to Eugene Mehl in 1883 and 
the same year purchased North Oaks. The new feirm, ten miles north of St. 
Paul, proved "commodious" and dramatically halted the pleuis for development 
of the Hillier farm. The livestock moved to North Oaks in September of 
1883, and Hillier was rented out. Hill did not sell the faunn on Lake 
Minnetonka until 1903 when lumber baron and friend Thomas Shevlin bought 
it. 29 
In many respects the most important of all the Hills' farms was the 
five thousand acres which eventually made up North Oaks. In 1883, shortly 
after completing the purchase of Humboldt and three years after buying 
Hillier, Hill purchased three thousand acres from Charles Gilfillan for 
$50,000. Over the next few years he bought two thousand more acres in 
small sections.^® 
North Oaks acted as a country estate. Hill kept it stocked with game 
birds, and the family often spent months at a time living there, especially 
in the summer. The land was decorated for pleasurable visits with flowers 
and shrubs. In 1888 the flower order included: columbine, auricula, 
candytuft, sweet peas, poppies, morning glories, cosmos, clematis, 
feverfew, forget-me-nots, gladiolas, french honeysuckle, lavender, 
nasturtiums, ceirnations, calendula, marigolds, sweet alyssum, asters, 
dianthus, hydrangeas and sunflowers. In addition, the farm provided the 
family's main residence at 240 Summit Avenue, St. Paul, with vegetables, 
eggs, milk, fruit and fresh flowers transported daily by Ccirt.^^ 
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North Oaks was also an important feirm in its own right. From 1883 to 
1893 it operated as a stock farm and a base for Hill's search for the 
perfect dual-purpose cow. Hill's initial approach to this problem 
continued his earlier work at Hillier. He tried to develop beef cattle 
with good dairy qualities. Overall he favored Scottish Shorthorn and Angus 
beef cattle, breeding them to try and increase their milk yield. In 1885 
he wrote to a fellow farmer, C. L- Van Fleet of Marshall, Minnesota, "As to 
milk, I have Polled Angus cows that have given me from 26 to 28 queirts a 
day from grass for six months at a time, and I have one family of 
Shorthorns . . . that gives from 20 to 25 quarts a day.''^^ 
To steurt a herd with the best bloodlines available Hill imported 
purebred cattle from Great Britain at tremendous cost. In 1886 he shipped 
six Shorthorn cattle and thirty-five Polled Angus over from Liverpool. 
Perhaps because of his Canadian connections, he chose to bring the stock in 
through Ccinada rather than New York. The cattle spent the winter in 
queireintine in Quebec because of cases of pleuro-pneumonia in the herd and 
did not reach the farm until May 1887. The total cost was $15,667.80.^^ 
Hill wanted to determine the optimum feed for maximized livestock 
production. Feeding experiments started in the early years at North Oaks-
In 1886 Hill wrote to the editor of the Farmers Advocate and Northwestern 
Stockman that a combination of turnips, beets, Ccibbages, hay, and oilcake 
provided better winter feed than corn. Two years later the National 
Livestock Journal discussed Hill's use of root vegetables, clover, and corn 
as feed.^'^ 
This use of root crops for forage had its basis in England, as Hill 
acknowledged, and had come to him by way of Canada. Ontario farmers 
regularly grew a sizable amount of root crops for fodder, dominantly mangel 
wurzels jind turnips. The acreage of Onteirio farmland invested in root 
1888 flower order. North OeJcs papers, JJHP; John Hasslen, interviewed by 
Betsy Doermann and Ellen Rosenthal, 24 November 1981, JJHH. 
32. Hill to Vsm Fleet, 27 Jemuary 1885, Letterpress Books, JJHP. 
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crops in 1895 represented 20 percent of the land planted in wheat. In 
contrast, the next year. North Dakota's root crop only represented 0.02 
percent of the wheat acreage. Hill ordered seed for rutcibagas eind turnips 
from Toronto, trying to grow plants which had adapted to a harsher 
environment.^ ^ 
Hill's interest at this time was not just limited to cattle. The 
North Oaks' letterhead from 1887 listed him as cin "Importer and Breeder of 
Short-Horn, Aberdeen-Angus and Jersey Cattle; Cleveland Bay Horses 
Shropshire eind HighleUid Black-faced Sheep. Cob Ponies; Berkshire Swine." 
He bred purebred pigs, buying Pilot, a prize-winning Berkshire boar, from a 
farmer in Edmonton in December 1887, cind he sold many purebred Berkshire 
pairs throughout this period at ten dollars per pair. In 1888 his interest 
turned to poultry, cuid he acquired some Mammoth Bronze turkeys, some Black 
Cochin cockerels, emd some Plymouth Rock cockerels. He also had various 
breeds of sheep and horses.^® 
The work at North Oaks involved a huge financial turnover. In 1888 
Hill's income from the farm was $30,673.66; $25,040.99 from the sale of 
livestock, $640.65 from the sale of meat, hides and tallow, $2,395.08 from 
dairy produce, $1,407.03 from fruit, vegetables, eggs, and grain, $267.48 
from firewood and $922.43 from sundries. Expenses totaling $32,614.78 
offset this income. Herein lay part of the reason for his failure to 
influence feirmers through example: the majority of farmers not only lacked 
huge sums of money to invest in experimentation, but they could not afford 
any year-end loss on their operations.^^ 
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During these eeirly yeeirs. Hill involved himself actively in the 
business of farming. He dealt with much of the agricultural correspondence 
himself. He ordered supplies, paid, or at least saw, all the farm bills, 
established retail eirrangements, amd hired staff. He also spent much time 
at the farm enjoying his herds. He appreciated the value of his farm for 
demonstration purposes, sending railroad passes to farmers to visit North 
Oaks. Through his work at North Oaks, Hill gained the knowledge necessary 
to qualify as a farmer. For this knowledge to operate as cin effective 
educational tool, however, he needed to turn it into a reputation. 
With the purchase of good quality stock, involvement in agricultural 
shows, breeding smd feeding experiments, and correspondence with other 
breeders euid the agricultural press. Hill used the methods of eighteenth-
century gentlemen farmers combined with modern science to established 
himself as an agricultural expert. North Oaks gained a reputation for 
quality stock among other breeders. Hill had large euinual sales which were 
featured in all the major stock magazines. For the 1887 sale, which Hill 
held jointly with lumber baron Nathaniel Parker Clarke of St. Cloud, 
catalogs were sent to 182 people in Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Dakota, 
Kansas, Montana, and Indiana. These farmers, already stockbreeders, had, 
unlike the majority of their professional peers, the financial eUaility to 
sustain their convictions.^^ 
Hill's status as a gentleman farmer was also acknowledged through 
competition. From 1885 Hill entered animals in the Fat Stock Show in 
Chicago and consistently walked away with prizes. In 1887 "the superior 
quality of the stock on exhibition at Chicago," prompted the secretary the 
Illinois State Board of Agriculture, Charles Mills, to suggest that the 
next show should be held in St. Paul. Two years later Hill won $705 at the 
show for his Aberdeen Angus and Shorthorns.'^® 
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Hill's agricultural influence extended to other groups interested in 
agricultural development. An active member of the Minnesota State 
Agricultural Society; he donated money, built railroad tracks to the fair 
grounds, and regularly "delivered interesting and valuable addresses." He 
viewed the society and the fair as vehicles for buttressing his credentials 
cind extending his influence over fanners- He exhibited his cattle, 
refusing all premiums. This steirted in 1886 with heifers, produced from 
his prize Shorthorn bull, Berkeley, Duke of Oxford II, being bred, "upon 
his grand broad-backed, deep ribbed Scotch show-cows." By this point, many 
members of the society acknowledged his expertise, and Hill received eleven 
votes for president of the organization in the annual election, even though 
he was not on the ballot. 
Unfortunately, most of the men involved in the Minnesota State 
Agricultural Society had little influence with respect to agricultural 
change. Like Hill himself, many of them were businessmen and politicians. 
Some, like Cleurke and Carson N. Cosgrove, maintained herds and demonstrated 
interest in breeding experiments emulating Hill's gentleman farmer role, 
while others had no agricultural connection at all.'^2 
As well as local businessmen, Hill did convince others of his claim 
to expertise, or at least of the quality of his stock, including university 
men. Theophilus Haecker, the professor of dairy husbeuidry at the 
University of Minnesota, recognized his breeding efforts and purchased 
animals from North Oaks, as did the Dakota Agricultural College. By the 
late 1880s, then. Hill had established a reputation as an expert among a 
group of rich fcirmers and agricultural scientists in the Midwest. He 
achieved this by developing his farms into model, scientifically run, 
diversified establishments and publicizing his accomplishments.^^ 
In addition. Hill worked to convince his national business peers of 
the applicediility of his agricultural ideas, especially meat-packing mogul, 
41. Darwin S. Hall and R. I. Holcombe, History of the Minnesota 
State Agricultural Society from its Organization in 1854 to the Annual 
Meeting of 1910 (St. Paul: McGill-Warner Company, 1910), 200, 273; "An 
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Philip Armour- He sent Armour samples of his Angus beef. Armour was duly 
impressed, saying "I never ate a better piece of meat in my life" and 
distributing more than a hundred roasts from three of Hill's cattle to 
people in New York, Chicago, and Milwaukee. More important in spreading 
his ideas throughout the railroad's territory, and harder, was to determine 
methods to convey his expert knowledge to the farmers, convincing them of 
his qualifications for expertise. Hill needed to find ways to convert his 
reputation into an educational tool.^^ 
Having estciblished himself as cin expert among a feunning elite who had 
money to attend stock shows and time to invest in the Minnesota 
Agricultural Society, Hill needed different tactics to reach grassroots 
fcunners. He chose to approach them as equals. Unlike many academic 
experts who, "don't know enough to put a crop in the ground or to hoe a row 
of turnips," Hill offered practical expertise.'^^ 
Thus, although he publicly supported universities. Hill aligned 
himself with the farmers. In speeches promoting his prime interests— 
diversification, crop rotation, and soil conservation—he relied on his 
fcurming experiences to esteiblish his agricultural authority. He reguleurly 
referred to his farms, describing himself as "farming by proxy." This 
helped distinguish him from professors and thus avoid being implicated in 
attacks on effete, book-learnt, agricultural scientists.^® 
Initially Hill approached the matter of feirmer education 
simplistically. Following the traditions of the eighteenth-century 
gentlemen farmers, he believed that the example of his successes would be 
sufficient to convince others of the efficacy of his notions. Thus part of 
44. Philip Armour to James J. Hill, 1 December 1885, General 
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his educational approach during these early yeeurs involved leading by 
example. 
Hill encouraged farmers to visit his farm at North Oaks, in addition, 
he allowed the farm to be used as a practical demonstration feirm for the 
agricultural classes at the university. In 1891 the University of 
Minnesota's magazine reported, "Prof. Hays recently took his class of 
thirty-five in euiimal husbandry to visit the magnificent stock farm of 
President J. J. Hill, north of St. Paul. It was a jolly picnic for the 
boys, and they appreciated the practical lessons, pointed out by the 
professor." Such outings seemed trivial, but they did expose farmers and 
farmers-to-be to Hill's up-to-date methods and techniques in a congenial 
eind, perhaps, persuasive manner. He also spread his expertise and 
knowledge through letter communication with feunners. At this time. Hill 
cinswered much of his agricultural correspondence personally. This involved 
exchcinges with other interested parties about the advantages of different 
breeds and the exchange eind collection of a Veiriety of seed.^^ 
In reality. Hill often preached to the converted, and thus his impact 
remained highly circumscribed. Farmers who showed interest in visiting 
North Oaks, agricultural students at the university, and breeders 
exchanging information, represented a group of agriculturists already 
convinced of the importance of the need for a scientific, or at least 
quasi-scientific, approach to farming. The bulk of farmers in the region 
lacked the time, money, and inclination to visit a rich man's farm or to 
correspond with him, and continued to practice the types of agriculture 
which seemed most productive to them. In addition, many resented the 
implied allocation of blame. Hill, like other rural reformers, saw the 
basis of the national farming problem lying in the inefficiency of the 
farmer. Many farmers countered that the undervaluing of their occupation 
in Aaieric£ui society at large represented the core issue. 
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To reach these men, at least those in the Red River Valley, Hill, 
through the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Meinitoba railway, started drainage 
schemes in the valley. He aimed both to improve the railroad's lands for 
sale, and also to demonstrate to local farmers the advantages of improving 
agriculture scientifically. 
The Red River Valley, on the Minnesota side, divided into three 
topographical regions running north to south. The two regions to the west 
and east had sufficient gradient eind natural streams to remain well 
drained. The middle region, however, did not. Consequently, the fetrmers 
in this cirea faced the damger of early seeding being destroyed by frost, 
which the damp soil exacerbated. One solution was to lay tile drainage 
systems throughout the valley which would help chemnel the excess water off 
the land and, through drainage ditches, back into the river. 
Floods also posed a problem to railroad operation as they could wash 
out the tracks. To prevent this, the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba cut 
an aggregate of forty-five miles of ditch in Kittson, Normein, Polk, and 
Clay Counties in 1879 cind 1880. Later, to improve the land of the St. 
Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba for potential purchasers, the railroad's 
engineers built outlet canals connecting closed watercourses such as the 
Sand Hill and Wild Rice Rivers to the Red River at the cost of several 
thouseind dollars. This drained the railroad's land but antagonized 
neighboring farmers, who sued the railroad for the supposed flooding of 
their lamd. According to Hill, the charges were generally unfounded as the 
farmers' Icinds "were benefitted by the better drainage facilities," but the 
suits "aggregated an amount of neeirly $100,000, and the Compsmy was forced 
to a heavy expense in defending them." In the end, mciny of the verdicts 
went against the railway. 
Despite his efforts to identify himself with the farmers amd 
esteiblish himself as an agricultural expert. Hill's first lairge-scale 
attempt to influence farmer practice failed. Settlers in the Red River 
Valley did not follow the railroad's lead in drainage and, moreover, they 
sued the railroad for the work it undertook. The image of Hill as a 
49. Ben Palmer, "Swamp Land Drainage with Special Reference to 
Minnesota," University of Minnesota, Studies in the Social Sciences, 
Bulletin 5 (March 1915): 64. 
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successful feirmer, amd thus worth emulating, had not taken hold. To lend 
more credence to his claims of expertise, Hill chemged his agricultural 
policy. Drainage in the valley represented the last attempt of the 
railroad to improve agriculture unilaterally for at least twenty-five 
yeeurs. From this point on, the railroad and Hill were cautious to operate 
in conjunction with other orgsinizations whether governmental, academic, or 
local, when promoting on-site improvements.^® 
This concern first became apparent in the continued issue of drainage 
in the Red River Valley. Hill backed out of private corporate drainage 
attempts, but some locals noted the good effects of the St. Paul, 
Minneapolis & Manitoba's few miles of ditch, eind interest in drainage grew. 
Hill capitalized on this interest, sponsoring a drainage convention in 
Crookston in 1886. At this meeting. Hill suggested that drainage projects 
should be funded directly from assessments of the leinds which benefited. 
This made locals nervous, as no-one could provide an estimate of the final 
cost. Thus the convention decided that the first order of business was a 
topographical survey of the valley to determine the potential for drainage. 
Hill paid half the cost of this survey (five thouscind dollars), and 
obtained the services of hydraulic engineer. Professor Fanning, to 
undertake the work under the direction of Charles G. Elliott a drainage 
engineer from Illinois. The results of the survey demonstrated the 
feasibility of drainage in the area, calling for 275 miles of ditch at an 
estimated cost of $750,000. The reconvened convention decided to push for 
state intervention to finance and complete the work.^^ 
The group, under the leadership of Ezra Valentine, one of Hill's 
lawyers in the valley, lobbied the state for appropriate legislation. This 
came in 1893 with a law to conduct drainage work in "the counties of 
Wilkin, Clay, Normem, Polk, Marshall, Kittson, Grant and Traverse." The 
law appropriated $25,000 to be spent annually for four years on this work. 
In addition, it specified that no money should be paid out of the state 
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treasury for any work until the Great Northern Railway Company had 
deposited $6,250 toward the drainage each yeeur.^^ 
Although pleased with the act. Hill was unhappy about the state 
appropriation of compeuiy funds as "the Great Northern Compcuiy cannot and 
will not allow the State to appropriate money for it to pay." He 
understood that the compemy should pay for any benefit to land it owned, 
but argued that the Great Northern owned no land in the valley. The 
federal government had grauited public domain to the St. Paul & Pacific 
which the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba assumed on becoming the parent 
corporation. In September 1889 Hill formed a new company named the Great 
Northern Railway. The Great Northern established a 999-year lease of the 
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba, so that they could operate in 
conjunction, but they remained, legally, separate corporations. Hill 
finessed the potential conflict with the state by paying the money on 
behalf of the Manitoba company which had "a large block of land on the Sand 
Hill River, South of Crookston, that would be benefited by the opening of 
that river." The work went ahead, with Erza Valentine and N. D. Miller, 
the chief engineer of the Great Northern being appointed to the Board of 
Audit by Governor Knute Nelson. 
By working through businesses eind a group of influential local 
farmers wealthy enough to benefit from technological advances, and by 
mobilizing the power of state legislation. Hill meinaged to achieve 
successful drainage in the Red River Valley. Thus Hill learnt the value of 
cooperation with other institutions to implement agricultural change which, 
"The majority of the people [the average feunners in the valley]- . . did 
what they could to prevent. 
Hill's attempts to educate farmers through personal or corporate 
example had very limited success. The feirmers who displayed interest in 
52. Palmer, "Sweunp Land Drainage," 66-69; General Laws of Minnesota 
for 1893, Chapter 221, "An Act to Appropriate Moneys for the Purpose of 
Opening of Closed Watercourses ..." 371-72. 
53. Hill to Donaldson, 19 June 1893, Letterpress Books; Knute Nelson 
to Hill, 15 July 1893, General Correspondence, JJHP; Malone, Jciines J. Hill. 
128-29; Mercer, Railroads and Land Grant Policy. 58-59, Mercer's book gives 
the year of incorporation of the Great Northern as 1885, all other 
references give 1889, Meurtin, James J. Hill. 376-78; Hidy et al.. The Great 
Northern Railwav. 72-73. 
54. Hill to M. S. Merager, 21 May 1889, Letterpress Books, JJHP. 
35 
his ideas were those already open to concepts of agricultural development 
and who had already embcirked on improving their methods. Hill's Ccurefully 
cultivated persona as a scientific gentleman farmer influenced only those 
with the money, interest, euid knowledge to invest in agricultural 
improvements. Hill' s attempts to reach the bulk of feunners directly 
through local example resulted in lawsuits against the railroad. What he 
did discover was the efficacy of promoting ideas through local 
orgeinizations and of utilizing institutional power to effect chemge. 
Hill also tried philanthropy to reach the fanners and encourage them 
to chcuige their methods. He understood the role of money in facilitating 
change and that many farmers lacked the capital necessciry to purchase 
quality cattle in order to maximize livestock productivity. His initial 
response to this was very in keeping with the gentleman feirmer image. As 
early as 1883 he envisioned breeding quality animals at North Ociks for 
annual distribution to farmers. He postulated that he would start small, 
distributing only four bulls the first yecir, products from the stock 
imported in 1883.^^ 
By the summer of 1884 he realized that breeding cattle for 
distributing would be time-consuming and changed his plans. He distributed 
imported cattle directly, giving away 143 purebred bulls from 1884 to 1885. 
Hill donated the cattle to fcirmers along the St. Paul, Pacific and Manitoba 
railway in thirty-one counties of Minnesota cind North Dedcota, in order to 
improve the general quality of stock throughout the area. Farmers received 
bulls on condition that for four years they allowed their neighbors access 
to the bulls' services for a nominal one dollcir charge (which would 
hopefully cover the cost of keeping eUid caring for the animal). The 
animals also had to be ceired for according to specific guidelines and, if 
sick, receive treatment from a veterineirisui chosen by Hill. Thus when the 
bull given to P. S. Lay fell ill in November 1885, Hill arranged for the 
cuiimal to be shipped to Grand Forks so veterineiriein, Dr. Alloway, could 
perform surgery. 
Hill's generosity in this matter continued until the end of the 
decade. In 1885 he distributed about a hundred bulls and had thousands of 
55. Hill to Andrew Nelson, Litchfield, Minn-, 1 April 1884, North 
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applications from farmers. In 1886 he expended $34,111.11 on placement of 
bulls, and in 1890 Hill placed Alloway, now superintendent of North OsJcs, 
in charge of distributing two carloads of Angus amd Shorthorn cattle and 
one carload of Berkshire pigs in North O£ikota along the line west of 
Larrimore. To encourage interest in the cattle he distributed. Hill 
offered prizes at various county fairs for the best offspring of cattle 
distributed by him, as well as for the best grade cattle. 
Although Hill personally distributed cattle along his line from 1884 
to 1890, his philanthropy proved considereJsly less effective than he had 
hoped. Farmers failed to look after the cattle properly. They either did 
not realize the time and effort necesscury to raise quality stock or were 
not prepared to invest it. Farmers tried to treat quality stock the same 
way as they had always treated the scrub cattle maintained for home 
production. As historian David Danbom contends, although understanding the 
theoretical benefits of diversification, many farmers remained primarily 
grain farmers, placing the needs of wheat production eibove all else. Thus 
the livestock did not receive the attention cuid time necesseiry, and feunners 
did not pleint sufficient acreage with forage and fodder crops. Inevitably, 
the cattle failed to thrive or produce profit.^® 
At a time of relatively high grain prices, fcLrmers were loath to turn 
valuable grain land over to pasture and forage crops. In fact, vocal 
opposition to Hill's distribution scheme eurose. Hill, talking from a 
perspective of nearly thirty years, svimmarized the attitudes of his 
opponents; "they said I was trying to ruin the reputation of the State; 
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that it was not a cattle state- It was not a live stock State; it never 
would be. It was the home of No. 1 hard wheat aind was always going to be 
the home of No. 1 hard wheat. They held political conventions and 
condemned me."^ ^ 
In addition, farmers may well have recognized an inherent maurketing 
problem. Unlike such dairy states as Wisconsin and New York, northern 
Minnesota and North Dakota lacked an accessible urbein market for dairy 
products, while, even after the crash of 1886-7, they would have to contend 
in the beef market with the well-established western industry.®® 
These problems with the cattle donation problem were highlighted by 
the success of the hog distribution on similar terms to those laid out for 
bulls. In comparison with cattle, especially dairy, pigs were easy to 
maintain, requiring little time, space, or special feed. They also had a 
quick market turn-around, a shoat being salable within six or eight months 
of birth. 
Hill recognized the relative merits of his distribution programs, 
continuing to distribute hogs into the new century, while ending donations 
of cattle in 1890. In responding to a request for cattle donation in 1899, 
Hill's secretary, John J- Toomey, acknowledged the failure of his 
distribution scheme, blaming it on the feirmers, "it is now eight of [sic] 
nine years ago since Mr. Hill distributed the thoroughbred bulls referred 
to, no bulls having been distributed by him since then; eind on account of 
the ingratitude shown by the farmers generally, in disposing of these bulls 
for beef and other purposes, Mr. Hill will not, I think, distribute any 
bulls hereafter." Again Hill's claims to personal agricultural expertise, 
even when combined with extreme largesse, failed to change farming 
practices.® ^ 
As with his drainage ventures in the Red River Valley, Hill found 
that, while he failed to influence feurm practices personally, he had 
considered^le success working in conjunction with other institutions. To 
protect his cattle schemes. Hill involved himself in the national campaign 
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against pleuro-pnevunonia. In 1886 a number of cattle imported by Hill 
caught pletiro-pneumonia while in qucorcuitine in Quebec. The same year the 
disease was identified in the Chicago stockyards, causing a nationwide 
panic. Congress had passed legislation in 1884 empowering the Bureau of 
Animal Industry to purchase and destroy animals suffering from certain 
diseases including pleuro-pneumonia, cind in June 1886 it appropriated 
$100,000 for the work. The funding proved insufficient and various state 
laws hamstrung the work of the USDA officials, not allowing the purchase of 
diseased amimals.^^ 
In November of 1886 the national Consolidated Cattle Growers' 
Association appointed Hill to the committee of Congressional legislation. 
This association had prepared a bill (the Miller Bill) to increase 
appropriations for work against pleuro-pneumonia. It also gave the USDA 
greater powers to purchase and destroy diseased emimals or impose and 
enforce quarcuitine restrictions. Senator Spooner, in Senator Miller's 
absence, introduced the bill in the Senate, while Representative Carey 
brought it to the House. 
Hill's job, along with the others on the committee for Congressional 
legislation, was to convince congressmen from his state to vote for the 
bill. To facilitate this. Hill used The Farmer, an agricultural newspaper 
which he fineinced, to publish articles advocating federal control of this 
disease. The bill passed the Senate in February 1887, and on 3 Meirch, the 
House. The new act gave the Bureau of Animal Industry half a million 
dollars for the work, with a fifth of that immediately availeible. In the 
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next Congress, two other bills regarding pleuro-pneumonia were introduced 
into the Senate to ensure continued funding of the program.®^ 
The work proved a great success. Utilizing the power of the federal 
government and the expertise of its employees, the Bureau had completely 
eradicated pleuro-pneumonia in the United States by 1892, at the total cost 
of 1,509,100 dollars. Once again, as with drainage in the Red River 
Valley, Hill learnt the benefit of working with other institutions in 
promoting agricultural chemge. In neither case, though, did Hill truly 
dictate the results; a disadvantage he would later realize.®^ 
Hill also tried to disseminate information during these early years 
to the feunners by sponsoring an agricultural newspaper. The Farmer started 
publication in the spring of 1886 under the editorship of one George W. 
Hill (no relation to the family), amd it had its base in the Minnesota 
fairgrounds. Hill completely financed it, eind within a year had become 
concerned about its lack of success. By April 1887, the newspaper had a 
subscription list of only 6,000 farmers throughout the Upper Midwest and 
had cost Hill over $56,000.®® 
George Hill, concerned that Hill would stop financing the paper, 
tried to explain its lack of success. Much of the high cost, he concluded, 
could be attributed to the one-time expense of starting a new newspaper, 
including purchasing equipment. He also explained the failure of the 
newspaper to obtain more subscriptions saying "It would be useless to deny 
the deep prejudice existing among a very large section of the farming class 
against a paper which does not join with them in or rather lead then in the 
direction of unreasoning antipathy to the other classes of the community 
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and in proving that all their ills are largely the result of their own 
shortcomings." Unwittingly, perhaps, George Hill hit upon one of the key 
reasons for farmer unwillingness to adopt chainges proposed by outside 
reformers; the implication that they themselves were to blame for the 
problems of rural life.®^ 
The paper had over the yesir, as George Hill pointed out, established 
itself as the "exponent of certain general principles." The paper promoted 
intensive, diversified farming, conducted on a scientific, or at least, 
professional, basis. Articles discussed crop rotation, visited successful 
"modern" feirms, promoted dual-purpose cattle, eind investigated various 
feeding regimens. In addition, the weekly interested itself in political 
matters concerning farmers. It provided detailed reports on the action 
taken to prevent pleuro-pneumonia at a state and national level, bringing 
James Hill's involvement to prominence.®® 
The paper also frequently addressed issues raised by various fanner 
orgamizations such as the Patrons of Husbandry and the Farmers' Alliance. 
It was extremely careful not to alienate fanners by dismissing or attacking 
these organizations. Instead it rationally discussed the pleinks of the 
movements, one by one. Of course, most of the farmers' ideas, especially 
those relating to railroad regulation. The Farmer deemed unnecessary and 
harmful. However, it did support the Grange's bid for a separate 
agricultural college in Minnesota, as the University of Minnesota had 
failed to provide hands-on practical farming education, relying too much on 
theoretical studies. To what extent a feunn paper, launched in 1886 in 
Minnesota, had any chance of succeeding without fully endorsing the 
farmers' movements is doubtful, but George Hill's somewhat negative 
assessment of the reasons for lack of success probeibly had a considercible 
degree of validity.®^ 
Additionally, farmers were traditionally non-literate in their 
lecurning techniques emd cautious of outside recommendations. As late as 
1913 a survey by the University of Minnesota discovered that although 84 
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percent of households took fcurming journals only 50 percent read them cuid 
only 43 percent "expressed any confidence in scientific farming methods."^® 
By the summer of 1887 James Hill proposed to shut the paper down. 
The editor protested, claiming that it would be more expensive to close the 
presses than to keep them going while looking for a buyer. Hill agreed, 
and the paper continued through 1888. In September of that year the Orange 
Judd Publishing Compjiny of Chicago took over the paper, moved it to 
Chicago, and renamed it The Orange Judd Fetrmer.^^ 
Orange Judd had been a successful agricultural editor for several 
decades when he became involved with Hill. At the helm of The American 
Agriculturist. he had been one of the first writers to convert scientific 
jcirgon into a readsdjle style, thus making the work of agricultural 
scientists accessible to literate fcunners. Hit hard by the depression of 
1873, his paper failed in 1879. He moved to Chicago and wrote for The 
Prairie Farmer for awhile, before availing himself of the opportunity to 
buy The Farmer. 
Despite Judd's takeover, James Hill remained financially involved in 
the paper. Because he had entirely financed George Hill, the paper owed 
him the outstanding bills for advertising and subscription, eind the 
collection process proved long, convoluted, and largely fruitless. Judd 
also borrowed money from Hill to maintain the paper in exchange for shares 
in the publishing company. Judd claimed that he needed the money since 
George Hill had misled him regarding the financial and subscription status 
of the paper, but Judd had also been unable to meet the initial purchase 
price. Consequently as late as February of 1891, Judd still owed James 
Hill $15,000. By spring of 1891 all correspondence between the Judd 
company and the Great Northern officials had ceased and was never resumed. 
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The next yeeir Orange Judd died, eind his sons took over the running of the 
paper, thus ending Hill's involvement.^^ 
Through launching his ovra paper Hill aimed to influence farming 
practices cmd thus reinforce the economic stcibility of his railroad empire. 
This attempt, like so many of his early agricultural endeavors, failed due 
to general farmer unwillingness to accept Hill's expertise and, 
consequently, his prescriptions. 
In 1893 Hill completed the Great Northern Railway, reaching Seattle. 
The line, the most northerly of the tramscontinental roads, spanned vast 
areas of unsettled territoiry and had been built without Icind grants. 
Instead it floated foreign loans based on the demonstrated haulage in the 
Red River Valley. Hill had to maintain eind extend this haulage across the 
country, to pay the loans amd make a profit. More than ever, he had to 
lecirn to exploit the railroad's territory, and agriculture seemed the only 
viaible option. 
Working from an eighteenth-century English tradition Hill had 
estedslished himself as a gentleman farmer only to find that the audience he 
needed to reach no longer deferred to this sort of expertise, if they ever 
had. Using demonstration and phileinthropy, as well as The Farmer, Hill 
tried to convince feirmers along the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba to 
practice intensive, diversified farming, with a focus on dual-purpose 
cattle. 
Hill's choice of image proved outdated. After the Civil Weir the 
American elite altered their approach to rural pastimes. No longer did the 
status of gentlemcm farmer legitimize privilege. As the nation moved away 
from its rural past, so agricultural pursuits ceased to endorse power, 
prestige, and influence cuid became more solely issues of leisure. Hill's 
contemporaries also invested time euid money in rural activities. Leleind 
Stanford bred racing emd trotting horses at his Palo Alto farm. He enjoyed 
watching horses on the track, studying the mechanisms of equine locomotion 
through photography. George Veuiderbilt, on the other hand, estciblished a 
73. Judd to Hill, 23 April 1889 and 30 Jeuauary 1891; to W. A. 
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model farm on his Biltmore estate where he bred hogs and prize-winning 
Jersey cattle. Unlike Hill, these men did not try to influence the general 
farmer. They had little vested interest in solving the problems of rural 
life and "farmed" for self-gratification rather than for power and 
influence. Hill valued the country estate connotations of his North Oaks 
fcLrm. However, his prime aim was to create an image of himself as a 
successful scientific fcunner to lend his attempts to educate farmers 
sufficient authority. With much land available, wheat prices high, and 
good climatic conditions, most feirmers simply ignored him.^^ 
By the time the rechristened Great Northern Railway reached Puget 
Sound, Hill had abemdoned all of his earlier attempts at agricultural 
education. While keeping North Oaks, he sold all the cattle, letting the 
farm become more of a country retreat than a working stock farm, although 
he still bred horses, pigs, and sheep. Both Hill and the Great Northern 
had ceased involvement with the two newspaper enterprises. Hill had lost 
faith in farmers remarking in his private correspondence, "I would be glad 
at any time to help enlighten the farmers, but they seem determined on self 
destruction, and perhaps the remedy will come quicker by letting them have 
their own way for the present. 
The most successful of Hill's early agricultural ventures seemed to 
have been his involvement with other institutions in the drainage in the 
Red River Valley. Having antagonized farmers by acting independently. Hill 
discovered success through more subtle and indirect means. He found that 
through promotion and expenditure he could influence local and state 
authorities to move in the desired direction. Hill's participation in the 
fight against pleuro-pneumonia and the extirpation of the disease through 
combining grassroots pressure with federal force, reinforced this concept 
of cooperation. Hill appreciated the success of this tactic and used it 
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consistently throughout the subsequent decade, gradually finding that the 
gains made through cooperation were offset by his loss of control in 
determining agricultural policy and promotion. 
By 1893, although in a good position economically, so much so that 
his railroad was one of the few to survive the crash of that year, James 
Hill entered the new decade eibandoning his agricultural policies eind 
programs and having to try to create new ones. 
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mobilizing expertise and influence, 1893-1902 
Business and political affairs surrounding his railroad ventures distracted 
Hill from agriculture for a few yeeirs after the Panic of 1893. Unlike such 
competing lines as the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific, the Great 
Northern avoided bankruptcy, due to a strong economic infrastructure in the 
Red River Valley, and an unusually well-built railroad with flat grades and 
quality equipment which pjured the operating costs to a minimum. 
The mid-1890s posed a political crisis for Hill. By inclination a 
low tariff Democrat, Hill had consistently supported Grover Cleveland, 
despite the president's initial failure to approve the St. Paul, 
Minneapolis and Manitoba's right-of-way across western North Dakota and 
Montana, and his refusal to mobilize government forces against Eugene 
Debs's Americaui Railway Union strike of 1894. In 1896, faced with the 
dramatic growth of the People's Peurty and the double presidential 
nomination of William Jennings Bryan, Hill changed affiliations, backing 
William McKinley and contributing ten times more to McKinley's campaign, 
$100,000, than he had ever given to Cleveland. He also worked with Marcus 
Heinna, McKinley's genius campaign manager, to gain a Republican victory in 
the Upper Midwest. The struggles Hill faced economically and politically 
during the first half of the 1890s served to distract his attention from 
his endeavors to educate farmers.^ 
Hill also engrossed himself in expanding his railroad enterprise at 
the end of the century. The second bankruptcy of Northern Pacific in 1893 
gave him a chance to acquire interest in this road cuid thus eliminate his 
major competition in the Northwest. Backed by J. P. Morgan, Hill embarked, 
in 1895, on a plan to bring the Northern Pacific under the umbrella of the 
Great Northern. 
Initially Hill aimed to completely merge the Northern Pacific with 
his railroad and under his management. This scheme, named the London 
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Agreement, was drawn up by Hill and various bankers in England in 1895. 
However, the idea of uniting the lines met with opposition from Henry 
Villard, president of the Northern Pacific, auid that railroad's personnel, 
who objected to being subsumed by the Great Northern. The Morgan/Hill 
faction also feared substantial political opposition to the move resulting 
from the anti-monopoly fervor of the 1890s. Hill persuaded a friend and 
business associate, Thomas Pecursall, to file a test case for a merger. The 
ambiguous results convinced Hill and Morgem that uniting the two lines 
might prove difficult. Thus they scrapped the Agreement in favor of the 
London Memorandum of 1896. This eliminated most of the competition between 
the two lines, forging a "permanent allieuice, defensive." Instead of a 
corporate merger, therefore, they settled for an agreement between the two 
compcuiies aimed at maintaining high prices. The London Memorandvim, unlike 
the straightforward merger proposed in the London Agreement, was definitely 
a "combination in restraint of trade," in violation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act of 1890, but had the advantage of being less conspicuous. ^ 
Hill found the new agreement less than satisfactory. Power rested in 
Morgan's hands, and the Great Northern did not even have a seat on the 
board of directors of the Northern Pacific. Over the next four years Hill 
worked to increase his control both by stock purchase and by badgering 
Morgan. The increasing respect of Morgan for Hill's eibilities and the 
death of Charles H. Coster, the general manager of the Northern Pacific, in 
March 1900, gave Hill his opportunity. By late fall the Morgcin group 
relinquished working control of the Northern Pacific to the Hill faction 
who immediately implemented the de facto amalgamation of the lines through 
personal ownership of stock and compeiny cooperation. They completed the 
merger on 12 November 1901, creating a holding company, known as Northern 
Securities, eind capitalized at $400 million.^ 
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By the middle of the 1890s, with McKinley elected and the London 
Memoreuidum signed. Hill's interest in agricultural development began to 
revive. He focused attention on strengthening his territory's 
infrastructure and linking it to external markets. 
With the completion of the Great Northern and the effective 
settlement of the Red River Valley, the geographical area of his interest 
expanded dramatically. Increasingly his attention focused on the problems 
of agriculture in the semi-arid West, especially the northern Great Plains 
which, in the 18903, was still dominated, politically eind economically, by 
stockmen eind mineowners from the western hills. In confronting the arid 
West, Hill faced em environment unfamiliar to him. However, his aim 
remained the creation of small, intensive, diversified holdings. These fit 
his agricultural ideology aind also supplied more business for the Great 
Northern than a few stockmen. As he later noted, "if you put a railroad in 
the garden of Eden eind had none but Adam and Eve patronize the road, it 
would be bound to be a failure."^ 
Hill's goals stayed the same but he adapted his strategy, reflecting 
lessons learnt. He acknowledged his earlier failures to convince feirmers 
of his agricultural expertise and thus influence them directly. Building 
on the success of the drainage commission in Minnesota aind the legislation 
against pleuro-pneumonia. Hill combined the weight of his political and 
economic strength with his agricultural expertise, and mobilized them all 
to aid other institutions which he saw furthering his agricultural goals. 
Working behind the scenes he sought to influence agricultural education, 
development, and legislation. Sponsoring programs for farmer education, 
drainage, irrigation, and dry farming. Hill bolstered his claim to 
expertise through the use of professional scientists and government 
officials. He remained closely involved with the projects he sponsored and 
chose them carefully. Profit to the railroad remained his own touchstone 
for judging agricultural prograuns; he rejected any scheme which did not 
promise this. 
The failure of his early attempts at educating the feunners through 
personal endeavor necessitated a rethinking of his agricultural strategy. 
More smd more he chose to act solely as financial backer for the 
4. Anaconda Standard. 27 October 1909. 
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agricultural schemes that he advocated. He, or the railroad, provided 
funds and advice to various institutions and organizations which actually 
ceirried out the educational work. Increasingly, he relied on university 
and government experts to perform the business of educating the feirmers. 
Hill's new deference to formal expertise did not represent a complete 
break with past tactics. He still cultivated his image as a farm expert. 
He continued to give speeches on agricultviral issues to farmers, feirmers' 
organizations, and students. He also maintained his involvement in 
agricultural organizations such as the Minnesota State Fair and stressed 
the importance of diversification amd scientific agriculture to increase 
production and income.^ 
In addition. Hill started an agricultural campaign which revolved 
solely around his business eind transportation expertise, trade with the Far 
East. The decline of wheat prices convinced Hill that one way to ensure a 
good living for the farmer was to expand their market and encourage trade 
with the Far East. If esteJalished this trade would benefit the Great 
Northern enormously, allowing it to haul grain and other products, in both 
directions along the line. The Canadian Pacific had established a shipping 
network to the Far East in 1886. It dismayed Hill that this foreign line 
should profit from carrying American products.® 
As eeirly as 1892 Hill sent employee Herman Rosenthal to Japan, China, 
and Korea to investigate trade potential. The report was favorable, but 
the 1893 crash distracted Hill's attention. He still investigated 
possibilities for steurting trade using Japanese steamships, but found none 
suiteible for Pacific crossings.^ 
5. William Liggett, boeurd of managers of Minnesota State 
Agricultural Society, to F. I. Whitney, general passenger agent on Great 
Northern Railway, 15 August, 1896; J. C. Heinley to Hill, 8 February 1899; 
Liggett to Hill, 16 November 1899; Edward Tuck to Hill, 31 December 1902, 
General Correspondence, JJHP; Record (Farao). September 1897. 
6. Meiry Wilma M. Hargreaves, Drv Feu-mino in the Northern Great 
Plains. 1900-1925 (Cambridge: Heurvard University Press, 1957), 17; John 
Feihey, The Inlemd Empire; Unfoldjnt^ Vt^arg. 1879-1929 (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1986), 16-18; Howard Schonberger, "James J. Hill and 
the Trade with the Orient," Minnesota History 41 (Winter 1968): 178-90. 
7. Schonberger, "James J. Hill eind the Trade with the Orient," 178-
90; Thomas Burke to Hill, 4 July 1893; Hill to Burke, 10 August 1894, 
Thomas Burke Papers, University of Washington Archives, Seattle, Washington 
(hereafter UWA). 
49 
The need for trans-Pacific commerce increased proportional to the 
eastbound haulage of the Great Northern. Working with his neighbor in St. 
Paul, Frederick Weyerhaeuser, Hill and his railroad greatly fostered the 
lumber industry of the Pacific Northwest. By 1896 the Great Northern 
Railway carried so much timber from the West that cars returned empty from 
the East, and Hill considered an empty car to be a "thief." The problem of 
what to send West revived the notion of trade with the Faur East. In 1896 
Hill sent more agents to Japan to investigate, eind treuis-Pacific shipping 
of goods traveling along the Great Northern started using Japanese 
vessels.® 
Unsatisfied with foreign ships. Hill lobbied for more American 
shipbuilding. With the advent of the Spemish-American Wcur, he joined the 
Ceunpaign to secure federal subsidies for building merchant meirine ships. 
Frustrated by congressional delays. Hill capitalized the Great Northern 
Steamship Company in 1900 emd started to build his own ships, launching the 
first one in 1903. He planned to ship lumber east and cotton (from the 
South by way of the Burlington with which Hill had estciblished a working 
affiliation in 1886) west emd then across the Pacific. Hill's promotion of 
oriental trade mirrored his earlier attempts at sponsoring agricultural 
education. He organized emd financed the development of a trans-Pacific 
network independent of governmental institutions.® 
Hill's usage of the North Oaks farm, however, reflected his changing 
attitude toward agricultural education. The farm, just ten miles north of 
his main residence in St. Paul, increasingly functioned more as the 
family's country estate. In 1893, with eight children still at home 
ranging in age from eight to twenty-three and two grcmdchildren, the farm 
provided an importcint refuge, especially during the sticky midwestern 
summers. 
The family played at North Oeiks; fishing in Pleasemt Lake, boating, 
riding, shooting, and going for country drives. The Hills often 
entertained guests and regulcurly celebrated Independence Day at the feunn. 
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On 4 July 1899 Mary Hill wrote in her diary "A beautiful morning—The Flag 
was run up early—Mr. F. B. Cleurke, Theodore Schurmeier and Louis went 
fishing. In the afternoon Papa, Mr. C. and Theodore went for a drive about 
the fields cmd pastxires—A circus performcince was improvised for James 
[Mary's grauidson]—He the clown. In the evening we had fireworks, later 
singing Sc."^^ 
In fact the family spent enough time at the North Oaks estate to 
considered it as one of their residences. Maury Hill wrote on 28 April 
1899, "I spent most of the day at North Oaks amd found considerable to look 
about after the winter's occupation by Walter and Mr. Bridgeman," and the 
family commonly spent a large part of the summer there. Mary and her 
daughters established a social network in the area and attended the 
Catholic church in neighboring White Becir Lake. ^ ^ 
The agricultural activities of the feirm had also cheinged. By 1893 
Hill had disposed of his Aberdeen Angus herd and, within two years, cattle 
breeding had completely ceased at North Oaks. Although continuing hog and 
horse breeding and feeding experiments. Hill definitely curtailed his 
involvement in all aspects of farming during the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. In 1896 a description of the farm in the St. Paul 
Pioneer Press sounded much more like a country estate than a working farm. 
"At North Oaks today carriage horses are bred, dairy cows eire kept, sheep 
feed upon the pastures, swine fattened on the mast of oaken forests, elk 
and deer browse upon the growth of a woodland enclosure and a herd of 
buffalo roams through a large range." The 144 head of cattle produced 
dairy products for local sale to offset the feirm's expenses. In 1897 Hill 
resumed investment in blooded stock, buying some Ayrshires, but use of the 
cattle remained personal. Having found that his assumed role of gentlemem 
farmer failed to sway his audience. Hill found other, more personal uses, 
for his farms. 
In terms of his financial investment in agricultural education Hill 
changed direction. Instead of launching his own schemes to convince the 
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farmers of the efficacy of new agricultural practices. Hill preferred to 
subsidize programs run by other institutions, such as the state and the 
University of Minnesota. In this way, he acquiesced to a modern, almost 
Progressive notion, of expertise. Hill did not acknowledge that other 
experts were more knowledgeable them himself. Rather, he hoped that they 
would prove more effective in conveying information to feirming audiences 
euid implementing improvement schemes. Thus, their expertise would 
complement his. 
This deference to other experts first emerged over the issue of 
drainage in the Red River Valley. Hill helped esteiblish a state program of 
drainage which expanded in 1897 eind culminated in the 1901 creation of the 
Minnesota State Drainage Commission. Although railroad financial 
involvement had ceased by this point. Hill kept a close eye on the work 
through Erza Valentine, one of Hill's pointsmen in the valley, and the 
president of the Boeird of Drainage Commissioners. Valentine reported 
annually to Hill on the state of drainage, and, in return, received ein 
annual pass to the railroad to carry out his work.^^ 
In addition to working with the state on the drainage in the Red 
River Valley, Hill also contributed to the University of Minnesota's 
attempts at outreach education in the valley. In 1888 the university hired 
Willet Hays, later assistant secretary of agriculture under "Tama" Jim 
Wilson. The university mcindated Hays to increased grassroots support for 
the institution. To achieve this. Hays developed an innovative new program 
to extend the institution's agricultural experiment stations and high 
schools throughout the state. 
Embarking on this effort in 1894, Hays needed to investigate possible 
sites for these stations ciround Minnesota. Seeking free railway 
transportation, he approached the Great Northern head offices in St. Paul. 
On his second visit, Sam Hill (James's son-in-law) ushered him into Hill's 
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24; Erza Valentine to Hill, 3 January 1902, General Correspondence, JJHP. 
14. "The Northwestern Experiment Station," p. 37, undated mss.. 
Institute of Agriculture files; Willet Hays, "Esurly History of the 
Northwest Agricultural School emd Experiment Station," p. 7, 10-11, undated 
mss.. Agricultural Experiment Station—Eaurly Papers emd Correspondence, 
Agricultural Experiment Station Papers, University of Minnesota Archives, 
Minneapolis, Minn, (hereafter UMA). 
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office. Immediately, the older Hill started to indicate on a map a 
proposed gift of land neeir Crookston, Minnesota. Hays protested, "Why, Mr. 
Hill, I am hardly in a position to consider gifts of land, for the board of 
regents has not even formally considered this project." Hill placed his 
hand on Hays's shoulder and said, "Young man you go sdiead."^^ 
Hill got his way. The university received the 476.61 acres from the 
railway on the condition that the land always be used as £ui experiment 
station. Hill persuaded the Minnesota legislature that year to authorize 
the esteiblishment of branch stations for the university. Hill's donation 
of Icuid also freed a state appropriation of $20,000 for buildings and 
equipment as well as the purchase of the land for the Northeast Station in 
Grand Rapids, Minnesota.^® 
Hill understood that the land eventually would be used as a branch 
agricultural school as well as an experiment station. Hays had explained 
his dream to the railroad man, and the idea of the school figured greatly 
in Hill's motivations for giving the land. Through his generous 
combination of gift eind action, Hill gave substance to his belief in the 
importance of agricultural education based on scientific principles. The 
donation also underscored his desire that the state organize agricultural 
education and that actual farms should figure prominently in this 
education. 
The gift of land to the university supported his own agricultural 
education ideas and offered the potential for increased production in the 
valley. Hill hoped that, unlike the early drainage work by the railroad, 
the university could effectively demonstrate the benefits of tile drainage. 
15. Hays, "Early History of the Northwest Agricultural School and 
Experiment Station," p. 10-11; "Northwest Experiment Station," p. 11, 
undated mss.. History 1908-1938; Conrad Selvig, "The Northwest Experiment 
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In addition, the donation proved a timely philanthropic gesture on the 
behalf of a railroad that was not without competition in the cLrea.^® 
The donation not only facilitated drainage experimentation, but also 
formalized Hill's belief in the efficacy of demonstration faurms as a 
learning tool, moving the onus from his own personal farm at North Oaks to 
the state institution for higher leeirning. The relieince on demonstration 
farms as the best method of teaching agriculture reflected Hill's alliance 
with farmers amd advocates of more traditional educational methods. From 
as early as the 1850s farmers considered model farms, run at a profit, the 
perfect way to instruct agraurians. They could visit these farms and 
witness new machinery and modes of bookkeeping and husbandry which they 
could transfer to their own lands. These farmers saw little need for the 
expertise of agricultural science to teach farming and had little faith in 
extant university demonstration farms which consistently operated at a 
loss. 
For all his advocacy of modern, scientific farming. Hill remained 
wary of academic experts. To him, demonstration farms were the key to 
agricultural education, and he thought that each county should have a 
demonstration farm. "This model farm would be simply a tract of land 
conforming in size, soil treatment, crop selection and rotation and methods 
of cultivation to modern agricultural methods. Its purpose would be to 
furnish to all its neighborhood a working model for common instruction." 
He saw practical demonstration as more effective than "a lifetime [of] 
reading books or listening to stump speeches. 
whatever benefits Hill's gift of leind had with respect to his 
relationship with settlers or competition with the Northern Pacific in the 
Red River Valley, it backfired in terms of his relationship with the 
18. John Luecke, "Minnesota Railroads," August 1993, Teacher 
Conference at the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota; 
Martin, .Tanit»g .T. Hill. 221; Hiram Drache, The Day of the Bonanza; A 
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Social Thought (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), 143-49; 
Hill, Highwavs of Progress. (Geurden City, N.Y.; Doubleday, Page & Compeiny, 
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university. Although he had admitted that the land was wet, this was an 
understatement. When James Boss of the St. Paul Experiment Station first 
arrived at the site in the early spring of 1895, he described it as, "a 
discouraging proposition for farming, emd a very much better one for 
ducks." The problem persisted for many years despite repeated and 
expensive attempts to drain the land. Experiment Station Superintendent 
Conrad Selvig reported that the annual flooding delayed seeding, endangered 
the foundations of the buildings, and provided material discomfort. It 
also washed unwanted seeds on to the experiment feunn, which, according to 
Selvig, "gave the exceedingly unfortunate impression that the Farm suffered 
from chronically careless management." Only in 1908, after the laying of 
50,000 feet of drainage tile and the construction of one and a half miles 
of open ditch, was the site finally drained effectively.^0 
The problem of draining the site and the embcurrassment of maintaining 
a swamp did not enhance the relationship between Hill and the university. 
Despite the enthusiasm of Crookston's first superintendent, a Hill protege 
named Torger Hoverstad, the university viewed the station as "an unwanted 
waif" and the state thought it a "white elephant." Hoverstad's annual 
reports to the dean of agriculture exuded "hope eind idealism" but little 
progress, and in 1906 he was fired. In addition, the drainage problem led 
to a twelve-year delay in founding an agricultural school. 
As the costs of maintaining the station multiplied, many university 
personnel viewed the railroad baron less favorably. Conversely, the 
university actions regaurding the station did little to endear the 
institution to Hill. In fact, with no school founded and little 
demonstration taking place, his skepticism toweurd the university's 
commitment to agricultural education and its claim to expertise, increased. 
Consequently, the gift of the Crookston leind meurked the totality of Hill's 
formal relationship with the university for many years. Despite this. Hill 
maintained personal contact with msuiy of the faculty, especially those who 
agreed with him regairding the importance of diversification and the nature 
20. Boss to Selvig, 2 July 1924; Selvig, "The Northwest Station at 
Crookston," p. 3; Agricultural Experiment Station—Eeurly Papers euid 
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of agricultural expertise. Agricultural experts, such as Andrew Boss and 
Thomas Shaw, empathized with Hill, in both practical auid theoretical 
arenas.^1 
The conflict over expertise was not limited to an external battle, 
pitting academics against farmers emd other amateurs. Agricultural 
scientists at land grant schools disagreed among themselves about their 
role and methods of implementation. Recipients of lengthy, formal 
education tended to perceive their mission as one of pure reseaurch with 
little or no educational component. Those who had achieved professorial 
positions before the new emphasis on academic credentials, remained more 
loyal to the original mandate of land grant schools. They thought that 
their work should combine applied research with a strong educational 
mission, acting as a bureau of information for fcunners of their state. 
Because of their personal backgrounds, this latter group, like Hill, 
rejected the mysticism and elitism that the new generation of scientists 
wove around their expertise. This internal conflict, in conjunction with 
the struggles raging externally between the universities, farmers, federal 
bureaucracy, and corporate entrepreneurs like Hill, did not find resolution 
until the second decade of the twentieth century and the creation of the 
federal extension service.^2 
In the 1890s Hill retained his interest in drainage and agricultural 
development of the Red River Valley, but, because of the bad press the 
railroad received in the 1880s, he expressed his involvement indirectly, 
through state agencies. The problems of draining the Crookston site, 
however, being more them just an issue of experimentation, unfortunately 
undermined Hill's relationship with the University of Minnesota, leading to 
a growing antipathy. The antagonisms surrounding the Crookston station 
presaged the railroad builder's future relationship with other institutions 
involved in agriculture. 
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With the extension of the Great Northern to the Pacific Coast, Hill 
became interested in the problems of agriculture in the arid West. Here 
his interest started to diverge from that of some railroads because his 
line was built without land grants. Unlike the St. Paul, Minneapolis & 
Manitoba in the Red River Valley, the Great Northern could not make money 
from land sales along its line, but only from haulage. This meant that the 
railroad personnel invested a large amount of time in finding effective 
ways to exploit their territory. Settlers were important and encouraged, 
but it was crucial that settlement prove successful. 
The decline of foreign immigration to the United States, euid 
especially to the northern Great Plains in the late 1890s, exacerbated this 
problem. Immigration did not pick up until well into the new century, and, 
by that time, the Canadian government had started a propaganda campaign to 
attract American fairmers. This campaign appeared especially successful in 
areas just south of the international border, with Minnesota and North 
Dakota contributing one third of the emigrauits. Although meuiy of these 
Americans returned home and the net permanent migration numbered no more 
than 200,000, concern eibout this exodus rem high during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Low wheat prices compounded and contributed 
to this problem of attracting settlers. Prices had fallen in the 18803 
with the influx of plains wheat onto the international market and did not 
recover, remaining low throughout the rest of the century. In 1893 wheat 
prices fell still further and did not start to rise again until 1897. 
Hill confronted the problem of making his railroad pay in the face of 
these disadvantages by continuing his push for small-scale diversified 
farms. To facilitate this in the West, he chose to stress the potential of 
irrigation and crops other than wheat. Learning from his experiences 
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during the previous fifteen years, he worked through a number of companies 
in Wenatchee, Washington, rather than acting independently. 
Hill had a vested interest in the Wenatchee area. In 1888 lawyer 
Thomas Burke and a group of other speculators from Seattle had purchased 
land on the Wenatchee Flats. They offered Hill a quarter of their holdings 
if he would route the Great Northern through the area. Hill accepted, and 
therefore este^Dlished a personal landed interest in the area, as well as 
his railroad's interest in haulage. 
The Wenatchee River Basin drains 1,350 square miles in central 
Washington. The river flows from the Wenatchee LeJce, forty-seven miles 
southeast to join the Columbia River. The town of Wenatchee is at the 
confluence of the two rivers. The subsoils of the valleys consist of 
gravel and sand deposited by glaciers and floods. Overlaying this is one 
to three feet of fertile, pervious, sedimentary top soil, conducive to 
irrigation.25 
Irrigation started in the valley shortly after the passage of the 
Desert Land Act in 1877 when a settler, Philip Miller, hired Jacob A. 
Shotwell to build some ditches on his leind. By 1881 Miller had established 
a "very promising orchard." Other settlers followed suit over the next 
decade, but it soon became appsirent that the valley needed Icurge-scale 
irrigation works for which the capital was not availeible. Irrigation 
generally proved successful when completed, providing water for bountiful 
crop yields cuid the establishment of orchards.26 
In November 1891, a yeair before the Great Northern reached the valley 
on its way to Puget Sound, Thomas Burke, by then a representative for the 
railroad, incorporated the Wenatchee Development Company. The compeiny 
aimed to develop the townsite by building up industry. Its first interest 
24. Keith A. Murray, "The Highline Cemal: Irrigation Comes to 
Wenatchee," r.nlninhia 17 (Winter 1995/96); 20; Burke to Hill, 8 June 1891 
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was the construction of sawmills, but it also weinted to extend irrigation 
works in the valley. Burke held the majority of the stock, but in 1892 the 
Great Northern purchased five hundred shcires, thus assuming considerable 
power within the company. 
At the same time ein itinerant newspaper man named Arthur Gunn moved 
to Wenatchee as cashier and memager of the local branch of the Columbia 
Valley Bank. Soon he assumed the post of local agent for the Great 
Northern cmd started to promote irrigation. He borrowed enough money from 
Hill to help Shotwell, who had bought and irrigated his own land by 1891, 
to enlcirge his ditch and draw up plains to irrigate the entire valley. As 
in the Red River Valley with Valentine, Hill promoted agricultural 
development in Wenatchee from behind the scenes, using Gunn as his front 
man.28 
The Wenatchee Development Company investigated the possibilities of 
irrigation around 1894. Burke had approached two private companies and 
planned, if that failed, "to see what can be done under the irrigation law 
of the state." The Panic of 1893 and the subsequent depression, delayed 
work in the valley, but in 1896 the various groups united , forming the 
Wenatchee Waterpower Company with Gunn as president.29 
This company was effectively a subsidiary of the Great Northern. 
Increasing national opposition to monopolies and other business mergers 
which hampered free trade had culminated in the passage of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act of 1890. To avoid prosecution under this law, railroads, 
and other Isirge corporations, hid their involvement in the development of 
businesses integral to their success. Thus, instead of running coal 
operations directly or eurranging for special rates connected to bulk 
27. Meuiuscript History of the Wenatchee Development Compajiy, Great 
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purchase, railroads created subsidiary firms such as the Great Northern's 
S£md Coulee Coal Compeuiy. These businesses, independent on paper, were 
under the de facto control of the parent organization. The Great Northern 
applied this tactic to veirious development operations including the Great 
Falls Development Company and the Wenatchee Waterpower Company. The latter 
not only received a loan of $13,000 from the Great Northern to complete all 
the proposed irrigation system, but, the railroad also bought the complete 
issue of bonds in April 1897, totaling $15,000.^® 
The Wenatchee Waterpower Company's paper independence from the 
railroad also protected Hill and the Great Northern from farmer accusations 
of eirbitreiry corporate action. By concealing his direct involvement. Hill 
hoped the irrigation endeavors would appear to stem from grassroots action 
eind thus be more palatable. Arthur Gunn worked on the continued 
construction of canals eind also busied himself inducing settlers to move to 
the valley. He completed the ditch extension in 1898 and, the next yecu:, 
persuaded a Dunkeird Brethren congregation from North Dakota to move to the 
area. Sale of irrigated land started in 1899 with parcels of five to ten 
acres fetching $140 per acre including perpetual water rights.^^ 
This success was only achieved at high financial cost. By mid-1898 
Gunn wrote to Hill that the bondholders should taJce possession of the 
company which was on the verge of financial failure. The Great Northern 
did taJce over, assuming responsibility for the compjuiy's liabilities, and 
pushing the completion of a gravity irrigation system by December 1898. 
Thus, although in the end the scheme increased the valley's production 
especially of fruit, it cost far more than anticipated, and Hill was "not 
overly pleased with the result of our irrigation matters. 
Despite the achievements of the project, the valley still required 
additional irrigation. Local residents decided to hire W. T. Cleurk who had 
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recently built a successful irrigation system in the yakima Valley, to 
build the Highline Canal. Clark funded the project initially with a loan 
from Robert Livingstone, president of the Oregon Mortgage Compcuiy based in 
Portleind, using feunners' land in the valley as collateral. Clark eind his 
associate managed to acquire "$150,000 for the work from Scottish capital 
representing in Portleind emd other interests. 
In addition the new Wenatchee Canal Company entered into an agreement 
in May 1902 with the Wenatchee Development Compciny. This specified that 
Clark would irrigate the Development Company's land for $6,000, some land, 
and a $1.50 per cuinum per acre fee for the rest, and that the work would be 
completed by May 1904.^^ 
Clcirk's work progressed well, but once again cost more them 
anticipated, and he continually searched for funding to prevent bankruptcy. 
Once water flow started in September 1903, farmers in the valley complained 
of the high cost and often failed to teUce full advantage of the work done. 
Although setting out new fruit trees, Thomas Burke complained that they 
"don't seem to carry on farming or horticulture according to modern 
methods. They do not seem to realize the importance of care and judgment 
in the selection of fruit trees or in their proper ceure afterwards." 
Therefore Burke suggested to Hill that the railroad company might send out 
a horticulturist to the valley to instruct farmers. By 1902, although 
considerable irrigation work had taken place in the Wenatchee Valley, it 
had all been characterized by high costs to the railroad and railroad 
personnel, and had yet to produce the substeintial income for the fcirmers or 
the line that materialized in the ensuing decades. 
In 1896 Hill embarked on a second irrigation project, this time on 
Crab Creek in Adrian, Washington, another tributetry of the Columbia 
draining more than 5,000 squeure miles around. Working with J. D. Mclntyre 
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who founded the Cooperative Irrigation Company, Hill agreed to transport 
the equipment necessary for the construction of irrigation works eind, on 
their completion, to buy the irrigated land at ten dollcirs an. acre. Hill 
specified which lands he intended to buy in advance of construction along 
with the proviso that "If there are any of these leinds that the water 
ceinnot reach by gravity, your Company [the Cooperative Irrigation Company] 
will be required to put in the necessary pumping works and to the water on 
the ground."36 
To protect his investment. Hill ordered an independent survey of the 
land, which reported that the prospects were good. Construction began in 
1896 and Hill kept a close eye on the project receiving reports from 
various officials when they passed through the eurea. Little consensus 
existed on the advcincement of the work, with disconcerting reports that the 
water flow would prove insufficient to irrigate the proposed area. A 
letter from Chief Engineer Jonatham Stevens followed, stating that "There 
is no doubt in my mind that there is plenty of water in Crab Creek one year 
emd another to irrigate twenty to twenty-five thousand acres of land, 
possibly a good deal more."^^ 
Mclntyre soon ran out of capital and asked the Great Northern for an 
advance to complete the work. To "prevent delay and possible abandonment" 
of the project, the Great Northern advanced Mclntyre $1,200 and paid his 
bills amounting to $3,800, but Mclntyre still fell short of expectations. 
The railroad soon found itself embroiled in a court case when vcurious 
suppliers sued Mclntyre for non-payment.^® 
In August 1898, with the completion of work in the Wenatchee Valley, 
Hill had Gunn turn his attention to the problems auround Adrian. Gunn's 
report bore little hope for the future of the project. He recommended that 
the Co-operative Irrigation Company immediately teJce some settlers to court 
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who had the potential to claim water rights under prior appropriation, that 
Crah Creek had insufficient water to irrigate the intended lemd in the 
summer, and that the ditch and its flumes were poorly constructed and would 
require considercible repairs to operate efficiently. Within a year. Hill 
had turned the work around Adrian over to Gunn, appointing him president of 
the Adricm Irrigation Compzuiy. Once again Hill found that irrigation 
though private companies proved difficult, if not impossible, to conduct 
successfully euid extortionately expensive 
In his promotion of irrigation in the valleys of the Columbia Plain 
Hill discovered a new flaw in his tactic of working through other 
institutions. Unlike in his dealings with the University of Minnesota, his 
expertise was not questioned. Instead he found, like mauiy others, that the 
private companies just could not float the necessary capital for successful 
irrigation. Faced with a practical rather than strategic problem. Hill 
looked to ally with other institutions, notably the federal government, for 
future recleimation work. 
Hill leeirnt a similar lesson in pursuing irrigation in Montana. 
Irrigation started in the Milk River Valley in 1889 when one T. B. Burns 
moved north from the irrigated Gallatin Valley and acquired water rights to 
land recently ceded by the Indieins- The next year he constructed a dam on 
the river. The flow of the Milk River in the summer proved insufficient 
for irrigation on a substantial level but a survey in 1891 by E. S. 
Nettleton of the USDA concluded that it would be feasible to divert water 
from the St. Mary's River to the Milk.^® 
In September 1897 J. D. Mclntyre wrote to Hill detailing a survey he 
had completed of the irrigation potential of the Milk River Valley. 
Although the survey seems to have been commissioned by Hill, he took no 
action. Unlike the Wenatchee Valley, Icurge-scale irrigation in northern 
Monteina continued to be complicated by the presence of several Indian 
reservations. This necesscurily added a level of federal involvement, and 
several depcurtments, to euiy pleins. 
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The next year, after the Ccinadian government had steirted an 
irrigation project on the St. Mary River, irrigation promoter, W. M. 
Wooldridge of Chinook, Montana, pressured Hill to involve himself in work 
on the Milk River. This pressure continued for a year and met with 
categorical refusal. Hill stated that Montana seemed very disinterested in 
the railroad, cheurging high taxes and failing to protect railroad property. 
In addition to lacking philanthropic feelings toward the state of Montana, 
Hill pointed out that, "The Company owns no leinds there and does not intend 
to buy any. ... It does not now or at any time hereafter, expect to 
spend any money in internal improvements in Montcina."^^ 
Hill's reasons were strong; unlike in the Wenatchee Valley he had no 
personal involvement in land sales along the Milk River. However, despite 
what he wrote to Wooldridge, he recognized the need for irrigation in the 
area and worked quietly, behind the scenes, to involve the federal 
government in such a project. In late 1899 he and Senator R. F. Pettigrew, 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, tossed around the idea 
of the government donating land to the state of Montana for the purpose of 
irrigation, but nothing came of it.^2 
His experiences in Washington and Montana convinced Hill that 
irrigation could not be completed through private individuals or 
corporations. The finaincial costs were prohibitive and the need for 
engineering excellence high. At the end of the 1890s Hill remained 
convinced that irrigation was necessary to mcike the land along his line 
fruitful. His faith in promoting agricultural development through other 
institutions had, in this instance however, been considercdily refined. By 
1898 the financial failure of irrigation in eastern Washington persuaded 
Hill that only the federal government had the resources necessary to 
undertake reclamation projects. 
Others also preached the necessity of federal involvement in 
irrigation. Attempts at irrigation during the 1870s and 1880s, both by 
private and state orgemizations, had consistently fallen short or failed 
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altogether because of the high cost of construction. In addition, states 
contested jurisdiction over water which failed to conform to political 
boundaries. Increasingly, proponents of irrigation looked to the federal 
government to provide the necessary funding, if not to actually conduct the 
work. From the late 1880s congressmen drafted numerous bills proposing 
national involvement in western irrigation. In 1891 Salt Lake City hosted 
the first of many irrigation congresses to agitate for federal irrigation. 
These efforts proved fruitless partially because of eastern and midwestern 
opposition to government expenditure on the West and partly to conflicts 
among the westerners themselves as to how the irrigation should be 
implemented. Some, such as Senator Francis E. Waurren and Elwood Mead, both 
of Wyoming, advocated government surveys euid construction of dams and 
reservoirs, but Weuited the leuid distribution and water allocation to be the 
preserve of the states. This would necessarily favor the controlling 
powers in each state which, in Wyoming, remained the cattle interests. 
Others, trying to promote more intensive settlement, preferred the 
government to control land sales as well as construction. 
In 1897 Hill became more involved in pressuring the federal 
government. At the irrigation congress in Wichita that year he worked with 
George Hebard Maixwell to form the National Irrigation Association. This 
organization ostensibly aimed to educate the American citizens to the needs 
for irrigation and the vital role that the federal government had to play. 
Although the association did perform this work through its publications, 
lectures, emd farmers' institutes, its more importcuit role was lobbying for 
irrigation legislation in Washington, D.C.*^^ 
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Hill's initial contribution to the National Irrigation Association, 
as well as motive force, was financial. He persuaded two, and later four, 
other railroads to join the Great Northern in contributing five thouseind 
dolleirs per annum to the organization. By 1899 the Great Northern, the 
Southern Pacific, the Santa Fe, the Union Pacific, and the Northern Pacific 
each contributed five hundred dollars a month to maintain operations at the 
association's headquarters in Chicago. Maxwell headed the organization.^^ 
Meucwell had been interested in irrigation for the small-scale farmer 
throughout his career. Observation of private and state attempts to 
irrigate leind in California led him to realize the necessity for federal 
intervention. A dynamic, forceful publicist. Maxwell launched Maxwell's 
Talisman after the formation of the National Irrigation Association to 
promote irrigation and undertook the new art of political lobbying with 
zeal.^® 
Hill's involvement did not end with financial support. During the 
first few years of the twentieth century he worked hard supporting 
Maxwell's maneuvers in Washington and exerting his own influence with 
congressmen. By late 1901 the sides in the debate had been clearly 
defined. On the one side stood Hill euid his supporters who favored total 
federal control of irrigation; on the other stood westerners who supported 
turning over irrigated lands to the states. Elwood Mead, now head of the 
Office of Irrigation Investigations in the USDA, led the latter group. 
Mead's history as the territorial and state engineer for Wyoming linked him 
closely to the grazing interests of the West for whom control over land 
distribution was a vital issue. 
Despite his earlier interest in stock raising and his promotion of 
diversified farming, by the mid-1890s Hill stood firmly against the 
cattlemen. Pgurt of his opposition was ideological. Hill thought that 
farming continued to be the best occupation for man and that farmers made 
the best citizens for a democracy. This idea, which farming audiences 
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found attractive, was a common theme in his speeches, such as the one to 
the Minnesota Agricultural Society in 1904 where he stated that, "Better 
men emd better women live in the country."'^® 
Although Hill had always believed in the primacy of farming, conflict 
with stockmen had only arisen in the 1890s due to a synchronicity of 
events. The completion of the Great Northern 2uid the need to maximize the 
haulage from the railroad's territory was the prime motivation. Little 
money could be made from hauling stock and supplying a few ranchers in 
compeirison with a well-settled agrarian hinterland. In addition. Hill 
opposed the continued practice of cattlemen accumulating vast tracts of 
public domain and thus precluding feirming settlers from acquiring good 
land. The ranchers achieved this through buying up scrip and by taking 
advemtage of the Desert Lemd Act, the Timber and Stone Act, and the 
commutation clause of the Homestead Act, as well as by Veirious nefarious 
practices. Finally the increase in emigration to Ccuaada worried those 
interested in the settlement and expeuision of the American West. Thus 
Hill's support of federally sponsored irrigation accompanied his desire to 
undermine the cattle interests' control in the West and to foster an 
increase of feLrm settlement. 
A federal irrigation bill drafted in eaurly 1901 by George Meucwell, 
Senator Freincis Newlands, emd Frederick Haynes Newell the chief 
hydrographer of the US Geological Survey, met many of Hill's aims. The 
bill proved radical in two important ways. Unlike earlier bills proposing 
federal irrigation this one did not plem to finance irrigation from the 
rivers and heirbor fund or from tcixation. Rather, it proffered a revolving 
fund where government sale of irrigated leuid would create the monies for 
subsequent works. This provision eliminated the main bone of contention 
for eastern politicicuis: cost- The bill also assigned the distribution of 
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irrigated land to the General Land Office rather than the state, thus 
effectively removing control from the cattlemen.^® 
The debate in Washington centered around two different sets of 
western interests with both sides trying to commeindeer eastern support. 
Hill's main supporters in Congress were Senator Peuris Gibson from Montana 
and Senator Henry C. Heinsbrough from North Deikota, and they identified 
their main opponents as "the covert opposition of representatives from the 
Rocky Mountain states who are evidently under the influence of speculators 
and large cattle men." Hansbrough acted as the senatorial sponsor of the 
Newlands Reclcunation Act cuid saw danger lying in the West, "The South eind 
East cire willing that we should have what we want. The trouble, I fear, is 
in the Southwest with eui occasional kicker from the Northwest." Hill 
helped the bill by "bring[ing] the eastern members of the House to a 
complete understeuiding of the question." He also persuaded the Burlington 
men to support the legislation thus gaining a "powerful influence over the 
Wyoming delegation, in who we [Gibson] have but very little confidence. 
Various changes in the legislation which Maxwell felt removed its 
teeth, complicated the passage of the bill. The alterations gave more 
control to the states, causing Maxwell to renege his support in February of 
1902. Hill followed Meixwell's lead, understanding the bill to be "totally 
impracticable." Mgucwell and Gibson believed that the bill would fail eind 
hoped that they would at least be able to force legislation for federal 
irrigation in a couple "special localities, which had been recommended by 
the Geological Survey." By April, however, the bill had "recently been so 
amended as to give very general satisfaction, and is now endorsed by 
Msucwell who will work for it with all his eibility." In preparation for 
passage of the bill, Pauris Gibson persuaded the Secretciry of the Interior 
to withdraw 1,700,000 acres from homestead access in Montana to await 
irrigation. Once again, Mcixwell and Gibson exhorted Hill to use his 
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influence in Congress, and in June 1902 the Newlands Reclamation Act 
passed. 
Although the passage of the Act represented the fulfillment of the 
main aim of the National Irrigation Association, the organization did not 
disbcind nor did its funding cease. Rather, Mcixwell embarked on a campaign 
to repeal the Desert Land Act and the commutation clause of the Homestead 
Act. Additionally the organization desired a forestry bill to protect 
water supply amd wanted to ensure that the federal monies appropriated for 
irrigation did not become a lever in interregional squcibbles. Overall, 
though. Hill's involvement in irrigation reached its zenith of optimism in 
1902 with the passage of the Act and the amticipation of federally 
sponsored irrigation throughout the West, but especially in northern 
Monteuia which had sparked Hill's interest initially cind promised to be one 
of the first eireas developed. Certainly in the case of irrigation. Hill, 
in 1902 at least, could claim his policy of promoting agricultural 
development through other institutions had triumphed. 
As Hill finessed his strategy of using other institutions to realize 
his agricultural goals, he never forgot that the bottom line was profit to 
the railroad. Thus he rejected any proposed scheme which would not benefit 
the Great Northern, including ideas of dryland farming cuid sugeir beet 
raising on the northern Great Plains. 
Drylamd farming, as it related to water-conserving cultivcible 
techniques, was largely initiated by a Vermont native, Hardy Webster 
Campbell. In 1879 he entered a homestead claim in Brown County, Dedcota 
Territory. He began to experiment with various types of cultivation 
techniques aimed at conserving the moisture in the soil and in 1890 he 
invented the sub-surface packer. This machine comprised a series of wedge-
shaped wheels which revolved eiround am aucle cutting deep into the soil, cuid 
tamping it at the bottom of the cut while mulching the top soil. It 
provided the basis for the Campbell System of cultivation which Heurdy 
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Webster Campbell sought to publicize through the Western Agricultural 
Improvement Society, founded in 1895. 
The basic premise behind the subsoil packer centered around the 
capillziry moisture in the soil. This is the small cimount of water which 
surrounds each soil particle emd moves through the soil as water through a 
sponge. Campbell and others cirgued that to meiximize retention and use of 
this water two things must be done. First, the siibsoil, from two to 
sixteen inches below the surface had to be packed down to encourage 
capillary action upward through the soil. Second, the top layer of soil 
had to be carefully and repeatedly cultivated in order to decrease 
capilletry action thus hindering evaporation on the soil surface. 
Campbell gradually developed more concepts related to dryland 
feirming. By 1902, when he published his first Soil Culture Manual, the 
Campbell System advocated 160-acre fcirms. On these farms he recommended 
deep fall plowing, cultivation before and after seeding, and alternating 
summer fallow with tillage of the soil during the fallow as well as the 
crop years. Campbell's success lay partially in his ability to tie his 
work closely to the scientific experiments being done at various experiment 
stations. He frequently quoted F. H. King of the Wisconsin Experiment 
Station emd Willet Hays of the Minnesota Experiment Station, among others. 
Most importemtly, though, Campbell was eui effective publicist. He 
incorporated a number of dry feirming organizations including The Campbell 
System of Farming Association. He also published many dry farming journals 
and magazines such as the monthly Drv Farming Magazine, and proselytized 
his ideas to the railways, which happily financed and promoted his work. 
As early as 1895 two of the future Hill lines, the Northern Pacific 
and the Burlington, financed dry farming promotion through Campbell. In 
that yeax he ran five experiment stations for the Northern Pacific in North 
Dedcota and gave lectures on dry farming along the Burlington. In 1907 his 
Hargreaves, Drv Farming. 85-6. 
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focus shifted to the Southern Great Plains and he worked for the Southern 
Pacific and the Santa Fe lines 
Campbell approached the Great Northern in these early years, but he 
failed to interest James J. Hill in the potential of dry feunning. In 1895 
he wrote to Hill requesting a meeting to discuss the vieibility of dry 
fcunaing- He wanted Hill's help in proving "to our people and outside 
parties that we have a country actually superior to the Eastern humid 
districts." Ceunpbell undermined his position by omitting to enclose a 
circular, a point noted on the letter in Hill's handwriting, but he did 
meet with Hill, or one of the road's officials, as well as with the 
management of the Northern Pacific. Letters between the railroads indicate 
that Campbell asserted to J. W. Kendrick, General Manager of the Northern 
Pacific, that Hill had agreed to finance a dry farming periodical for 
Campbell. However, no evidence exists that Hill, in fact, made this 
promise, and the financial support did not materialize, probcJaly due to 
Hill's lack of interest.^® 
In ecirly 1897 B. S. Rufsell of the Great Nor-thern drafted an 
agreement with Campbell regarding dry farming experiment stations in North 
Dakota. The agreement stated that the Great Northern would give Campbell 
$3,300, free transportation, and supplies for maintaining seven 40-acre 
feirms for three years, in return for Ceunpbell supplying 1,000 copies of 
Campbell Soil Culture and Farm Journal throughout the region, and 
instructing local farmers on the methods and benefits of dry farming. This 
agreement was never put into practice.^® 
With Hill firmly in charge of the Great Northern's agricultural 
policies in the 1890s, the line followed his lead and channeled its efforts 
into irrigation promotion. Hill's emphasis on irrigation remained strong 
as late as 1904 when he stated that all the land in Montsma, cultivable 
without irrigation, had been claimed. Hill's caution concerning dryland 
farming can also be linked to the Great Northern's need, far more than some 
other railroads, to have successful amd sustained development of lemd, not 
just an initial attraction of settlement and land sales. Because of 
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reasons intrinsic to the structure of the Great Northern, Hill resisted 
joining other lines in promoting the dry fairming boom at the end of the 
century. In the end. Hill's resisted ary agricultural idea that he did not 
perceive as benefiting his road.®® 
Hill's attitude toward experimentation with sugar beets on the 
northern plains proved similcirly resistant. In 1897 the North Dakota 
Agricultural College decided to resume experiments in sugaur beet growing 
which had steurted five years previously. The president of the college, 
John H. Worst, wrote to Hill inquiring if he knew of any limestone quarries 
along the line. Milk of lime is used in sugar manufacture to remove 
nonsugars from the beet syrup. Hill's reply was discouraging. Completely 
ignoring the question of limestone, he asserted that he had no doubt that 
sugeir beets could be successfully grown in Minnesota and North Dakota. 
However, he believed that the business could not be profitaible, and that 
no-one would invest the necessary money in establishing a factory. With 
its cheap Icibor and government subsidies. Hill asserted that European sugau: 
would always undercut the American product. Worst replied that the 
investigation was still important. It would determine if, indeed, sugar 
beet growing was feasible, but impracticable due to high leibor costs, a 
situation which he stated might cheinge as "inventive genius [overcame] the 
cheap Icibor of Europe through horse power and machinery on these level 
fertile prairies."®^ 
In this interlude. Hill clearly placed practicality before the 
increasingly dominant notion of scientific expertise centered around pure 
research. He saw no value in experimentation which led to no immediate 
fineuicial prospects. If American sugar could not sell, why investigate its 
production? If the situation cheuiged (which it did after the Second World 
W2ur), then scientific expertise could be applied to the problem. 
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By 1902 Hill's involvement in agriculture had changed direction in a 
seeiningly very successful way. Removing himself from the position of 
eighteenth-century gentleman farmer, he started to utilize other 
institutions to fvirther agricultural development. In his drainage 
endeavors he worked through the state of Minnesota, while in irrigation he 
first utilized subsidiary compemies and later lobbied for federal 
involvement. 
This reflected an acquiescence to the increased professionalization 
of the late nineteenth century as well as cheuiges in education. No longer 
did wealth itself indicate knowledge and expertise. Increasingly these 
were displayed through formal education and institutionalization. Thus 
Hill retreated into his position as a business expert, using this expertise 
to mobilize others. Employing engineers eind publicists, lobbying 
politicians on a state cuid federal level, he had, by 1902, achieved more, 
agriculturally, in the previous nine yecirs than in the entire fifteen 
preceding the completion of the Great Northern. 
Despite these successes. Hill's adoption of the modern, narrow 
definitions of agricultural expertise was evidently more pragmatic than 
theoretical. Utilizing professionals toward his own ends, he never 
questioned his own claim to expertise, colored by the needs of his railway. 
Using the organization genius with which he had built the Great Northern, 
he maneuvered people and opinions at will, rejecting ideas, however 
scientifically sound, when they did not promise direct benefit to his 
corporation or his territory. 
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"the nation's future," 1902-19071 
Hill's elation at the passage of the Newlands Reclamation Act proved 
ephemeral, failing to last through the first decade of the new century. 
Although his well-built and efficiently run railroad continued to profit, 
chcmges in national politics reduced Hill's influence in Washington, D.C. 
Concurrently, continued interaction with national agencies served to 
highlight the gulf between the federal agricultural vision emd that of Hill 
and his railroad. 
Having weathered the economic £ind labor crises of the 1890s, the 
Great Northern's personnel turned their attention to increasing traffic on 
the road. More ore and lumber haulage required more freight cars, from 
13,818 in 1895 to 34,954 in 1906. This also reflected a continued 
expemsion of wheat production in North Dedcota, which replaced Kansas in 
1890 as the nation's leading wheat state. Unfortunately, Hill's political 
involvement did not mirror his economic successes.^ 
Hill's fincincial and tactical support of McKinley's 1896 and 1900 
campaigns encibled him to maintain the federal leverage he had enjoyed under 
Cleveland. Like mauiy contemporary business moguls, however, he had little 
faith in Theodore Roosevelt. Young Roosevelt had proved his interest in 
progressive reform as a New York City police commissioner, as governor of 
New York, and in a variety of other political posts. His popularity 
following the charge of San Juan Hill made him contemplate running for the 
presidency in 1904. The Republiceua Party decided to control this "damned 
cowboy," eind capitalize on his popularity, by burying him in the vice-
presidential slot in the 1900 election. McKinley's assassination in 1901, 
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thus, caused great consternation among the political and business elite, 
placing "that madman" in the White House.^ 
Hill's concerns about Roosevelt were quickly justified. Continuing 
his support of Progressive regulation now president, Roosevelt decided to 
reinforce the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which had been undermined by an 
unsuccessful suit against E. C. Knight in 1895. He chose Hill's Northern 
Securities Company for this test case eind, in Februzury 1902, Attorney 
General Philander Knox filed suit.^ 
The Supreme Court did not retvum a verdict until 1904. In the 
interim. Hill and his associates invested considercJsle energy in attempts 
to mend fences between the Northern Securities conglomerate and the 
president. This included a 1903 meeting between Howard Elliott, president 
of the Northern Pacific, eind Roosevelt, at which Roosevelt assured him that 
the law would be enforced although he was glad to have a "Harveird man" in 
charge of the railroad. Elliott happily reported this implicit assurance 
of old boy support, failing to note the indirect attack on Hill, a self-
made mem who left school at fourteen. Hill, perhaps less naive than 
Elliott, railed against Roosevelt and invested considerable time and energy 
in defending the corporation he viewed as his personal property.^ 
The ripples from the Northern Securities case washed over all areas 
of Hill's life. The time eind energy he invested affected his health, and 
his family rallied around as he saw himself "growing old and helpless." He 
was amazed, as the case unraveled, that the court admitted no benefit in 
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trusts or security compcinies. Attacks on combinations had been growing for 
more thcin a decade- Hill failed to understand the extent to which 
politiciems had embraced the question of regulation, for both pragmatic and 
ideological reasons. Fighting the case, he found himself defending an 
increasingly obsolete ideology in every possible way, including 
contributing an essay to a book in defense of trusts. Hill's Quixotic 
position as a result of Northern Securities v. U.S. which dissolved the 
Northern Securities Compeiny, foreshadowed his growing alienation from the 
mainstream of agricultural thought during the last fifteen years of his 
life. The case had more immediate consequences on Hill's agricultural 
success reducing his political influence and exacerbating his antagonism to 
federal agencies.® 
Roosevelt's accession to the presidency and his embarkation on a plan 
of trust-busting, removed Hill from the federal influence he had enjoyed 
under Cleveland and McKinley. This shift had a detrimental effect on 
Hill's efforts to strengthen the agricultural infrastructure of his 
railroad. Hill had hoped that irrigation would facilitate his vision of a 
West where "the small farm, thoroughly tilled, [replaced] the large fcunn, 
with its weeds, its neglected corners, its abused soil and its thin 
product." And where "Every intelligent euid progressive feirmer will join 
stock raising with grain raising. Nature has provided the cattle to go 
with the land." But, when the Recleunation Service failed to meet these 
expectations, Hill had little political recourse.^ 
Three weeks after the passage of the Newlands Act, Congress created 
the Reclamation Service within the United States Geological Survey headed 
by Frederick Haynes Newell. In 1907 the Service became an independent 
agency and, in 1923, was renamed Bureau of Reclamation. Newell embodied 
the growing dominance of expertise in America at the end of the nineteenth 
century. An engineering graduate of MIT, he had led the hydrological 
studies of Geological Survey from 1890. He saw the Newlands Act as the 
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opportunity to centralize and rationalize issues of water throughout the 
West, under the guidance of well-trained engineers rather than fcLrmers or 
politicians. This perspective left no room for variants such as state 
water laws or fcirmer income, propelling Newell into conflict on msuiy 
fronts.® 
The Reclamation Service proved slow and expensive in fulfilling 
Hill's visions. The Service undertook a large number of projects to 
maximize political support and costs proved much higher than estimated. 
The requirements of the Newlands Act added further delays. Before a 
project received federal expenditure the Reclamation Service's engineers 
had to establish the practicality of irrigating the region, and a 
grassroots interest had to be demonstrated. The latter placed the onus for 
advancement once more on the fairmers whom Hill had found so conservative. 
Lacking political power. Hill could only rail against the 
inefficiency of the Service and divert his agricultural attention 
elsewhere. Hill remained interested in irrigation and continued to try eind 
foster it working through other institutions. As these efforts proved 
ineffective he began to invest more energy in dryland feirming eind crop 
diversification.^ 
Hill's declining federal influence, sind the growing difficulties of 
working with other agencies, led Hill to revisit independent action. 
Unlike in the 1880s he chose to do this through the Great Northern as well 
as through personal action- Hill's disillusionment, with the state of 
American agriculture and with the dedication of governmental and academic 
agencies to rebuild it according to his vision, grew significantly in the 
esirly twentieth century. With few available alternatives. Hill displayed 
his fears for "the Nation's Future" in foreboding Malthusian speeches, 
predicting America's ineibility to feed its citizens. "Within twenty yecurs 
under the present conditions our wheat crop will not be sufficient for home 
consumption," and then "how are we to provide our own children with . . . 
their daily bread." He showed concern with soil fertility and 
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conservation. "The soil is exhausted amd never replenished. What must be 
the end?"^® 
Hill remained active in the push for irrigation even after the 
passage of the Newlands Reclamation Act by continuing to work through other 
institutions. He firmly believed that in irrigation he had found a 
salvation for the nation as well as a meal ticket for his line. "No agency 
at work," he insisted, "does so much to ameliorate, to elevate, to raise 
the general level of comfort and intelligence and even of character as the 
reclamation of our desert lands." Hill' s idealism reflected the central 
precepts of groups such as the Country Life Commission. Hill and other 
rural reformers of the time offered a modernized vision of a Jeffersoniein 
America. Hill argued that irrigation would help a family support itself in 
relative comfort and independence—replenishing the yeoman class that 
Jefferson saw as key to American democracy; it would also facilitate dense 
settlement along his line where a "spirit of associative enterprise" could 
be cultivated. These intrinsic benefits would counter the negative trends 
of industrialization: the creation of "immense population centers, 
surrounded by a country speirsely settled, imperfectly cultivated, and 
looking to the metropolis for the realization of dreams." Hill's ideals 
were, as ever, inseparable from the needs of his line, which would profit 
from the high haulage generated by increased agrarian settlement. 
Continuing to lobby for more federal intervention through George 
Maxwell and the National Irrigation Association, Hill also operated 
independently, trying to promote irrigation under the Newlands Act in 
various localities along his road, especially North Dakota. 
In North Dakota some interest had emerged in irrigation as early as 
1889, with plans to irrigate the state by means of cainals tapping the 
Missouri River. The promotion came largely from state politicians who 
viewed population growth as both the key to, and the proof of, the state's 
10. Hill, Highways of Progress. 38; Sioux Citv Tribune. 8 September 
1906. 
11. James J. Hill, Speech at National Irrigation Congress in 
Portland, Oregon, 1905, Louis W. Hill Papers, James J. Hill Libreiry, St. 
Paul, Minn, (hereafter LWHP). 
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success. Settlers, still availing themselves of the relatively well-
watered lands in homesteading showed little interest. 
To satisfy the conditions of the Newlcuids Act promoters of irrigation 
formed the North DeJcota Irrigation Association at Hill's instigation. The 
association held its first meeting in Bismarck on 20 and 21 October 1903. 
Its president was Erastus Applemsin Willieims, part of the McKenzie ring. 
Alexeinder McKenzie had worked on the construction crews of the Northern 
Pacific before the crash of 1873, settling in Bismetrck at that time. He 
continued to work for the railroad in veurious capacities, gradually 
acquiring political control over the state as Republiciui national 
committeeman. McKenzie always represented the interests of the railroads 
and other Twin Cities businesses, helping to make North Dakota, politically 
as well as economically, a colonial extension of St. Paul/Minneapolis.^^ 
Through the association. Hill aimed to keep irrigation in North 
Dakota at the forefront of the federal eind state mind. The group paid for 
a state engineer to assess irrigation potential independent of the federal 
government. It then mobilized bipeirtisan support for irrigation on a state 
level and held annual congresses. The organization also developed an 
educational component; to fulfill Hill's aim of making "the value of 
irrigation ... a permainent part of the common stock of knowledge; not the 
possession of a band of enthusiasts or a picked body of scientists and 
specialists." Here again. Hill expressed a broad conception of expertise. 
Although acknowledging that irrigation could only be funded on a federal 
level eind constructed by engineers, he assumed that the basic principles 
should be within the reach of all farmers. Thus James Hill hoped to blend 
practical agricultural education and scientific expertise into ein 
integrated program of corporate and social development that, in his 
estimation, would save the nation. 
12. Louis N. Hafermehl, "To Make the Desert Bloom; The Politics and 
Promotion of Esirly Irrigation Schemes in North DaJcota," North Dakota 
History 59 (Summer 1992); 13-27. 
13. Ibid; E. A. Williams to Louis Hill, 19 January 1905, Outgoing 
Correspondence, E. A. Williams Papers, North OcUcota Historical Society 
(hereafter NDHS); Faroo Forum and Daily Republican. 21 and 22 October 1903; 
Elwyn B. Robinson, History of North Dakota (Lincoln; University of 
Nebraska Press, 1966), 219-20, 230. 
14. Hafermehl, "To Mcike the Desert Bloom," 13-27; Jzimes J. Hill, 
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Although relatively successful on a political level, the association 
had much less success in convincing farmers of the importcince of 
irrigation. Farmers in North Dakota assumed a more radical stance than 
their compatriots in neighboring states even before the rise of the 
Nonpartisan League. They continually resisted the McKenzie ring and their 
colonial status, and attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to control the 
railroads through legislation and taxes as early as 1890. Consequently the 
North Dakota Irrigation Association, with its political associations, met 
with considercible skepticism. 
The first state irrigation congress was well attended, but the same 
could not be said of the next two. Hill dismissed the farmers' lack of 
enthusiasm as ignorance; "Work in North Dakota has been delayed by the 
slowness of the people, owing to a lack of appreciation of the great 
benefits accruing, to co-operate." North Dakotans' caution, however, had a 
solid foundation. Feirmers were wary of plans which would conimit them to 
indeterminate costs. The structure of the Newlands Act made them 
responsible for repaying the expense of irrigation in annual increments, 
yet the Recleunation Service only provided them with an estimate of the 
final cheirges. Mcuiy found this unsatisfactory, especially since the 
rainfall generally remained adequate into the 1920s, seemingly negating the 
need for irrigation. Some boosters also feared that promotion of 
irrigation would solidify external impressions of North Deikota as an arid 
state, thus discouraging immigration. Finally, the North Dakota 
Agricultural College and its experiment stations showed little interest in 
irrigation, being more concerned with crop rotation and diversification. 
Agricultural academics' lack of interest did have some significance.^® 
15. Robinson, Historv of North Dakota. 241; James J. Hill, Speech at 
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Historians debate when the work of agricultural scientists became 
accepted by the majority of the rural population. David Danbom argues that 
it took the agricultural depression of the 1920s before farmers 
relinquished their independence, while at the other extreme, Aleui Marcus 
and Howard Segal postulate farmer dependence on experts by the early 
twentieth century. Neither eurgument is persuasive. Fcirmer deference to 
agricultural scientists was a gradual and regional process. Many 
VcLricdsles, including the personnel of specific agricultural colleges, the 
general state of the local farm economy, and the success of their methods 
in meeting farmer needs, affected the rate of grassroots acceptance of 
academic expertise. Certainly, by the early twentieth century, the Farmer 
Institute Movement had become well-established and feunner attendeuice at 
meetings grew. 
In North Deikota, institutes started out as voluntetry endeavors by the 
staff. Their popularity led to state funding and a growing trust between 
some fsirmers emd educators such as Torger Hoverstad, who took over as 
superintendent of the institutes in 1907. The University of Minnesota 
fired Hoverstad in 1906 for failure to drain the lands of the Crookston 
Experiment Station. He had a wealth of experience in feirming in the Red 
River Valley which North Dzikota farmers recognized and appreciated when he 
crossed the River. 
The promoters of irrigation in North Dakota countered this lack of 
interest among their state's academics by using professors from Montana. 
Perhaps due to a history of successful irrigation in areas such as the 
Gallatin Valley, Monteinans as a whole, were more positive toward 
reclamation. The Montana Agricultural Association, headed by W. M. 
Wooldridge of Hinsdale who had corresponded with Hill in the 1890s 
regaurding irrigation in Montzina, promoted reclamation relentlessly but, 
unlike in North Deikota, the agricultural college under Frederick B. 
17. David DeUibom, The Resisted Revolution; Urban America and the 
Industrialization of Agriculture. 1900-1930 (Ames: Iowa State University 
Press, 1979), 138-45; Alcin I Meurcus juid Howard P. Segal, Technology in 
America: A Brief History (Fort Worth; Heurcourt Brace JoveUiovitch, 1989), 
192-93; Roy. V Scott, The Reluctant Farmer; The Rise of Agricultural 
Extension to 1914 (Orbana; University of Illinois Press, 1970), 106-07. 
18. Danbom, "Our Purpose is to Serve". 20-22, 28, 32, 53-54; Hunter, 
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Linfield, also displayed an active interest. Consequently, Williams 
persuaded Wooldridge eind Linfield to attend the various congresses cuad the 
North Dakota State Fair, and the former brought exhibits of crops grown 
under irrigation shipped gratis on the Hill-run Northern Pacific. 
Wooldridge acknowledged the importance of Farmers' Institutes in conveying 
information on irrigation in Montana and suggested the importance of 
something similar in North Dakota.^® 
Hindered by a lack of grassroots interest in irrigation emd of 
academic support, political conflict further stymied promoters in North 
Dakota. Senator Henry C. Heinsbrough, a McKenzie man, had consistently 
supported the Hill faction with respect to reclamation and settlement in 
lobbying for the Newlands Act. However, his re-election in the winter of 
1902 had been contingent on him appeasing "the cattle and land speculating 
interests in his State." Hansbrough recognized the difficulty of his 
position, caught between two opposing groups, the railroads eind the 
ranchers. These groups not only contested power throughout the eirid West 
but held very different views on irrigation and leuid allotment. Ranchers 
wanted complete control of water access and to acquire leirge tracts of land 
through homesteading fraud. The railroads wanted increased settlement, and 
so desired governmentally controlled communal water access and the repeal 
of land laws which lent themselves to fraud.20 
Consequently, Hansbrough tried to walk a tightrope between the two 
factions in 1903 by introducing a land bill that made land fraud more 
difficult. Unfortunately, this bill did not appease the leaders of the 
National Irrigation Association. Maxwell thought it would benefit 
speculators, and the resulting media and letter row between these two 
proponents of irrigation in North Dakota did little to facilitate the 
progress of irrigation in the state.21 
19. F. B. Linfield, "Agricultural Development in Montana," n.d., 
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Despite these obstacles, irrigation promoters did make progress. 
Fanners in the Buford-Trenton region on the Missouri emd the Little Muddy 
River, which feeds into the Missouri just below Williston, agreed to comply 
with the requirements of the Newlcmds Act. They formed water associations 
and contracted to pay back the cost of irrigation over the course of twelve 
yeetrs. Both valleys eire composed of rich alluvial soil, emd the farmers 
aimed to grow potatoes, sugar beets, and alfalfa on the irrigated land. 
The valleys were also on the main line of the Great Northern, and thus 
farmers had a greater assureuice of being able to market their crops. The 
area, also had the advemtage of being near a large deposit of lignite coal. 
This coal, while useless for railroads because of its tendency to 
spontaneously combust if stored, could generate electricity at the new 
power plant, which one booster described as being "practically as solid and 
substamtial as the pyramids themselves." The electricity ran a main beirge 
pumping unit on the Missouri River and other, smaller, pumps to distribute 
the water. The Reclamation Service completed construction in June of 1907 
and intended that the project should ultimately irrigation 52,000 acres.22 
The Secretary of the Interior Jeunes Garfield formally opened the 
Buford-Trenton and Williston project in 1907. The consequent publicity 
hype did not solve the inherent problems of cost and faunner resistaince to 
irrigation. The majority of farmers holding Icind in the irrigation 
districts refused to join the water users' association and assume the 
consequent costs, so they were blocked from access to water when it started 
pumping in 1908. Irrigation promoters over-optimisitcally believed that 
high productivity on the irrigated lands would soon persuade reluctant 
fcunners of the project's benefits.23 
Hill's experiences with promoting irrigation in North Deikota 
demonstrated his continued problems with realizing his agricultural vision. 
Having lobbied and advertised on a national level for five years, he faced, 
in 1902, the same problem of geurnering grassroots fcirmer support which had 
plagued him in his ecirlier yeeurs of agricultural promotion. Continuing to 
22. Anon., "The Williston euid Buford-Trenton Irrigation Projects," 
North Dakota Magazine 2 (August 1907): 1-8; William Seuauel Bryans, "A 
History of Transcontinental Railroads and Coal Mining on the Northern Great 
Plains to 1920" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Wyoming, 1987), 27-63. 
23. Anon., "The Williston and Buford-Trenton Irrigation Projects," 
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operate through other institutions he helped found the North Dakota 
Irrigation Association, lending the orgcmization his stature and 
agricultural expertise. As with his distribution of cattle and his 
attempts to drain the lands of the Red River Valley, Hill found his 
credentials insufficient. Farmers relied on a more complex network of 
information than that provided by one railroad mein, backing a group of 
unpopular politicians, when deciding to chemge their practices. In North 
Dakota, regardless of the efforts of Hill, boosters, and politicians, only 
the feunners with direct access to the railroad showed any interest in 
irrigation, and only a few of them. 
Unlike in North Dakota, the problems faced by irrigation promoters in 
Montana in the early years of federal reclamation, tended to be more 
political than social or economic. Irrigation in the state had began as 
early as 1865 along the river valleys. By 1880 350,000 acres of the state 
"were under the ditch." This acreage had increased to nearly one million 
acres by the passage of the Newlands Act. Montcinans, both fcirmers and 
academics, were, thus, well-aware of the benefits of irrigation. 
Elwood Mead, as head of the USDA's Office of Irrigation 
Investigations, wanted greater state control over water issues in Montana. 
Mead had been both the state and territorial irrigation engineer in Wyoming 
where he helped create the water policy of the state constitution in 1889. 
The Wyoming law extended the Colorado system of placing unappropriated 
water under state ownership by claiming that all water in the state was 
state property for which people could apply for a right of use. This 
creation of a powerful bureaucracy worked fairly effectively in a state 
which operated essentially as an oligarchy, but it portended conflict in 
states like Montana where a vziriety of vested interests contended over 
available water. Mead supported federal involvement in irrigation to an 
extent, realizing that only the national government had the resources for 
the extensive surveys necessary. However, he was one of the main advocates 
of a decentralized federal program which would continue to allocate 
substantial power to individual states. 
24. Linfield, "Agricultural Development in Montana." 
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Due to their different approaches to federal irrigation. Mead had 
always been in conflict with Newell of the Geological Survey who favored 
federal centralization and rationalization. This conflict expanded in 1898 
when Mead was appointed head of the newly created Office of Irrigation 
Investigations in the USDA. With the triumph of centralized control in 
1902 and the appointment of Newell as the Commissioner of the Reclamation 
Service, Mead moved the struggle to the state level. He encouraged 
disgruntled western politicians to pass laws similar to those established 
in Wyoming, intended to reassert state control over water as much as 
possible. This, according to George Maxwell, would hamper the Service's 
ability to work in the state which offered "greater possibilities than any 
other state for development under the national irrigation policy."26 
Maxwell foresaw that the livestock interests would favor greater 
state control over water while the mining interests would be disinterested 
euid thus open for persuasion by ranchers. Increased state control needed 
to be stymied to give federal irrigation its head. Maxwell strategized by 
calling in meirkers and persuading allies such as Hill to do the same. In 
addition he sent a lengthy press release to all Montana editors, 
legislators, and members of the National Irrigation Association, detailing 
the problems inherent in the idea of state control of water. The efforts 
of the National Irrigation Association proved successful, indefinitely 
postponing or derailing in the Senate all four bills introduced into 
Montana's lower House.^7 
Other problems surrounding irrigation in Montana focused on Hill's 
pet project in the Milk River Valley. The valley was federally approved 
for irrigation in 1903 and district engineer Cyrus C. BeJab surveyed it for 
irrigation potential. In hearings before the House committee on irrigation 
of eurid lands in 1904, Babb reported that irrigation in the lower valley 
between Chinook and Glasgow was eminently feasible with a storage reservoir 
26. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West, 307-09; Worster, Rivers of 
Empire. 173; Letter from Maxwell, 11 Februeiry 1903, GNRP. 
27. Meucwell to J. H. Hamnaford, to W. H. Phipps, to F. I. Whitney, 
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on the St. Mary's River, in what is now Glacier National Park, channeling 
additional water into the lower Milk River. Unfortunately, a Vcuriety of 
problems confronted construction. A cattle compeiny owned the proposed 
reservoir site, eind the irrigation works would result in flooding some 
Great Northern tracks. Railroad engineers had estimated that the necessary 
modifications would cost four hundred thouscind dollars, eind it was unclear 
how the burden of this cost would be divided between the government and the 
railroad.28 
More importsmtly, after rising in western Monteuia, the Milk River 
first flows northeasterly into Ceinada for over a hundred miles before 
recrossing the international border into the eastern part of the state. 
The St. Mary's River also flows north into Ceuiada eind by 1904, a 
governmentally supported irrigation compeuiy, the Canadian Northwest 
Irrigation Company, had esteiblished a canal network bringing water to 
thirty thousand acres. The international border considerably complicated 
matters amd forced BcJab to involve the state depsirtment in negotiations 
over water rights. Newell, also present at the hecurings as the head of the 
Reclamation Service, pointed out that, although initially appearing most 
favoraible, the problems encountered on the Milk River suggested that 
reclamation monies in Montana could be better used elsewhere in the state, 
namely the southern portion. This diversion of attention from the Milk 
River Valley did not endear the service or Newell to Hill. It demonstrated 
that the problem of relying on other agencies for agricultural change lay 
in the potential for diverging agendas. Geographical and bureaucratic 
complications, forced Hill to consider other options for making the 
railroad's territory in Montana profitcible.29 
On a federal level Hill had not abandoned irrigation-related 
agitation, although the accession of Roosevelt had diminished Hill's 
28. Stanley W. Howeurd, Green Fields of Montana; A Brief History of 
Irrigation (MemhattcUi, Keins.: Sunflower Press, 1974), 31; House, Hearings 
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political clout. Having achieved the irrigation legislation. Hill, 
Mcucwell, emd their congressional allies turned their attention to what Hill 
described as "the insane policy of land laws which tend toward the 
exhaustion of the public domain by the Icind monopolist and speculator." 
These various loopholes in the homesteading and other land laws allowed 
ranchers, miners, emd speculators to appropriate large acreages. Mine and 
cattle companies encouraged their employees to register claims which they 
later purchased.^'' 
Cattle owners showed particular concern to control access to water, 
especially after the blizzards of 1886 and 1887 forced them away from free 
ranging towcird more controlled reinching. The dramatic losses of cattle in 
the storms had convinced many cattlemen to provide winter shelter and 
fodder for their stock- They needed regular access to water to raise 
forage and water their herds while in confined winter quarters. Thus, they 
frequently used the land laws to gain control of streams in the public 
domain, making the adjacent land useless for farming or other ranchers. 
The National Irrigation Association began a push to repeal laws which 
facilitated land fraud, namely the commutation clause of the Homestead Act, 
the Timber and Stone Act (1878), cind the Desert Land Act (1877). Joseph 
Queurles of Wisconsin introdu'jad the bill in November 1903, and the Senate 
referred it to the Committee on Public Lands.^2 
The composition of the opposing forces in the conflict over the 
Quarles Bill resembled the struggle over state or federal water control in 
Montana. On the one side, according to Maxwell, were the "Elwood Mead-
Wyoming coterie" who wanted to protect their interest in "speculative leuid 
grabbing or the building up of great stock ranches to the exclusion of 
settlers." Mead, so dependent on ranching support, could not afford to 
back actions so obviously designed to undermine his constituency.^^ 
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On the other side aligned Hill, Meixwell, and the members of the 
National Irrigation Association. Maintaining a Jeffersonian belief in the 
inherent superiority of small-scale, independent farmers, they desired a 
West settled by a plenitude of yeomen. They couched this view in the most 
ideological terms. They opposed "speculating interests" who were 
"grabbing" land intended "for the benefit of the people." Only true 
settlers could utilize lamd "which is now idle or waste," and the nation 
depended on the association who faced "a very hcurd fight, for personal 
interests [the opposition] will get up and work in the night while 
patriotism is asleep." These repealers did not deny their self-interest in 
the matter. They insisted instead that the "development of the west" was 
vital "especially to the commercial interests . . . who must have 
population to create trade. 
For Hill, at least, the ideological stance of the supporters of the 
Quarles Bill was not assumed. Despite his holdings of western lands, such 
as those given to him by the Wenatchee Development Company for routing his 
railroad through the valley, he did not see himself as a "speculator," a 
negatively charged term, but a "developer." That those supporting the 
Quarles Bill stood to gain fineuicially from the repeals, did not make their 
contention that the legislation represented the best for America any less 
sincere. Self-interest compounded rather than contradicted their position, 
and they stood firm backed by a legacy of over a century of Jeffersonian 
agraricinism. 
At stake in these eirguments was not just access to lamd but, in the 
broader scheme, the social euid moral future of the nation- America was 
undergoing wrenching transitions: from rural to urbsin, agrariein to 
industrial, and local to centralized control by corporations and the state. 
Hill, like other industrialists such as Henry Ford, occupied a paradoxical 
position. A foremost beneficieiry of these chainges, he yet vociferously 
opposed some of their consequences and upheld meuiy moribund ideals which he 
had helped overthrow. 
In 1903 the National Irrigation Association marshaled its forces once 
again, this time for the annual session of the National Irrigation Congress 
34. Meixwell to L. W. Hill and to J. W. Cooper, 6 August 1903; Press 
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held in September in Utah, "the heart of the enemy's country." Maixwell 
foresaw problems with Hansbrough who had supported the Newlands Act. 
Heinsbrough, faced with conflicting visions of irrigation within his 
constituency, chose a proactive stance by introducing a bill that walked a 
middle road. He proposed amendments to the Desert Land Act which would 
make fraud more difficult and outright repeal of the Timber and Stone Act. 
The commuted homestead clause he advocated leaving, arguing that fraud 
occurred less than "the yellow journals would make us believe," and that 
the clause provided eui important benefit to genuine homesteaders. To 
ameliorate matters further, Hansbrough argued that the repeal of the Desert 
Land Act would hinder public land sales and thus prevent the construction 
of a sizable fund for reclamation. 
The forces of the National Irrigation Association opposed 
Heinsbrough's actions, denying his claims that little fraud was committed 
under the Desert Land Act and the commutation clause of the Homestead Act. 
Instead, Montana Senator Paris Gibson, a close friend, business partner, 
cind political ally of Hill's, saw Hansbrough's actions as "just what the 
stock-men and speculators want, and . . . simply designed to give them more 
time in which to gobble up the remaining agricultural land." Gibson also 
dismissed as ridiculous the idea that repeal should be delayed in order to 
fund reclcunation, writing, "How absurd that we should permit the wholesale 
stealing of the public land, for the sake of creating a reclamation 
fund! 
Hill worked hard, but ineffectively, to publicize the salient issues. 
He integrated the complex issues of land laws into his public addresses of 
the time, telling audiences to "Keep demanding the repeal of vicious and 
fraudulent land laws still in force, by which all our lands are being 
dissipated," but his political opportunity had vanished. Hansbrough's 
appointment as chairmcin of the Senate Committee on Public Leuids compounded 
the problems confronting the National Irrigation Association, despite the 
fact that the committee also held powerful pro-Hill forces such as Knute 
35. Mzucwell to Cooper, 6 August 1903, GNRP; Congressional Record. 
58th Cong., 1st sess., 1903, 37, pt. 1; 181; Hemsbrough to Hill, 12 
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Nelson, Peiris Gibson, and, to a lesser extent, Freincis Newlands. Deadlock 
resulted, and, finally, in the spring of 1904 Congress "indefinitely 
postponed" the bills proposed by Hansbrough eind Quarles.^^ 
After 1902 Hill's hopes for national salvation through irrigation 
foundered. He believed that only intensively farmed, irrigated land could 
produce "one continuous village, with neighbors everywhere, and no 
incentive for the creation of vast centers that breed evils of their own." 
It would also maximize his railroad's revenue. But Hill's ambition of an 
irrigated West beceime increasingly frustrated. The National Irrigation 
Association failed to maintain its influence on federal policy after 1902, 
with the initiative moving to the western opposition. The inability of 
Hill and his allies to enact further legislation favoring small-scale 
settlement, compounded the slowness of the Bureau of Reclamation's work to 
irrigate Montema. In the yeairs immediately following the Reclamation Act, 
Hill's optimistic conception of efficient federal irrigation and settlement 
foundered on political opposition and bureaucratic complexities.^® 
These factors, combined with the reluctance of feirmers in North 
Dakota to embrace irrigation, pushed Hill to consider alternative ways to 
encourage a populated, agreurian West. Thus in 1905, he belatedly followed 
the lead of the Great Northern's sister railroad, the Northern Pacific, 
becoming involved in the dryland farming movement which offered an 
alternative method of establishing agricultural settlement on the airid 
plains. 
Although the Great Northern profited from transporting wheat from the 
Plains and Hill advocated increased wheat production to match anticipated 
population growth, he initially had reservations about the dry farming 
movement. Needing stable, productive agriculture, not just leind sales, to 
make profit on his railroad, he hesitated to invest in a potential dryland 
fcunning bubble- Additionally, dry farming tended toweird extensive 
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monocropping, which rested uneasily with a man devoted to intensive 
diversification. But, after 1905, the stalled status of federal irrigation 
combined with other railroads' successful boosting of dryland farming, 
altered Hill's perspective. 
Hill's increased interest in dryland farming resulted from a 
pragmatic assessment of irrigation progress, but his strategies of 
promotion remained the same. As with irrigation. Hill utilized the 
expertise of others to compound his own. The involvement of state 
experiment stations in dryland feunning lent scientific validity to the 
movement through their research. While continuing to believe in his own 
claim to expertise in agriculture through practical experience and business 
success. Hill valued the professionalization of farming by university 
personnel. The endorsement of academic expertise gave the concepts of 
dryland fjurming the additional validity which Hill recognized that he could 
not provide. Grounding his authority in the old concept of a gentleman 
farmer, he nevertheless thought that Progressive notions of scientific 
research and farming would uphold, not undermine, his ideologies and 
prominence. 
The Great Northern's first involvement with practical dry farming 
experimentation came through its sister railroad, the Montana experiment 
station, and the USDA. In the fall of 1904 Thomas Cooper, leind 
conanissioner of the Northern Pacific, wrote to the agricultural college at 
Bozeman, noting that the successful wheat growing in eastern Washington 
took place in an area, with less rainfall than eastern Montana. Cooper also 
approached the USDA and asked for cooperation in the problem of dry 
feirming. In Februau^r of the next year. Cooper met with Elwood Mead of the 
Irrigation Division of the USDA and Professor Frederick B. Linfield, 
director of the Montana Agricultural Experiment Station. They decided to 
establish four demonstration farms in Montana at Helena, Dillon, Miles 
City, 5uid the station north of Glendive. The Northern Pacific contributed 
twenty-five hundred dollars to this work, and the USDA and Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station gave a thousand dollars each.^® 
40. Thomas Cooper to president. State Agricultural College, 29 
November 1904, MSU; Linfield, "Dry Farming in Monteuia," 13; anon. "Co­
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The next year the USDA ceased its involvement in the program, having 
estciblished its own Office of Dry Leuid Agriculture under Ellery Cheinning 
Chilcott, formerly of the South Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station. 
This office gave the USDA autonomous control over dryland farming 
investigations, which proved important when conflict erupted, notably in 
Uteih, over relative state and federal jurisdiction. The Utcih Agricultural 
College had the most advanced dryland fcirming investigations in the arid 
West. In 1905, Walter Jasper Kerr, the college president, obtained a ten 
thousand dollar state appropriation for irrigation and dryland farming 
investigations subject to a like appropriation from the federal government. 
Mead at the USDA insisted that all work, except at the agricultural station 
itself at Logan, be under his control. Kerr fought for equal jurisdiction 
for the college. Linfield, having taught at Utah for nine years before 
moving to Montana, was very interested in, and apprised of, this argument. 
To avoid similcur problems, he chose to circumvent the federal government 
altogether, approaching the railroads directly and arranging for financing 
for continuing research. 
In 1906 the Montana Agricultural College and the Northern Pacific 
discontinued the stations at Helena cind Dillon because they were too far 
from the railroad. Work at Miles City also stopped as the expert in 
cheurge, W. W. McLaughin of the Utah Experiment Station, judged it to "be a 
waste of time." Instead, the Northern Pacific sponsored three stations in 
Montana, north of Glendive, near Forsyth, and north of Billings. The same 
yeeir the Great Northern, at the instigation of Linfield, committed two 
thousand dollars to maintain three dry farming stations along its lines, 
640 acres north of Harlem, 100 acres neeu: Shelby, euid 40 acres neair Great 
Falls.42 
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The Heurlem station was cin exercise in cooperation. Congress 
authorized the use of a section of land for ten years, amd the Great 
Northern donated treinsportation for men emd equipment involved in the work. 
Neither agency, however, could overcome some of the inherent difficulties 
of the site. The land was at a consider£Q>le distance both from the town 
and from water which exacerbated the problems of dryland feirming. The 
isolation of the site allowed range cattle emd horses to damage the crops 
before fencing could be constructed. Grassroots help ultimately proved 
vital in estedDlishing this station as local town people did what they could 
to help- During the first season, they built a house on the fairm, fenced 
the land, and drilled a well. The first year of Great Northern involvement 
saw some successful grain production, and samples of grain from all three 
sponsored plots were exhibited at the Montana State Fair.^^ 
The decision of the USDA to end its involvement in dryland farming 
investigations in Montana created a gulf between its personnel smd those of 
the experiment station amd railroad. Collaboration had hidden conflicts 
over authority eind expertise which, now exposed, added to the confusion 
surrounding the viability of dryland farming. Aware of the problems in 
Utah, Linfield had been Ccireful to prevent the USDA from trespassing on his 
authority. However, the Montana Agricultural College, largely financed by 
the state and aware of the tremendous political power of the railroads, had 
to please its constituents. The USDA, on the other hand, with a broader 
audience and wider financial base, could afford to be more objective, and 
consequently reticent, in this matter. 
Not dependent on the railroads, or other outside interests, for 
funding, USDA personnel could voice their concerns regarding promotion and 
resecirch with impunity. In response to inquiries eibout dryland farming 
statistics from a Great Northern immigration agent, Chilcott expressed many 
of his nascent concerns. He believed that the Great Plains had undergone a 
period of "abnormal rainfall for the last three yeeurs," and that this, 
rather than any "so-called methods or systems of dry land farming" had 
caused the crop improvement. He expressed concern regaurding the promotion 
Linfield, "Dry Farming in Monteina," 14; euion., "Co-operative 
Work in Dry Feirming in Montana," n.d., GNRP; B. Campbell to L. W. Hill, 23 
August 1906, GNRP. 
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of dry land farming being undertaken by the railroads. "I would say that 
meuiy of the eirticles that have appeared in magazines and other publications 
concerning the possibilities of dry leind agriculture are wildly 
exaggerated. 
The Montana Agricultural College's railroad funding colored 
scientific assessments of dryland farming. The college publications of 
this time optimistically advocate dryland farming techniques. Financial 
need, as well as determination to assert his independence from federal 
overseeing, temporarily trapped Linfield and his staff in subordination to 
the railroad's research agenda, blurring the objectivity of their 
science. 
As regards his involvement in the agricultural development of the 
Great Plains, Hill initially channeled his efforts primarily into veirious 
irrigation schemes. His emphasis on irrigation remained strong as late as 
1904 when he stated that all the land in Montcina, cultivcible without 
irrigation, had been claimed. His caution with respect to dry land farming 
can also be linked to the Great Northern, because of its lack of land 
grjints, requiring successful development of land and not just the initial 
attraction of settlement and land sales, to make a profit. In addition, 
incorporating dryland fjunning, with its emphasis on large-scale, 
monocropping, into Hill's "gospel of the small farm," proved difficult.^® 
The slowness of the Reclamation Sejrvice in embarking in projects of 
particular concern to Hill combined with his alienation from federal power, 
forced him to reconsider the possibilities inherent in dryland fairming. By 
the beginning of 1907 the Great Northern, along with the Northern Pacific, 
had thoroughly committed to a progrcun of resecirch and promotion of dryland 
farming on the benchlands of Monteuia. In keeping with his other 
agricultural enterprises of this time. Hill auid the Great Northern invested 
money but left the type and direction of research to the scientists at the 
agricultural college. The earrsuigement seemed to work well but, as early as 
44. E. C. Chilcott to C. W. Mott, 30 November 1906, MSU. 
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1906, Chilcott's wairnings foreshadowed a potential division between the 
corporation's desire for quick settlement and production and the academic 
conmunity's concepts of research and proof. 
Hill did not limit his cooperation with academic institutions to the 
Montana Agricultural College. He and the Great Northern also helped the 
North Dakota Agricultural College reach the farmers of their state and 
transmit the foundations of scientific agriculture. Throughout the early 
years of the century the railroad tramsported groups of feirmers gratis to 
visit the college in Fargo. Unlike the Montana school, however, the North 
Dakota Agricultural College refused to actively investigate either dryland 
farming or irrigation for arable production, preferring to focus on 
identifying suitable crops euid crop rotations for the state. This 
alienation from the prime interests of the Great Northern strained 
relations between the two organizations somewhat. 
Divergent experimental interests aside, the North Deikota Agricultural 
College personnel generally assumed a more suspicious approach to the 
railroad than their peers in Montcuia. Much of this difference stemmed from 
the different perceptions of the leaders of the two institutions. Linfield 
in Montana had trained in Guelph, Canada, under Thomas Shaw at the Ontario 
Agricultural College. He was, thus, part of a Canadian network of ideas 
and heritage. The involvement of his old mentor in dryland promotion 
helped medce it more accessible and acceptable to him. President John H. 
Worst of the North Dakota Agricultural College, on the other hand, proved 
perennially suspicious of railroads. Eeirly on he assumed em activist 
stance, trying to break the railroads' hold on farmers by recasting the 
oft-touted cry of interdependence. At a speech at the college in 1907 he 
stated, "We owe much to the railroads and to other forms of corporate 
wealth, but they owe more to us. We could live without them, but they 
47. C. H. Honey to Hill, 21 July 1902 emd 23 July 1903; 
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cannot do business without us. Our interests at least should be mutual and 
not one sided, and not on their side at that. 
This pro-farmer political activisnr, which often manifested itself as 
anti-railroad, continued throughout his life. Participating fully in the 
Nonpartisan League uprising in North Dakota starting in 1915, Worst 
advocated state-owned terminal elevators and became commissioner of 
immigration under the new, radical state government. 
In 1906 the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific financed work on 
six demonstration farms in North Deikota. The railroad paid farmers to 
cultivate five four-acre plots on their feirms in accordeince with the 
directions of E. G. Schollemder of the agricultural college. Although 
similar in method to the dry fairming work in Monteina the focus was somewhat 
different, the objectives being "to determine, what method of crop rotation 
is best adapted for that particulcu: neighborhood, to introduce field corn 
and clover into the fields, to build up the fertility of the soil, instead 
of summer fallowing, and by extra tillage preserve the moisture and clean 
the land." This tied in with Hill's agricultural aims; feed for livestock, 
crop rotation, and fertility being prime concerns.^® 
Despite this cooperation, relations between the railroad and the 
college were never close. Worst resisted corporate dominance in earlier 
years although his antagonism became more pronounced over time. In 1905, 
Louis Hill, by then a vice president of the Great Northern, became 
concerned when he discovered that the North Dakota Agricultural College had 
run an agricultural train in conjunction with the rival Soo line. Worst 
justified the action as in response to crop failures along the line the 
previous year, and pointing out that similar failures had not occurred 
along the Hill lines. Louis did not believe this explanation but instead 
saw a conspiracy to decrease the Great Northern's power in the state. "I 
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am more inclined to think that Pennington [president of the Soo line] is 
trying to get a foot-hold in North Dakota politics eind has been cultivating 
the Deputy Commissioner of Labor and Agriculture, Kaufman, of Bismarck, eind 
that Worst is very willing to fall in line-"^^ 
Louis Hill thought Worst nursed a grievance against the Great 
Northern because of the railroad's continual delay in building a promised 
spur to the college heating plant. The supposition proved insightful. 
When accused of favoritism. Worst expressed surprise, suggested that the 
Great Northern run an agricultural train in conjunction with the college, 
but then raised the issue of the spur. After the railroad completed the 
spur in 1906 the agricultural college cooperated with the railroad in its 
"Good Seed Specials" which toured Minnesota and both Dakotas.^^ 
The Good Seed and Soil Specials ran in the spring of 1906 covering 
nearly two thouseind miles. The trains carried academic agricultural 
experts selected by James J. Hill, including Perry Holden, professor of 
agronomy at Iowa State College. Holden, who participated in the Corn 
Gospel trains in Iowa in 1904 and 1905, promoted the Ccireful selection eind 
testing of seed. Later he resecirched corn hybridization, more often 
associated with the Wallaces, founders of Pioneer Hybrid and editors of 
Wallace's Farmer. 
Also on the trains was Thomas Shaw who, at this point, worked for 
both the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific as well as writing for the 
Orange Judd Farmer. Born in Woodburn, Ontario, of Scottish parents, Shaw 
spent his early career at Ontario Agricultural College at Guelph, before 
accepting the chair of animal husbandry at the University of Minnesota. 
Here his interest in cattle feeding led him to investigate potential forage 
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crops and drought resistant plants, eind he published three works on forage 
crops in the late 1890s. 
Hill's Canadicui network pivoted on Shaw. Meeting each other first in 
Minnesota around the turn of the century, they developed a friendship based 
on their common heritage euid interest in agriculture. Long before Hill 
officially employed Shaw the latter's ideas reinforced Hill's own, and he 
acted as "a sort of agricultural explorer to report on the future 
development of agriculture in the undeveloped regions." The respect Shaw 
gained in academic circles in America reflected on Hill, lending his ideas 
scientific credibility.^^ 
Shaw's reseeurch on forage plamts led him into dryleind farming 
investigations. In 1899 the Regents of the University of Minnesota 
received a letter from Vermilion, South Dakota, asking for Shaw to 
supervise experiments at Highmore Drouth Resisting Forage Station, "Because 
of the wide experience of Professor Thomas Shaw ... in this work, and 
because of the success which he has achieved at the Minnesota University 
experimental station, and of his interest in . . . growing these crops, it 
is our judgement that no one in the West is better fitted to supervise such 
additional experiments." Shaw complied- In 1902 Shaw resigned from the 
University of Minnesota to assume the editorship of The Farmer in St. Paul 
before moving to The Dakota Farmer and railroad employment. The Great 
Northern did not put Shaw to work directly on the questions of dry farming, 
his first official involvement with the line being on the demonstration 
trains of 1906. 
The use of informational trains probeibly steurted in 1891 when the 
Agricultural College at Guelph, Ontario, sent two lecturers out on a wagon. 
As Hill's friend Shaw came from that college, the launching of Great 
Northern trains reflected the influence of his Canadiein network. Hill also 
54. Campbell to L. W. Hill, 29 March 1906; Herbert Myrick to Hill, 
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could have been following the lead of the Burlington which launched 
informational trains in four states in 1904. In addition, the presence of 
agricultural trains in North Deikota run by the competitive Soo line added 
incentive. 
The experts on the trains gave talks on how to select good seed grain 
for themselves, the way to treat the grain to prevent smut and other 
diseases, and the importance of rotating crops and maintaining soil 
fertility. Over ten thousand farmers attended the trains' presentations, 
which compared favorably to similcu: trains run by the Canadian Pacific and 
Northern Pacific. The total cost of the enterprise was $1,879.21.^® 
Hill utilized the trains to promote his vision of the small-scale 
family farm and diversified agriculture. One of the problems facing stock 
farmers in the northern Great Plains was winter feed. In more temperate 
cureas such as Iowa, corn worked very well as a high calorie, nutritious 
feed, but in the eeirly years of the twentieth century corn was a risky crop 
in the Deikotas and Montana, often failing to ripen. 
In 1905 Hill pursued the problem of feed on a personal level, 
starting his first major experiment unconnected to stock rearing. His 
friend, Frank Sturgis of Round Hill Fcirm, Fairfield, Connecticut, wrote to 
him eibout his "flint corn" which he claimed matured in nine weeks at forty 
to fifty bushels per acre, or 50 percent more than the average yield for 
Iowa farmers at the time. Hill acquired some seed for North Oaks and 
Humboldt and, following his speech edDout the corn at the North Dakota State 
Fair in 1905, he received letters from various educational institutions 
requesting some of the corn.®® 
Hill distributed the corn throughout Minnesota and North Dakota, 
using the Good Seed Specials as part of the distribution mechanism. Shaw 
took the corn and growing information out to the farmers. The corn had 
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been named "Jim Hill corn" to associate it with the virile western 
agricultural image the railroad man had engineered for himself. A letter 
from Andrew Boss at the St. Paul Experirnent Station to Hill's personal 
secreteury John J. Toomey shows a willingness to help with the project. The 
university, he said, would distribute ten bushels to farmers for 
experimentation, but would also keep enough at the Station to maintain a 
pure line. A note on the letter listed the people to receive the corn. 
Dean Liggett at the University ten bushels. Worst at the North Dakota 
Experiment College one bushel, Shaw for the Good Seed Special one bushel. 
North Oaks twelve bushels, Humboldt half a bushel.®^ 
The corn was a disaster. Letters from the farmers who tried it, 
either from the university or from "The Good Seed Specials," stated that it 
matured late (if at all, frost ruined some crops), it was too hard for 
cattle or horses to eat, and even Dent corn matured eeirlier. At the North 
Dakota Agricultural College "six Veirieties of corn . . . were planted. . . 
When the first freezing weather ceime in the fall from 90 to 95 percent 
of all the corn had fully ripened with the exception of the Hill corn."®^ 
The failure of Jim Hill corn demonstrated to university 
agriculturists Hill's amateur status with regards to scientific farming. 
Jealously guarding their newly won professional provenance, academics were 
wary of Hill's claim to expertise. Based on experience and money. Hill's 
authority represented for them an antiquated, and therefore dangerous, 
approach to improving agriculture. Ideologically, their stand asserted 
that objective experiment, not financial investment or practical 
experience, would enhance agricultural productivity. At this time 
agricultural scientists had not yet solidified their legitimacy and 
authority to dictate the future of American agriculture. Their expertise 
remained contested by small-scale faunners who, consciously or otherwise, 
recognized the inherent threat to their livelihood embodied in the 
promulgation of a capital- and technology-intensive agriculture. In 
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attempt to assert their domincmce, these university experts opposed all 
other forms of agricultural knowledge, including Hill's.®^ 
Professors at the University of Minnesota already viewed Hill's 
expertise askance. Their distrust stemmed peirtially from embarrassment 
over the waterlogged Crookston experiment station, and partly from their 
rejection of Hill's advocacy of dual-purpose cattle during the last decades 
of the nineteenth century. The debacle of Jim Hill corn only further 
alienated collegiate institutions from Hill and his agricultural plans, but 
this break was feir from complete. The Montana Agricultural College still 
cooperated with the railway in its dry farming demonstrations, and no 
university within the northern tier could afford to completely antagonize 
the president of the Great Northern Railway. 
The increasing suspicion with which academics viewed Hill mirrored 
his growing disillusionment with institutional agricultural development. 
Dissatisfaction with the Reclamation Service and research adopted by the 
North Dakota Agricultural College, shook Hill's conviction that 
institutional cooperation would facilitate farm improvements. Although not 
completely absmdoning cooperative ventures. Hill became more circumspect in 
his choice of partners and once more launched some independent programs. 
In late 1905 Thomas Shaw, then northwestern editor for The Farmer. 
still published by the Orange Judd Company under the presidency of Herbert 
Myrick, wrote to Hill about a farming contest that the paper intended to 
run. Shaw wanted to offer prizes for five consecutive years, aiming to 
improve cultivation techniques and wheat production. Hill expressed 
interest in this plan and, by early 1906, had agreed to provide the prize 
money. The competition covered the congressional districts of Minnesota 
and the DaJcotas and first prize in each district was three hundred 
dollars. 
Hill's involvement was contingent on certain cheuiges in the contest's 
rules, including a stress on livestock. As he said two years after the 
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competition, "I stipulated that a man, in order to be entitled to compete, 
should have twenty head of live stock for breeding purposes." By the time 
the paper published the criteria for the contest, they looked like a list 
of Hill's personal concerns for agriculture. In addition to number and 
quality of livestock, the judges considered rotation of crops for soil 
fertility amd good yields, drainage, and fertilizing techniques.®^ 
The Good Seed Specials euid The Farmer publicized the contest eind the 
latter also did the paperwork. The judges were Shaw and Torger Hovers tad. 
Shaw had wemted to continue the contest annually, pending success in 
1906.66 
The competition had limited success. Out of five hundred farms which 
entered, only a hundred had sufficient livestock to be considered. The 
contest thus affected only the few farmers already practicing scientific 
agriculture. It was a case of preaching to the converted. One of the 
winners, D. Tallman, of Willmar, Minnesota, exposed this dilemma in a 
letter to Hill thsmking him for a first prize. The award, he said, 
"compensates one for the work they have been doing along lines in an 
agricultural way so different—in this insteuice—from my neighbors." As 
Hill's failure to influence general farmer opinion became appcirent, the 
contests ended after the first yeeir. Once again Hill's personal attempts 
to change farming practices fell flat.67 
Moving from the euphoria of 1902, Hill found the delays in starting 
irrigation works, the continued stress on wheat production throughout the 
Northwest in the early years of the century, and conflict with academic 
institutions, worrying. In part he expressed his concern by stressing the 
need to broaden the export markets for America's agricultural products, but 
he also started prophesying a Malthusian vision of an America unable to 
feed itself. He wanted production levels to remain high through exports to 
prepcure for the massive population boom he foresaw. Hill was not alone in 
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his pessimistic predictions. Mciny economists saw sm increasing population 
not matched by expemding farm acreage eind predicted disaster.®® 
Hill argued that ejnigration of American farmers to Canada compounded 
the decline of wheat production in the United States. This necessitated a 
continuation of the extensive farming practices which, in turn, resulted in 
a draining of soil fertility and a decline in production. As American 
farmers moved north, more immigrants flooded the nation's cities. Thus 
Hill predicted that "It is a mathematical fact that within twenty years 
under present conditions our wheat crop will not be sufficient for home 
consumption."®^ 
Hill offered a three-pronged solution: a national recognition of the 
importance of agriculture; an increased concern to conserve and wisely use 
farming resources such as the soil, and the maintenance of American 
production levels through development of new international markets. As he 
said, "There must be a national revolt against the worship of memufacture 
emd trade as the only forms of progressive activity. ... A clear 
recognition on the part of the whole people . . . that the tillage of the 
soil is the natural and most desirable occupation for man." In addition to 
a grassroots change. Hill prescribed an increase in government involvement 
and expenditure in agricultural education, promoting intensive farming.^'' 
For Hill, this Malthusian vision of America's future centered around 
the waste of the soil, which he considered, "the sole asset that does not 
perish," capeible of "infinite renewal." Through poor feirming practices 
including monocropping and a failure to fertilize the American farmer was 
destroying this perpetual resource. Thus, as early as 1903, Hill became 
interested in the issues surrounding soil conservation and fertility, an 
interest which naturally sprung out of his push for diversification and the 
decline in American productivity.^^ 
Hill became increasingly concerned about the decline of production of 
American feunns. Using production statistics to prove his case, he claimed 
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that bad farming practices had resulted in a decline of wheat production in 
the West from twenty to thirty bushels per acre to twelve. Hill's 
consistent use of numbers in his speeches reflected his commitment to 
Progressive notions of science, objectivity, and proof. Perhaps, more 
importantly, it reinforced his expertise. By employing a standardized eind 
objective referrsmt, such as numbers. Hill removed his knowledge firmly 
from matters of personal interests and prejudices into an abstract, 
impersonal sphere.^2 
Developments in international markets heightened Hill's gloomy view 
of his nation's population growth in relation to its productivity. America 
sold much of its surplus wheat to the British Empire. In 1902 Joseph 
Chamberlain, England's Colonial Secretary, sought to revive an Empire 
struggling from the effect of the Boer War, and his own political fortunes, 
by advocating tariff reform. The reform he proposed centered auround 
reciprocal imperial preference whereby a protective tariff wall would 
foster inter-empire trade by placing taxes on goods from other nations. 
This would make American grain uncompetitive on the English market in 
comparison with that of Cemada. Launching his proposal in a speech in 
Birmingham in May 1903, Chamberlain plunged England, where many had long 
favored free trade, into political turmoil and created fears for 
international markets eiround the world. These concerns did not abate until 
the dreimatic end to Chamberlain's political career following a stroke in 
July 1906.'73 
Hill, very aware of Chamberlain's push to institute a protective 
tJiriff on non-imperial goods coming into Englauid, gave a speech in 1904 at 
the Minnesota state fair which illustrated his concern. If instituted. 
Hill claimed, this tax would cost Minnesota amd the Dakotas twenty to 
thirty million dollars a yeeir. The solution, as he saw it, lay in expanded 
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trade with Asia, especially China. This trade would enable America to 
maintain its export market for wheat regardless of the actions taken by the 
British Empire. Hill believed "that every nation, including India, once 
they get wheat flour, prefer it to all other food." Thus Hill used the 
threat of Chamberlain's teuriff to return to his old hobbyhorse of Asian 
trade. 
Hill's desire to estciblish this trade with Asia, extended beyond 
speeches emd promoting westward freight on his lines. He commissioned the 
construction of two oceemgoing liners, built at Groton, Connecticut. The 
S. S. Dakota was launched in February 1903, and her sister ship, the S. S. 
Minnesota. in April. Within two years, both ships regularly traded with 
Japan and Hong Kong. In their day they were the leirgest ships ever built 
in America, the largest under the United States flag, eind the largest 
trading in the Pacific. Despite their monopoly on size, the vessels failed 
to be profiteible. Underpowered and difficult to handle, they lost money on 
every voyage. In March 1907, the S. S. Dakota sunk one mile out of 
Yokohama on a well-charted reef with no lives lost. Hill tried to sell the 
S. S. Minnesota in 1908, but did not find a buyer until 1915.^^ 
Again, Hill proved unable to independently launch an agricultural 
development program. Despite his fervent belief in the necessity of 
Asiatic trade, his shipbuilding ability fell far short of his talent for 
railroad construction. Pzurt of the problem lay in federal reluctance to 
encourage American shipbuilding. In the late nineteenth century America 
turned its attention toward internal improvements, investing in railroads 
and industrial developments. Although building his railroad without 
government laind grsuits. Hill could not rescue American shipbuilding from 
its Postbellum decline, which many recognized but did little to resolve 
until the impetus of world Weirs.^® 
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Hill failed to see the changes he had anticipated in agriculture in 
the eeirly twentieth century. The Newlands Act, which had been such a 
triumph in 1902, proved to be slow, ineffective, and bureaucratic. 
Problems with international water rights delayed construction in the Milk 
River Valley, and farmers in North DcUcota did not display the necessary 
interest to encourage federal spending. Frustrated, Hill launched a 
program of investigation into dryland farming in conjunction with the 
Montana Agricultural College. By 1907, this too, became problematic, with 
its very optimistic results being questioned by USDA officials. 
Other agricultural efforts that Hill ran personally or through the 
railroad were no more successful. The Good Seed Specials attracted 
attention, but were not repeated until the 1920s, while his contest reached 
only those faunners already practicing diversified agriculture. 
Consequently Hill became increasingly pessimistic in his view of the future 
of American agriculture. He seemed unaible to persuade farmers of the need 
for change. Hill thus started to present a gloomy picture in his 
agricultural speeches, foretelling a time in the not too disteint future, 
when America would be unable to feed itself. 
In 1907 James Hill retired as president of the Great Northern turning 
the post over to his second son, Louis Hill. James instead took on the 
position of chairman of the board. If anyone thought that this would usher 
in an era of lesser involvement by the elder Hill, they were wrong. He 
kept a tight hold on the reins of power, directing the railroad, and its 
agricultural enterprises, through his son and feeling quite at ease 
overriding Louis when necessary. Increasingly frustrated with 
institutional involvement, James Hill directed his energies toward 
expanding corporate agricultural promotion and attempting to bully federal 
and state agencies into creating the type of feirming he envisioned for the 
northern plains. 
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conflict and disillusion, 1907-1912 
In 1907 Hill resigned as president of the Great Northern in favor of his 
son Louis. Although still chairmein of the board and still maintaining a 
close watch on operations. Hill removed himself from much of the day-to-day 
irunning of the railroad. Hill invested much of his newfound free time in 
promoting agricultural development of the Northwest. Now in his sixties. 
Hill devoted energy to his vision of a settled, agrarian northern tier with 
continued emphasis on irrigation and dryleind farming. His concern for soil 
fertility propelled him into federally driven conservation efforts. Hill's 
second son, Louis, aided and abetted him in all of these activities. 
Continued exposure to governmental action euid expertise during the 
five years from 1907 to 1912 increased Hill's frustration with bureaucratic 
inertia and highlighted the gulf between governmental and corporate 
perceptions of western agricultural needs. As federal bureaucrats and 
experts solidified their control over public land management and 
consistently ignored criticisms from Great Northern personnel, corporate 
tactics shifted. Returning to political lobbying, the Hills favored state 
rather than federal control over western resources. They hoped this would 
better foster their needs and reassert the Great Northern's influence. 
The nation enjoyed a period of prosperity. Internal political unrest 
had been leurgely left behind with the old century; prices were high and 
crops bountiful. Internationally, Roosevelt launched his corollary of the 
Monroe Doctrine, to many asserting America's rightful place in 
international affairs. Faith in Man's abilities and the potential of 
reason to cure all ills reached center stage as the federal government 
embraced Progressivism. 
In keeping with the times, the Great Northern flourished. By 1907 it 
had purchased the assets of all fifteen of its affiliated companies. Thus 
it avoided the creation of an illegal holding compeuiy, forming instead a 
corporate giant. The railroads operated efficiently emd effectively, 
increasing haulage capacity eUid lacing the Northwest with new spur lines. 
Railroad promotion of settlement in Montana began in ejirnest in 1908. 
Remarkably successful, the number of farms in the state nearly doubled 
107 
between 1900 and 1910. Hill remained actively involved in the road, but 
his empire was complete and would prove haurd to undermine.^ 
With more time to spend on his interests. Hill played the role of 
agricultural expert with new zeal. The prominence of his line in the 
northern tier, combined with Hill's carefully crafted public image, had 
elevated him to celebrity status. With his retirement, he expanded his 
public visibility, accepting a larger proportion of speaking invitations. 
He spoke at most of the county fairs along his line and at mamy others. 
His arguments did not chcuige. For the good of the fsirmers and the nation. 
Hill contended, agricultural practices had to improve. Only by following 
the precepts of "high grade fcirming," such as intensive agriculture, 
diversification, and soil conservation, could farmers continue to feed the 
growing American population.^ 
Hill's agricultural interests during these years continued to embody 
his belief in the small-scale family farm. He agitated for effective 
irrigation by the federal government to facilitate the creation of 
intensively fairmed smallholdings in the arid West. He also persisted in 
his advocacy of diversified farming and the need for soil conservation 
through fertilization. By 1908 he found a new forum for these longheld 
beliefs with the conservation movement, ironically led by his old foe, 
Theodore Roosevelt and Roosevelt's friend Gifford Pinchot. 
Although his railroad continued to fare well. Hill's agricultural 
enterprises did not. Already somewhat disillusioned with federal and 
university experts, his lack of faith grew from 1907 to 1912. Distrust 
became antagonism and even outright opposition. Concurrently Hill found 
himself implicitly thrust in the position of having to justify his right to 
criticize these experts. Borrowing much from his earlier experiences as a 
gentleman fairmer. Hill refined his notion of personal expertise, using the 
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railroad and a group of sympathetic college men to expand eind solidify his 
position. 
Hill's relationship with mainstream conservation broke down after a 
brief honeymoon in 1908 as he discovered that, as with irrigation, federal 
control of land policy undermined his corporate influence. This schism 
mirrored the national fracture between President William Howard Taft's new 
Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger, and Pinchot, who remained 
Chief Forester. Hill had peripheral importeuice in this swirling, political 
and ideological controversy, finding himself on the losing side of a battle 
not of his own making. 
Pinchot, who had largely controlled all of the Roosevelt 
administration's public land policy from his position in the Bureau of 
Forestry, enjoyed strong federal bureaucratic control over natural 
resources in the West. Seeing resources as assets to be rationally 
harvested, Pinchot believed federal mcuiagement necesseury for the nation to 
garner the greatest good for the greatest number. Consequently, he 
proposed legislative changes which increased the federal government's power 
in determining and policing the use of the public domain. Simultaneously, 
he developed systems of education and credentials which facilitated the 
creation of an elite body of federal experts. Pinchot's vision of 
Progressive conservation was augmented by the unswerving support of 
President Roosevelt which gave him almost dictatorial powers, and the 
presence of many likeminded men, notcJaly Frederick Newell of the 
Reclamation Service, in other branches of the bureaucracy.^ 
The election of Taft in 1908 undermined Pinchot's dominance. Taft 
appointed Richard Ballinger, a Seattle lawyer euid one-time Commissioner of 
the General Lsuid Office, as Secretary of the Interior. Ballinger disagreed 
with Pinchot's land policy, not so much on ideological grounds as on 
practical issues of memagement. Ballinger wanted a lessening of federal 
control in the West and eui increase in private enterprise. Pinchot, who 
had been used to his vision dictating the actions of the Interior 
3. Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gosnel of Efficiency; The 
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Department as well as the USDA, saw in Ballinger the undoing of the Bureau 
of Reclamation.^ 
The political squadable which followed muddied everyone involved-
Ballinger and Pinchot both fielded an army of subordinate spies. Taft 
vacillated, failing to offer clear support to either party or to discipline 
anyone. In 1909 Pinchot stepped outside bureaucratic channels euid used the 
media to accuse Ballinger of illegal mismanagement of Alaskein coal leinds. 
This obvious breach of policy forced Taft to action, and he fired Pinchot 
in Janueury 1910, but the storm continued. Congress, upset earlier by 
Pinchot and Roosevelt's highhanded executive style, held hearings to 
investigate the actions of both men and their bailiwicks. Although the 
commission formally exonerated Ballinger of all cheirges, he resigned the 
following year due to Taft's refusal to allow him to move the Interior 
Depeirtment fully away from Pinchot's concepts of resource mcuiagement. ^ 
The national debate on the nature of resource management engulfed 
Hill and his railroad, pivoting, as it did, around irrigation and 
conservation. More importantly, the controversy raised the question of who 
should determine resource management. Having initially pushed for federal 
involvement in irrigation. Hill increasingly found his own power undermined 
by bureaucratic experts. In response, he supported Ballinger's advocacy of 
a larger degree of state and private control in the development of western 
lands hoping that this would restore his influence. 
Having unambiguously supported the lobby for federal irrigation. Hill 
found that the Reclamation Service completely usurped his power to affect 
change. As the Newlands Reclamation Act approached its tenth anniversary, 
James eind Louis Hill's dissatisfaction with the Reclamation Service 
increased. They were not alone. Federal recleimation progressed slowly, 
largely due to unpredicted costs, and often stalled altogether. This 
heightened local frustration with the Service as it withdrew land 
indefinitely from the public domain for reclamation. With the delay of 
irrigation pl£ms, the land often became unobtaincJale, unus£ible, and 
remained unirrigated. Sometimes the public domain remained accessible and 
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homesteaders staked claims with am anticipation of irrigation which 
remained unfulfilled.® 
In addition to western discontent, some government officials 
complained at the cost of the projects, which federal personnel often 
underestimated. The Ballinger-Pinchot senatorial heairings of 1910 revealed 
that, out of thirty projects commenced, the Service had only completed two. 
One official of the Reclamation Service judged this "em inordinate and 
unjustifiable failure to produce results." The majority of the 
congressional committee ruled that "It would have been better if a less 
number of projects had been in process of construction at the same time, as 
more funds, more energy, and more speed could have been obtained in such 
case. 
In North Dakota the Buford-Trenton emd Williston projects along the 
Great Northern continued to be underused as settlers proved reluctant to 
pay for water. Those who used the water judged the charges excessively 
high- By early 1910 settlers at Williston had organized a Water Users' 
Association and issued a statement listing grievances and proposed 
solutions. The cost of irrigation, they believed, was "excessive and . . . 
extravagant," being at least twice the estimate they had been given- They 
wanted the years 1908 and 1909 to be considered experimental with little or 
no payment required for the water "on account of the inability [of the 
Reclamation Service] to furnish water when necessary." They also 
recommended that all construction charges be postponed until 1913, by which 
time the settlers hoped to be benefiting financially from the irrigation. 
In addition they contended that, even if forced to sell their land, they 
would not realize enough money to pay the current debts to the Reclamation 
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1909, Great Northern Railway Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. 
Paul, Minn, (hereafter GNRP); Senate, Investigation of the Department of 
the Interior and of the Bureau of Forestry. 61st Cong., 3d sess., 1911, S. 
doc. 719, p. 85. 
7. Perkins to Ballinger, 1910, Ballinger Papers, University of 
Washington Archives, Seattle, Washington (hereafter UWA); Senate, 
Investigation of the Department of the Interior and of the Bureau of 
Forestry. p. 85. 
Ill 
Service. The petition failed, and the Service refused to turn the water on 
until farmers had paid all back debts.® 
The crop "fiasco" which ensued sent the association to Washington, 
D.C. and to James Hill for help. Louis Hill assured the settlers that 
their only hope lay in the Curtiss Bill then before Congress authorizing 
the Secreteury of the Interior to negotiate new contracts, emd urged the 
association to write to their congressmen. Louis also wrote his own 
letters to Congress and persuaded Northern Pacific personnel to do the 
same. Congress passed the Curtiss Bill in 1911 emd the Service negotiated 
new contracts with the settlers emd, although not exactly what they wanted, 
farmers received water for the 1911 crop yeeir. Despite this temporeury 
respite the Reclamation Service closed irrigation projects in North Dakota 
in 1915 because of farmer failure to pay charges.^ 
This failure of federal irrigation to operate in North Dakota as 
intended unfortunately compeired favoreibly to the Reclamation Service's 
progress on James Hill's pet project, the Milk River Valley in Montana. 
Having withdrawn leind from settlement euid water rights from Montanans, the 
Service became bogged down in negotiating international rights with Canada. 
To pacify the settlers, the Service did construct the Dodson dam and ceuial 
between Havre and Malta, but these were useless without water. Aside from 
badgering the Service and congressmen, the Great Northern did little to 
rectify the situation. Negotiations with Canada continued and, ten years 
after the passage of the Newlands Act, none of the Milk River Valley had 
been irrigated by the Reclamation Service.^® 
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During the late summer of 1909 Louis took a trip along the Great 
Northern in the company of the Senate Irrigation Committee eind reclamation 
engineers, both to assess the progress of irrigation and to conduct some 
grassroots publicity. During this journey he attended some local meetings 
held by the Reclamation Service. At these he "was greatly impressed with 
the fact that the people are very critical about amd generally displeased 
with the reclamation service. 
In fact, settlers complained so vociferously, especially regeirding 
the delays in implementing projected schemes, that Louis proposed 
subcontracting several of the projects from the Service and having them 
completed by Great Northern engineers. He collected cost/acreage 
statistics for a variety of northern Great Plains projects and corresponded 
with irrigation promoter W. M. Woodridge in Montana. His proposal received 
endorsement from "settlers [who] think we [the Great Northern] could do it 
in one-half the time and at one-third of the cost." Several newspapers 
also promoted this idea of corporate intervention. By early 1910 
Arthur P. Davis, chief engineer of the Reclamation Service and friend of 
Newell, wrote to Louis explaining the international problems with water 
rights in the Milk River Valley. At the same time, Davis encouraged the 
railroad to construct Ccuials so as to "expedite the ultimate irrigation of 
the valley." Alerted to these diplomatic problems, Louis quickly backed 
out, stating that the responsibility for irrigation lay with the federal 
government and that Great Northern personnel had merely been encouraging 
settlers in their territory to keep "alive to the situation. . . and keep 
after this subject until they get what is properly coming to them."^^ 
The Great Northern's frustration with the Reclamation Service 
heightened in 1909 with an unfortunate exhibit at the Minnesota State Fair. 
Edmxind Taylor Perkins, engineer-in-cheu:ge and head of the Chicago office of 
the Reclamation Service and a strong ally of Ballinger, planned a publicity 
campaign to highlight Service activity and attract settlers to irrigated 
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cLreas. The campaign took the form of a black tent exhibit which toured 
vetrious state fairs in the fall. In the tent, officials displayed 
illustrations of irrigation projects, gave lectiures, and provided 
literature. 
Perkins had approached a number of railroads, including the Hill 
lines, for help in financing the campaign, expressing concern that "all 
Reclamation Service projects be covered." The publicity issued by the 
Reclamation Service included railroad advertising. One of the Hill lines, 
the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, declined the opportunity to participate, 
believing they "could get better results from newspaper advertising." 
Perkins took this rejection to include all the Hill lines, despite the 
assurance of the general traffic manager of the Great Northern, W. W. 
Broughton, that his line would peurticipate. When the black tent show 
started its circuit in the fall of 1909, the entire cost of Perkins's 
project had been assumed by the Union Pacific. 
In September 1909 the Service set up the black tent show at the 
Minnesota State Fair, eind Louis Hill stopped in to see the work. Furious 
to find only southwestern projects in territory of the Union Pacific 
adveriiised, he stcirted a series of complaints to congressmen, such as 
Thomas Caurter in Montana, and to Newell himself. Louis complained of 
Perkins's incompetence and ignorance in his belief that the Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy could make decisions for the Great Northern. He 
suggested that only advertising those projects in the territory of an 
interested railroad was "illegal from the standpoint of discrimination," 
and he called for a complete reorganization of the Service. Perhaps to add 
substcuice to his complaints, Louis expressed his father's concern over the 
matter emd the older Hill's demand that information be sent to President 
Taft. At Louis's instigation, the St. Paul Jobbers and Manufacturers' 
Association launched a simultaneous series of complaints eJsout the 
geographical limitations of the black tent show. The association 
complained directly, lobbying federal officials and promoting a general 
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regional grievance against the Reclamation Service, through local Minnesota 
papers. 
Spurred by these two incidents, Louis further investigated the 
actions of the Reclamation Service. He discovered that Perkins made a 
personal profit from the publicity venture of the black tent shows. Louis 
asserted that this would not be tolerated in the railroad business and that 
"To me it appecirs an innovation that a saleuried Government man should 
engage in outside matters in which the Government is involved securing 
profit to himself through the operation." Louis' accusation of vested 
interest struck at the very heart of ideal civil service emd impartial 
government; supposedly an hallmark of Progressive land management.^® 
Louis also took the matter up with Newell, asking for Perkins' s 
resignation or threatening to "put the whole matter before the Press." In 
their defense Newell and Perkins claimed that the Service had not neglected 
northern irrigation projects, but represented them with slides and 
pamphlets. Again they raised the fact that the Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy had declined involvement on the pcirt of all the Hill lines. 
Louis Hill informed the Minnesota State Fair organization of the 
involvement of the Union Pacific in the exhibit. The fair association had 
waived the fees for Perkins's black tent space on the basis of federal 
involvement. On hearing of the corporate contributions to the show, the 
secretary of the fair association, Mr. Beek, demeuided the requisite one 
hundred and fifty dollars, payable by all private organizations. He also 
complained that the visitors had been misled eind that they "had a right to 
know with whom they are dealing, whether the Government, in the exercise of 
a government function, or a private corporation promoting its own 
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interests." Fundamentally, Beek attacked the Progressive government for 
failing to live up to its own ideals of objectivity.^® 
Louis Hill coordinated many of these attacks, making sure that the 
appropriate letters circulated among interested peirties. With a view to 
generating public sympathy to his cause he ensured that Beek billed the 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy for the black tent space first, so that the 
railroad could publicly deny involvement, pointing the finger at the Union 
Pacific.^® Newell used the furor over the black tent shows to his 
own political advantage. While defending the Service's actions to outside 
critics, the attack gave him leverage in his internal weir against 
Ballinger. Newell denied personal involvement in the shows, stating that 
Perkins had ignored the official chain of command and worked directly with 
Ballinger. Newell also used Louis's complaints to justify two departmental 
investigations. These verified Louis Hill's accusations that Perkins had 
profited personally from the black tent shows, receiving five hundred 
dollars a month from the Union Pacific over and above his federal salary of 
two hundred and seventy five dollars. Perkins had also agreed to route all 
the freight connected to the tent shows by that line and its 
subsidiaries. 
The investigations and their findings reflected a broader problem 
within the Reclamation Service than graft. With the appointment of 
Ballinger in 1908 eui ideological rift, and subsequent power struggle, soon 
appeared between the Pinchot-ite Newell and his boss Ballinger. Perkins 
sided with Ballinger, reporting that "The administration of F. H. Newell 
has been disastrous to the Reclamation Fund. ... He is not a skilled or 
experienced engineer. ... He is of a we2ik and vacillating nature." 
Perkins also provided Ballinger with details of the costs of the various 
projects undertsiken and adjudged that "neither foresight nor ordinsury 
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engineering or business ability were shown in undertaking the 
construction."21 
Newell, on the other hcind, received significeint political support 
from Pinchot, who wrote to President Taft that "Under Mr. F. H. Newell, as 
Director, the U.S. Reclamation Service has become am organization of 
exceptional efficiency." Pinchot-ites opposed Ballinger as a puppet of 
western power trusts who would inevitably turn public resources over to 
greedy corporations. Pinchot saw Ballinger's aim as fostering the 
railroads and power and mining companies, which resulted in "his desire to 
cripple the reclamation service by ousting the mem who has built it from an 
iridescent dream to a great, practical, home-meiJcing, dollar-yielding 
reality."22 
This internal division in the Reclamation Service supported Newell's 
claim that he knew nothing of the black tent shows and that they had been 
arranged through Perkins and Ballinger. On the basis of the investigation 
findings, Newell did attempt to discipline Perkins. He first informed him 
that he "should immediately cease all such connection by which you profit 
personally" and, five days later, suggested his resignation. 
In defense of his own actions cmd those of his svibordinate, Ballinger 
launched his own inquiry into the events surrounding the black tents shows 
and the efficacy of the Chicago office generally. Not surprisingly, his 
investigation reached markedly different conclusions than those conducted 
under Newell. This research exonerated Perkins from the chcirges of graft 
and, in fact, the report recommended that the Chicago office be reorganized 
by giving him more authority.^4 
Louis Hill amd the Great Northern had hoped to use the black tent 
shows to effect a complete reorgeinization of the Reclamation Service and 
its personnel. Louis launched a complete lobbying campaign, buttressing 
letters to federal bureaucrats with sending copies of releveint reports and 
21. Senate, Investigation of the Depcirtment of the Interior and of 
the Bureau of Forestry, p. 84; Perkins to Ballinger, 1910, Ballinger 
Papers, UWA. 
22. Pinchot to Taft, 4 November 1909; Article by Roy Creindall, sent 
to E. C. Brainerd, editor of the Post-Intelliaencer. 14 August 1909, 
Ballinger Papers, UWA. 
23. Senate, Investigation of the Department of the Interior and of 
the Bureau of Forestry, p. 1836-38-
24. Ibid, p. 1842-49. 
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letters to politicians eind press agents. Claiming that he squashed the 
black tent shows due to a visit to Washington, D.C., Louis failed to 
implement the larger corporate agenda.25 
In fact, the Great Northern faced a serious political dilemma as the 
investigations into the black tent shows progressed. Despite the fact that 
Louis publicly claimed that "I have no interest for or against Mr. Pinchot 
or Mr. Ballinger," he, like most other power brokers in the West, heeurtily 
opposed Pinchot's conception of conservation. Privately he asserted that 
Pinchot's "theories eure not favorably accepted in the western states for 
the reason that they would seriously reteird the development by withdrawing 
too great a portion of the public domain and closing forest reserves that 
should be peirtially open for settlement." Louis Hill realized that his 
railroad held a vested interest in exonerating Ballinger from Pinchot's 
charges, yet the trail of responsibility for the black tent graft led 
directly to Ballinger, not Newell in Pinchot's camp. Realizing this, Louis 
settled for the end of the shows and resumed generic criticisms of the 
Reclamation Service that demanded its reorgcinization. Hill's attacks 
remained firmly focused on Frederick Newell.^6 
Louis Hill received more fodder for his complaints against the 
Reclamation Service in June 1910 when a Chicago real estate businessmcin 
sent him a copy of an article supposedly written by Newell for the Ceinadian 
Pacific. In this article, Newell compared the irrigation projects in 
Canada and the United States unfavorably to the latter, and also decried 
the possibilities inherent in dryland farming. The same firm supplied 
Louis with information on money the Reclamation Service had invested in 
projects which it later abandoned. Louis distributed this information to 
V2irious editors and complained to Ballinger, who promised an 
investigation. 
25. L. W. Hill to Charles B. Nichols, Leslie's Weekly, 6 April 1910; 
to D. M. Hoyt, E. H. Cooney, Governor Norris, Helena Independent, W. B. 
George, 5 April 1910, GNRP. 
26. L. W. Hill to Nichols, 6 April 1910; to M. J. Costello, 28 June 
1910, GNRP. 
11. McKinney, HcKinney, Hobbs & Mass, to L. W. Hill, 6 and 18 June 
1910; L. W. Hill to Nichols, 28 June 1910; Ballinger to L. W. Hill, 6 
August 1910, GNRP. 
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Ballinger had already received a copy of the article from Perkins a 
few months prior to Hill's complaint. Perkins claimed that it had been 
submitted to the National Irrigation Journal but that the editor, noting 
the "fulsome - . . praise" given to Canadian projects, especially those in 
the Bow River Valley, had sent it to Perkins. Despite this agitation, 
Louis cuid others achieved nothing by their campaigning. Louis was unable 
to prove Newell's authorship of the article, and the personnel of the 
Reclamation Service remained in place. 
Ballinger, as determined as the Hills to dispose of Newell, tried to 
capitalize on his victory over Pinchot in the 1910 senatorial hearings by 
asking Taft to approve the dismissal of Newell and Davis. Taft refused, 
fearing further public controversy. The hollownesa of Ballinger's 
congressional triumph became clear in the fall of 1910 when Progressive, 
pro-Pinchot victories in the western states further undermined his 
authority. Having initially fostered the controversy through vacillation, 
Taft adopted a more active stance by firing Pinchot in 1910. Increasingly 
convinced that the factionalism in the conservation movement could only be 
healed by the removal of the other main antagonist, Ballinger, Taft forced 
him to resign in March 1911, replacing him with Pinchot-ite Walter L. 
Fisher.29 
Toward the end of 1909, growing disillusionment of Great Northern 
personnel toward the Reclamation Service crystallized. The combination of 
the black tent shows, financed by the Union Pacific and advertising the 
Southwest, continual complaints from settlers along the Great Northern, and 
Newell's supposed authorship of an article promoting Canadian irrigation 
resulted in an all-out campaign against the Service by Louis Hill. The 
campaign resurrected eaurlier political maneuvers such as the push for the 
Newlands Act. Louis wooed editors, called in private msurkers with 
congressmen, and even contemplated teiking over some reclamation projects. 
However, all his efforts accomplished little, and the political victory 
went indisputably to the opposition. 
28. Perkins to Ballinger, 9 June 1910; to Senator Weldon B. Heyburn 
of Idaho, 9 June 1910, Ballinger Papers, UWA; H. H. Parkhouse to L. W. 
Hill, n.d. GNRP. 
29. Elmo Richeurdson, The Politics of Conservation; Crusades and 
Controversies. 1897-1913 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962). 
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The failure to effect change in the Reclamation Service succeeded in 
fostering Louis's personal, eind the Great Northern's general, animosity 
toweurd the federal agency- Despite both institutions' belief in the need 
for irrigation in the eurid West, the gulf between them widened as the 
Reclamation Service became caught up and stalled in bureaucratic red tape. 
The corporate focus of the Great Northern prevented its personnel from 
recognizing support for irrigation projects outside the railroad's 
territory as anything other thain favoritism. 
The removal of Ballinger from the Interior and the triumph of the 
Pinchot-ites in federal land mcinagement constituted a serious blow to the 
Great Northern Railway. It represented the failure of the corporation, 
headed by Louis, to sustain the political influence which had proved so 
useful. It resulted in the dominance of Pinchot's ideology of governmental 
management for the public domain, at least within the federal bureaucracy. 
It also reflected a clear-cut move toward a narrower. Progressive 
definition of expertise, moving authority and power to academically 
qualified bureaucrats. Ballinger, with his deference to private as well as 
public interests, tacitly acknowledged that expertise in land management 
could reside in a multiplicity of places and persons. With Ballinger's 
resignation, Pinchot's vision of a public domain controlled by bureaucratic 
experts with regularized credentials, gained ascendeincy. 
At the same time as Louis Hill fought and lost the battle over the 
Reclamation Service, many of the same characters contested many of the same 
issues through the forum of the national conservation movement. As with 
irrigation, Louis Hill meurshaled much of the political struggle over 
conservation. His father, however, because of his self-created image as a 
successful farmer and longterm concern with soil conservation, moved to 
center stage. 
James J. Hill had always asserted that wasteful feirming lay at the 
root of many of the American farm problems. Despite the continued success 
of monoculture. Hill believed AmeriCcin farmers needed to practice the 
intensive, diversified agriculture of Europeeui countries such as France or 
Denmark to keep production levels high. In his public addresses at the end 
of the first decade of the twentieth century. Hill consistently stressed 
the need for feirmers to be more conservative in their methods, especially 
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with respect to soils. He had long preached that "what you take from the 
soil you must put back." Indeed this had provided part of his dual 
justification for diversification, the production of free fertilizer. 
Hill's advocacy and the visibility of his ideas grew as an academic debate 
propelled the issue of soil fertility into the public eye. This prominence 
gave the railroad magnate a place in the early national conservation 
movement-^® 
Soil fertility and conservation gained public prominence in 1903 when 
Head of the Bureau of Soils Milton Whitney issued a Fcirmers' Bulletin 
disclaiming the need to fertilize soil. Whitney argued that "practically 
all soils contain sufficient plant food for good crop yields, [and] that 
this supply will be indefinitely maintained." He claimed that experiments 
at the Rothcunsted station in England, based on the work of eighteenth-
century agriculturist Jethro Tull, demonstrated that faunners could maintain 
soil fertility solely by appropriate crop rotation and ceureful tillage. 
Whitney based his argument on the belief that the soil contained all 
the necessciry chemicals which could be continuously replenished by water 
movement. Using research of the Bureau of Soils, he concluded that soils 
differed little in their compositions and that the issue of maximizing 
production pivoted on soil physics rather thain soil chemistry. 
Productivity rested on three factors: the "mechanical condition of the 
soil"; the ease with which water could permeate it; and the amount of 
moisture present in the soil or the climate. Whitney postulated that the 
only chemical problem inherent in cultivation centered on different plants 
excreting toxins which proved deleterious to subsequent crops; the best 
solution to which was crop rotation. 
30. St. Paul Pioneer Press. 6 September 1910; Omaha Daily News. 9 
December 1909; Chicago Dailv News. 30 October 1909; News-Messenoer 
^Marshall. Minn.^. 8 October 1909; Seattle Post-Intelliaencer, 6 September 
1910. 
31. Milton Whitney, "The Chemistry of the Soil as Related to Crop 
Production," Bureau of Soils, Bulletin 22 (1903): 55-56, 64; Cyril 
Hopkins, "The Duty of Chemistry to Agriculture," University of Illinois 
Agricultural Experiment Station, Circular 105 (November 1906): 4. 
32. Cyril Hopkins, "Chemical Principles of Soil Fertility," 
University of Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station, Circulaur 124 
(November 1908): 2; Whitney, "The Chemistry of the Soil as Related to Crop 
Production"; Hopkins, "The Duty of Chemistry to Agriculture," 25-27. 
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Whitney's claims caused an uproar among soil scientists. At a time 
when scientific agriculturists still faced powerful attacks on their claim 
to expertise and leadership, meiny believed in the necessity of presenting a 
united informational frcunework. Whitney's deviation from the mainstream of 
academic thought undermined the apparent objectivity and certainty of 
science. Additionally, a federal leader's propagation of incorrect 
information provided opponents of scientific agriculture with a formidable 
weapon. Whitney's academic opponents countered that crops did permeinently 
deplete the soil £ind that scientifically designed, eurtificial fertilizers 
offered the only effective remedy. Concern for their tenuous ascendancy as 
objective experts, combined with a growing feeir eimong agriculturists that 
American farm practices would lead to a food shortage if not unchecked, 
made a response to Whitney's bulletin imperative.^^ 
Dr. Cyril Hopkins, a professor of agricultural chemistry at the 
University of Illinois, led the opposition. Hopkins cast Whitney's error 
in most invidious terms, predicting that, "the injury to American 
agriculture that may result from the wide dissemination and adoption into 
agricultural practice of erroneous teaching from one occupying a national 
position of high authority is too vast to justify agricultural scientists 
and investigators in the easier and more agreeeible policy of ignoring these 
teachings." Hopkins rationalized the attack on Whitney as an unpleasant, 
but necessary, moral crusade. 
The conflict lasted much of the decade. Both sides published 
evidence supporting their theories and mobilized support from authorities 
as varied as the Association of Official Agricultural Chemists and 
Congress, 
Despite the continuing controversy, Whitney remained in office and 
kept advancing his theories. In 1908 he presented a report to the National 
Conservation Commission which offered a modified perspective. Whitney 
chamged his main thrust, attacking "unscrupulous manufacturers" who sold 
feunners "worthless materials for exorbitant prices." He called for more 
33. Hopkins, "The Duty of Chemistry to Agriculture," 25-27. 
34. Ibid, 14. 
35. Eugene Davenport, University of Illinois Agricultural Experiment 
Station, Circular 123 (1908); Hopkins, "Chemical Principles of Soil 
Fertility," 1-4. 
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investigation into the principles governing fertilizers emd more 
legislation to control their manufacture. The next year he issued another 
Farmers' Bulletin which compared the mineral compositions of soils in 
America and Europe. The similarity of his findings, compounded by the high 
productivity of some European systems, led him to conclude once more that 
"there is [no] demger of permjinent loss of fertility of our soils through 
loss of mineral plant-food constituents . . . through the removal of our 
very moderate crops. 
The emergence of this debate over soil science, synchronous with 
Hill's growing concern with soil exhaustion throughout the nation, 
increased his visibility. The director of the Illinois Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Eugene Davenport, talked about "warnings of soil 
depletion from men such as James J. Hill." As a result of this visibility. 
President Roosevelt invited Hill to be one of four guest speakers at the 
Governors' Conference on the Conservation of Natural Resources, held at the 
White House in May 1908. The official invitation cited his areas of 
expertise as being "trcinsportation and . . . the commercial development of 
the country." Hill accepted with alacrity and highlighted his eirea of 
concern: "The greatest foundation of value and, I might say, of life 
itself, is in the fertility of the soil, auid this is being wasted as 
recklessly and rapidly as any of the others. 
The conference was well attended. Governors from forty states and 
territories came, along with members of the cabinet and the Supreme Court, 
representatives from various national orgeinizations, and periodicals, and 
special guests including Milton Whitney.^® 
36. Senate, Report of the National Conservation Commission with 
Accompanying Papers. February 1909. 60th Cong., 2d sess., 1909, S. doc. 
676, Vol. 3, p. 108; Milton Whitney, "A Study of Crop Yields and Soil 
Composition in Relation to Soil Productivity," Bureau of Soils, Bulletin 57 
(October 1909). 
37. Davenport, Circular 123. 5; Theodore Roosevelt to Hill, 4 Meirch 
1908, General Correspondence; Hill to Roosevelt, 20 March 1908, Letterpress 
Books, Jjunes J. Hill Papers, James J. Hill Libreury, St. Paul, Minn. 
(hereafter JJHP). 
38. RaltiTtiore AmericcUi. 14 May 1908; W. J. McGee, ed., Proceedings 
of a Conference of Governors in the White House Washington. D.C. May 13-15. 
1908 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1909), vi, viii-ix, 
xix, xxv-xxxi• 
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Hill and two other speakers, Andrew Carnegie and John Mitchell 
arrived early on the first day and took front row seats in the East Room of 
the White House. Carnegie and Mitchell both spoke that first day, one 
about ores emd minerals, the other briefly on the waste of coal. On the 
second day Hill's lengthy address provided, according to national 
newspapers, the "stelleir spesiking attraction" which "won more attention to 
the 'conservation of resources' proposition than all other efforts in that 
direction." As well as discussing forests and coal. Hill spent most of his 
talk detailing the declining productivity of American soils. With his 
usual extensive use of statistics, he demonstrated the diminishing returns 
of soils throughout the nation. The remedy he offered combined crop 
rotation with natural fertilizers to act as "tonics" for the soil, 
stressing manure as fertilizer. 
His speech was well received, making a "very deep impression" on 
Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson. William Jennings Bryan, who also 
attended, considered that he had "rendered the Conference a real service." 
Professor Charles Van Hise of the University of Wisconsin eUid president of 
the National Association of State Universities upheld Hill's ideas about 
the importance of manure as a fertilizer in a later presentation. 
Accolades paid to Hill's speeches by federal and university experts, 
combined with favorable coverage in the newspapers, catapulted Hill to a 
position as an expert regarding soil conservation.'^^ 
The acknowledgment of Hill's expertise in soil conservation in the 
media cuid by the federal experts attending the conference, placed him in a 
favorable position to exercise authority. Semi-retired from the railroad. 
Hill toured his territory in the fall of 1909 speaking at county fairs. 
His talks continually refined his eirguments about soil conservation, and in 
1910 he collected sixteen of his essays on favorite topics for publication 
as Highways of Prooresa. Five of these papers dealt directly with 
agriculture, all of which included Hill's views on soil conservation.^^ 
39. Baltimore American. 14 May 1908; McGee, Proceedings of a 
Conference of Governors. 37-39, 63-75; Chicago Record-Herald. 15 May 1908; 
Augusta fGa.^ Chronicle. 18 May 1908; Sun fNew York^. 15 May 1908. 
40. McGee, Proceedings of a Conference of Governors, xxv, 96, 203, 
432; Roosevelt to Hill, 8 June 1908, General Correspondence, JJHP. 
41. Minot fN. D.^ Dailv Qptic. 28 September 1909; News-Messenger 
(Marshall. Minn.). 8 October 1909; Helena Independent. 28 September 1909; 
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On hearing of the intended volume, Cyril Hopkins approached J. P. 
Morgan to arrange an interview with Hill. Hopkins was anxious to set Hill 
straight on several matters "in connection with the rotation of crops and 
the maintencmce of the soil," especially because of "the tremendous 
influence [the] book will have." Hopkins's concern centered upon Hill's 
statement that "a proper three or five year rotation of crops actually 
enriches the soil." He feared that Hill's view trespassed on the errors 
enunciated by Whitney, whom Hill had met at the Governors' Conference. 
Hill reassured him in a well-cited letter that this was not the case and 
that he just saw rotation as £in intrinsic part of a three-part system which 
included fertilization eind careful tillage. Hopkins also stated that 
manure provided an insufficient fertilizer, questioning the work of Van 
Hise (also at the conference) who asserted that if a farmer applied all 
meinure to the soil all the necessary elements would be returned. Hopkins 
pointed out that livestock utilized soil nutrients, through feed, for meat 
cind milk production cind thus the chemicals ingested far exceeded those 
excreted. Even if feirmers applied all barnyard manure to the soil, 
therefore, it would remain insufficient to maintain fertility. Hopkins's 
eurguments proved persuasive enough that Hill began to embrace the 
importance of artificial fertilizers, although never abandoning his stress 
on the ease and importance of manuring. 
The attention directed at soil science due to the Whitney/Hopkins 
controversy in combination with Hill's longstanding interests in productive 
farming and the nascent conservation movement temporarily validated his 
claim to agricultural expertise on a national level. Recognition and 
deference from federal and academic experts ostensibly placed Hill in a 
position to influence national policy as well as farming practices. 
However, the larger political conflict surrounding the Ballinger-Pinchot 
controversy soon subsumed questions of Hill's expertise and soil 
conservation. 
Post and Record (Rochester, Minn. >. 1 October 1909; Jeimes J- Hill, Highways 
of Progress, (Geurden City, N.Y.; Doubleday, Page, & Company, 1910). 
42. J. p. Morgein to Hill, 7 December 1909, Hopkins to Hill 21 emd 29 
December 1909, General Correspondence, JJHP; Hill to Hopkins, 29 December 
1909; Hopkins to Hill, 3 January 1910, GNRP; Charles R. Van Hise, 
"Conservation of Soils," in Proceedings of a Conference of Governors. 431-
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By the time of the first Conservation Congress in Seattle in 1909, 
the controversy was in full spate. Although Taft had yet to decide on the 
necessity for a congressional hearing, the main ideological and material 
issues had crystallized in the months following Ballinger's appointment. 
Both sides had spent the summer of 1909 publicizing their positions, but 
the Pinchot faction successfully dominated the Seattle meeting, receiving 
considerable support from westerners. This interregional backing of 
Pinchot undermined claims by the Ballinger-Hill group that the problem lay 
in sectional misunderstanding, with the East attempting to dominate auid 
direct the West. The congress adjourned after deciding to hold the 
following meeting in St. Paul.^^ 
In 1910 the Governors' Conservation Committee asked Louis Hill to 
help raise funds to defer expenses of the St. Paul congress. Louis proved 
more than willing and petitioned various local railroad companies for a 
contribution of five hundred doll£u:s. Louis also peirticipated in the local 
committee to appoint the speakers, and he worried that Gifford Pinchot eind 
"his crowd, who are all eastern theorists," would dominate the conference. 
Pinchot, although fired from his federal office early in 1910, still held 
the position of chairman of the National Conservation Association, the 
sponsoring body for the conference. The men who dominated the association, 
Louis believed, "would seriously retard the development [of the West] by 
withdrawing too great a portion of the public domain." He feared that, 
unless some effort was made to contain this eastern influence, many 
important westerners would boycott the St. Paul meeting. Consequently, he 
launched a lobbying campaign to ensure that men "who can speaUc in the 
interest of home settlement in the west," accepted invitations to speak at 
the conference. 
The invitations to speakers came from the Association's national 
offices in Washington, D.C. eind were, according to Louis, dominated by 
Pinchot. Despite this, James J. Hill received an invitation to spe5Jc at 
the conference on soil conservation as, so the letter read, "No man in the 
43. Richeurdson, Politics of Conservation. 60-80; Lawrence Rakestraw, 
"The West, States' Rights, and Conservation: A Study of Six Public Leuid 
Conferences," Pacific Northwest Quarterly 48 (July 1957): 89-99. 
44. L. W. Hill to C. G. Goodrich, E. Pennington, W. A. McGonagle, F. 
E. House, A. J. Eeirling, and Marvin Hughitt, 16 Februeiry 1910; to Costello, 
28 June 1910; to Caurter, 28 June 1910, GNRP. 
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United States is so well qualified to discuss this subject as yourself." 
When the Association published the proposed list of speeUcers, Louis Hill 
objected to Taft's secretary, Charles Norton, that the list was "decidedly 
against the present administration," and that Pinchot's group refused to 
allow the conference to stage a Taft day. Minnesotan Knute Nelson, 
chaimiem of the Senate's committee on public lands and cm old political 
ally of the Great Northern, concurred with Louis Hill. He believed that 
Pinchot and his allies intended to utilize the entire conference as "a 
drive at President Taft," especially by Pinchot's attorney in the 
congressional hecirings, Louis Brandeis, who Louis Hill judged as "one of 
the worst and most unscrupulous pettifoggers I have ever seen."'^^ 
The proposed representation for the conference upset other 
politicians and businessmen who favored greater state control of western 
resources. Governor Meurion Hay of Washington also favored the states' 
rights position. Having been asked to nominate delegates for the 
conference, his advocacy for at least one state-control representative met 
with outright refusal. This forced Hay into open opposition to the federal 
position on conservation, and he sent letter to western governors inviting 
them to a meeting in Salt LeJce City to try and protect western interests.^® 
Despite considerable machinations and negotiations on the part of 
veirious westerners such as Louis Hill and Hay, which included a meeting in 
Chicago and one in Salt Lake, the program for the St. Paul conference 
remained little changed from Pinchot's original proposal. Taft had been 
invited but "North and South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Oregon, Wyoming, 
Utah and Colorado are only represented on the program by Senator Dixon, of 
Montauia." At this point, Louis changed his tactics and, realizing that the 
program could not be altered in his favor, started working to implement a 
boycott of the meeting. LecUcing information on the program to Governor 
Edwin Norris of Montama to take to the meeting of western governors in Salt 
Lake City, he stated that he thought the western governors ought not to 
condone the meeting by attendance. In addition he refused to offer reduced 
45. B. N. Baker to Hill, 30 June 1910; L. W. Hill to Chcurles Norton, 
13 July 1910; Knute Nelson to L. W. Hill, 19 July 1910; Nelson to L. W. 
Hill, 19 July 1910, GNRP. 
46. H. J. Bergmem, "The Relucteuit Dissenter: Governor Hay of 
Washington and the Conservation Problem," Pacific Northwest Oucurterlv 62 
(Jeuauary 1971); 27-33. 
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rates on the Great Northern if the governors did not come. This ploy 
worked, and many of the western governors stayed away, for which Louis 
publicly blamed Pinchot-^^ 
The conference proved a triumph for the Pinchot-Roosevelt faction, 
favoring federal control of conservation. Governor Hay, who did attend, 
had little impact and later wrote of the conference as "The frameup at St. 
Paul [which] was so reuik that it was really laughable." Overall the 
states' rights advocates were ignored emd ridiculed. The speeches given by 
critics of federal conservation met with disinterest from the audience 
showing, as in Seattle, that despite their claims, they did not represent a 
West unified against federal control. Many westerners stood solidly behind 
Pinchot, believing that only federal authority could undermine the region's 
industrial political machines and ensure more equitable land use and 
mcinagement. ^ ® 
James J. Hill gave his speech during the afternoon of the third day. 
Despite the title of "Soils, Crops, Food and Clothing," Hill used the 
opportunity to attack federal control of national resources. Using 
irrigation as his example, he stated "There cire dangers inseparable from 
national control and conduct of affairs. The machine is too big and too 
distant; its operation is slow, cumbersome emd costly. So slow is it that 
settlers are waiting in distress for water promised long ago." Roosevelt, 
Pinchot, and former secretary of the interior, James Garfield among others, 
overrode Hill's views, and the old railroad man was also subjected to 
direct attack for his speech. Two days after his presentation Francis 
Heney, a San Francisco lawyer and avid Pinchot-ite, accused Hill of wasting 
national resources through the congressional land greint worth at least six 
hundred million dollars to the Great Northern. He also stated that Hill's 
annual salary was fifty thousand dollaurs. Despite the inaccuracy of his 
statements—the Great Northern received no land grant and Hill had never 
drawn a salary, personally flourishing from sheures alone—the attack proved 
very popular with the audience. Hill received no opportunity to respond. 
47. L. W. Hill to Edwin Norris, governor of Montana, 12 August 1910, 
(two letters); to Charles Norton, 16 August 1910, GNRP. 
48. Bergman, "The Reluctant Dissenter," 27-33; Hay to Dr. F. 0. 
Hudnutt, 15 September 1910, Hay Papers, Washington State Archives, Olympia, 
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and the same day the conference ended with considereible strife over its 
resolutions. Although the federal component won out, state advocates such 
as Governor Hay offered heated opposition.'^® 
The outpouring of conflict and acrimony which marred the conference 
took some time to die down. Leslie's Weekly, a Chicago newspaper which 
favored the Hills, issued a lengthy description of Pinchot's manipulation 
of the program of the conference and of the fight launched to add some pro-
western speeikers. To refute Heney's attack Jaunes J. Hill issued a public 
statement that "The Great Northern did not receive a dolleir in money or an 
acre of land from the federal government [and] . . . that I have never 
received . . . one dollar of salary from any railroad company."^® 
Despite these defenses, the pro-federal conservation movement 
remained dominant. In fact, the election of a number of Progressive, pro-
federal governors in western states in the elections of 1910 exacerbated 
the situation. Federal experts aggressively asserted their hegemony over 
public Icmd mamagement, assuming power previously distributed among states 
and corporations. Hill, a victim of this centralization, removed himself 
from involvement in the growing national movement for conservation. 
Responding to a request from the new president of the National Conservation 
Congress, Henry Wallace, to pay for the printing of the proceedings of the 
St. Paul meeting. Hill wrote, "While I have for a long time, and am now, 
deeply interested in conservation of our natural resources, I have not 
forgotten the unfair and shabby manner in which many of its friends were 
treated in Saint Paul." Wallace also invited Hill to address the third 
National Conservation Congress in Kansas City. Hill refused and remained 
adamant despite Wallace's repeated requests. Hill did include in his 
letter a five-page statement on conservation which could be read at the 
conference if desired, a strategy he repeated in 1912.^^ 
49. Seattle Post-Intelliaencer. 8 September 1910; Saint Paul Pioneer 
Press. 7 and 9 September 1910; Minneapolis Morning Tribune. 8 September 
1910. 
50. Leslie's Weekly fChicaaoW 22 September 1910; Saint Paul Pioneer 
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51. Bergmem, "The Reluctant Dissenter," 30; Henry Wallace to Hill, 
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Although removing himself from the national movement James J. Hill 
remained interested in conservation. Instead he involved himself in local 
groups, which he could more easily dominate, using their meetings as a 
foriim for propounding ideas and attacking national trends. In November 
1912 Hill delivered a speech at the Second Minnesota Conservation and 
Agricultural Development Congress in Minneapolis. "The first business of 
real conservation," he insisted, "is to lift agriculture to the rank of a 
science well understood and practically applied. . . . This is real 
Conservation- It is not a temporary fad, not a method of serving personal 
ambition or local interest, but a system of harmonious co-operation between 
the laws of man's environment euid his liveliest anticipation eind most 
joyous activity." Thus he simultaneously vindicated his interest in 
conservation as altruistic, while condemning his opponents as self-
aggrandizing cind unnatural. 
By 1912 Hill found that his earlier use of federal expertise to 
promote agricultural change had backfired. The creation of the Reclamation 
Service enaibled federal experts to refine their conception of expertise and 
ensure its dominance at the expense of amateurs like Hill. Former 
governmental allies had thus undermined Hill's position as an agricultural 
expert. 
Pinchot's professionalization of federal land management and his 
success in the struggle with Ballinger, heightened Hill's isolation. 
Roosevelt eUid Pinchot used Hill's prominence to launch a national awareness 
of conservation, but they had no intention of deferring to Hill's ideas at 
the White House Conference. Thus, while achieving some media validation of 
his agricultural expertise through involvement in soil conservation, James 
and Louis Hill remained paper tigers when it came to national policy. 
Loss of political clout effectively hamstrung Hill and his railroad 
in policy areas other thsm transportation. The Hills's continued attempts 
to influence agricultural development in the northern tier by political 
lobbying, direct media attack, and appeals to presidents, consistently 
52. James J. Hill, "Minnesota's Agriculture," Speech at the Second 
Minnesota Conservation and Agricultural Development Congress, Minneapolis, 
Minn., 19 November 1912, Louis W. Hill Papers, James J. Hill Library, St. 
Paul, Minn. 
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failed. The ghettoization of Hill's agricultiaral interests resulted in 
him, and his railroad, removing themselves from the institutional 
involvement which they had cultivated for two decades. The increasing 
national emphasis on professional expertise compounded this isolation. As 
civil engineers dominated the Reclamation Service and professional 
foresters assumed control of the public domain, amateurs, such as Hill and 
Ballinger, were marginalized in policymaking and their claims to expertise 
refuted. 
While this process played out on a federal level, a similau: pattern 
unfolded between the railroad and local institutions. Embarking on a 
series of dryland farming ventures to compensate for the lack of irrigation 
taking place in his territory. Hill found his expertise as contested by 
state and regional institutions as it was on a national level by federal 
authorities. 
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isolation and expertise, 1907-1912 
With governmental irrigation stalled in the northern tier eind interaction 
between the railroad and federal agencies degenerating into acrimony. Hill 
and the Great Northern explored new ways of increasing the agricultural 
productivity of railroad territory. By the eeirly 1900s the obvious 
alternative to irrigation on the northern plains had become dryland 
farming. The Great Northern's interest in dryland experimentation £uid 
promotion dated as early as 1906 cuid, as conflicts with the Reclamation 
Service grew, so did the railroad's financial commitment to dry farming. 
Attempts to coordinate research and development with the Montana 
Agricultural College and promotion with the Dryland Feonaing Congresses 
proved as frustrating as alliances with the Reclamation Service and 
conservation movement. The railroad once more found itself at loggerheads 
with institutions and agencies. 
When efforts to promote agriculture through institutions failed the 
Great Northern revisited private action. However, aware of the problems 
inherent in Hill's ecirlier image of gentlemsui farmer, the corporation 
carefully esteJalished a more professional basis for expertise. The Great 
Northern founded an Agricultural Extension Depsurtment in 1912 staffed by 
likeminded agriculturists. The department conducted its own experimental 
and educational program and continued work which had previously been 
conducted under the auspices of the Industrial Department. Unlike later 
railroad programs which functioned as a mesms of disseminating university 
information, the Great Northern's department in the eeirly years clearly had 
its own agenda and conducted its own research.^ 
The Great Northern staurted financing dryland farming experimentation 
in 1906 through a cooperative agreement with the Northern Pacific, the 
state of Montana, and the Montema Agricultural College. Great Northern 
funded experiment substations along its line for three yecurs. In 1909 the 
1. Howard Leigh Dickman, "James Jerome Hill and the Agricultural 
Development of the Northwest" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Michigan, 1977), 
107, 193-250. 
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railroad limited its expenditxire to $1,700 for a new station at Chester eind 
fifty dollars a month toward the saleu^r of supervisor M. L. Frang of the 
Montana Experiment Station. The line also fvirnished transportation for 
Freuig zmd for Professors Linfield emd Atkinson to visit the stations at 
Harlem, Havre, Chester, Fort Benton, Great Falls, and Moccasin.^ 
The Great Northern's decision to discontinue its support of the 
Montana Experiment Station was intimately connected with the nature of the 
railroad. Results had not been consistent; some of stations had 
successfully promoted settlement but others had not- In October 1909 
Thomas Shaw reported to Louis Hill that 250 homestead claims had been filed 
around the recently established station at Chester. He also reported that 
land prices at Moccasin had doubled since the experiment station had opened 
eighteen months previously. On the other hand, when W. W. Broughton, 
general traffic manager for the company in Montcuia, raised the issue of 
continuing the work at Chester in February 1910 Louis Hill wrote to him, 
"At present I feel that we should not donate euiything for Montana 
experimental stations for the reason that in the past we have not obtained 
satisfactory results." Railway personnel believed that the production euid 
settlement generated did not justify continued expenditure.^ 
Tension arose between the railroad and university academics over the 
future of dryland farming. The Great Northern wanted to promote dry 
farming settlement faster than the experiment stations believed 
justifieible. In eeirly 1910 the director of the Montana Agricultural 
2. F. B. Linfield, "Fourteenth Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 
ending June 30, 1907," Montana Agricultural College Experiment Station, 
(February 1908), 164; W. W. Broughton to L. W. Hill, 26 December 1907; "Co­
operative Work in Dry Farming in Montcuia," emon., undated. Great Northern 
Railway Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minn., (hereafter 
GNRP). In 1907 the Northern Pacific contributed three thouseind dollars to 
dryland farming experimentation and the state of Montana to two thousand. 
The state also gave two thousand dolleurs to start a station in Fergus 
County not far from Moccasin in the Judith Basin, on a branch line of the 
Great Northern. All peurties found the work generally satisfactory despite 
some personnel problems at the Shelby station. In 1908 the Northern 
Pacific's contribution dropped back to $2,500, eind the Shelby station along 
the Great Northern was discontinued. In 1909 the state increased its 
contribution to nine thousand dolleurs and the Northern Pacific to five 
thousand, with two more stations being est£d}lished along its line. The 
Chicago, Milwaukee emd St. Paul Railway also committed two thousand dolleurs 
per year for two stations on its road. 
3- L. W. Hill to Broughton, 21 Februsury 1910; Thomas Shaw to L. W. 
Hill, 1 October 1909, GNRP. 
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College, Linfield, expressed his concern that settlement was proceeding too 
swiftly cind would lead to farm failure. The general immigration agent for 
the Great Northern E. C. Leedy forweirded the letter to Louis Hill who 
responded with a letter of complaint to Montana's Governor Edwin Norris. 
The letter testified to Louis's desire for settlement and his inherent 
Social Darwinism: "I do not feel that anyone can take the responsibility 
of educating all the people who Ccune to Montana to make a living for 
themselves. We cein only hcindle this matter by selecting the best people we 
can allowing the theory of survival of the fittest to provide the final 
outcome. 
Despite em understandable interest in settlement, the main concern of 
the Great Northern was generating haulage through crop production, 
especially wheat. Without a land grant, the railroad depended on haulage 
for profits. In 1908, the last year that the Great Northern funded the 
stations at Harlem and Great Falls, the substations' production proved 
eibysmally small compared to yields at the University of Minnesota's 
experiment station (see Table 1). Even allowing for climatic differences, 
the Hills decided funding the Montana Agricultural College's program was a 
poor investment.^ 
The Great Northern's dual focus on production and settlement led its 
officials to terminate their involvRment with the Montana Agricultural 
College in 1909. As a corporation independent of the Great Northern, the 
Northern Pacific continued its funding because of greater concern with land 
sales. Additionally, the yields on the experiment farms it sponsored, such 
as Forsyth, proved much better than those along the Great Northern (see 
Table 1).6 
In 1909 the Great Northern gave its meiximum support to another dry 
farming organization: the dryleuid farming congress. Initially called the 
4. Linfield to E. C. Leedy, 28 January 1910, Montana State 
University Archives, Bozeman, Mont., (hereafter MSU); Dickman, "James 
Jerome Hill," 173-174; L. W. Hill to Edwin Norris, 8 February 1910, GNRP. 
5. In 1910 Jjunes J. Hill published his collection of speeches. 
Highways of Progress (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Compeiny, 1910), in 
it he demonstrated his concern with wheat yields, saying "The average wheat 
yield per acre in the United States in 1907 was 14 bushels. The average 
for the last ten years is 13.88. . . . It is a disgraceful record," 75. 
6. Thomas Cooper, lauid commissioner of Great Northern, to Howard 
Elliott, president of Northern Pacific, 15 December 1908, GNRP. 
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Table 1. Production figvires for experiment stations in Montana and 
Minnesota, 1908 
Great Falls Harlem Forsyth St. Paul 
Spring wheat 
Sixty day oats 
White barley 
Turkey Red wheat 
Fall rye 
12.77 4.33 17.34 32.6 
18.25 27.06 32.92 44.0 
12.73 8.00 29.90 44.0 
10.40 16.63 45.31 32.6 
8.71 — 32.46 39.8 
Sources: Alfred Atkinson cind J. B. Nelson, "Dry Faunning Investigations in 
Montana," Bulletin 74. Montana Agricultural College Experiment Station, 
(December 1908): 74-75; Andrew Boss, et al., "Seed Grain; Selection, 
Treatment, Varieties, Distribution," Bulletin 115. University of Minnesota, 
Agricultural Experiment Station, (April 1909): 376-383; L. W. Hill to 
Broughton, 21 February 1910, GNRP. 
Note: All figvires given represent bushels per acre. 
Trans-Missouri Dry Farming Congress, this organization had started two 
years earlier in Denver and included representatives from almost everywhere 
except the farm. Governors of states eind territories could appoint 
delegates, as could mayors, county commissioners, national and state 
agricultural associations, railroads, chambers of commerce. The congress 
also encouraged the attendance of senators, congressmen, officers of the 
agricultural colleges and the USDA, as well as state engineers and members 
of state land boards.^ 
The 1907 meeting, like subsequent Dry Farming Congress meetings, 
combined boosterism and scientific presentation. Ellery Chcuining Chilcott, 
head of the USDA's new Office of Dryland Agriculture, gave a paper on crop 
7. Proceedings of the Trans-Missouri Drv Farming Congress. Held at 
Denver. Colorado. January 24. 25. 26. 1907 (Denver Chamber of Commerce), 3-
4. 
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rotation; William M. Jardine of the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station 
and Robert Gauss, editorial writer the Denver Republican, talked on 
breeding drought resistant strains of plants; others, such as Governor 
Brooks of Wyoming emd Mr. Adams, a minister from Arizona, testified to the 
beauty euid potential of their regions, the energy and industry of the 
American people, and the belief that science would find an answer, even if 
the question often remained ill-defined.® 
The dryland farming congresses continued until 1915, the scope of 
their work broadening to become national and, by 1911, international. The 
annual congresses made no attempt to affect the farmers directly or 
increase their participation at the conferences, but dryland boosterism 
increased consideredaly. By the time of the Fourth Dry Farming Congress at 
Billings in the fall of 1909, the organization published a hundred-plus 
page booklet detailing the attractions of Montana and the opportunities for 
settling and establishing profitable fanning.® 
These congresses were testaments to the Progressive belief in the 
efficacy of science. For many Americcins science offered a objective, non-
moralistic cure to social problems. The image of science in the early 
twentieth century was that of an industrial process of cogs eind gears 
rather than a negotiated, orgemic interaction between mcin and nature. Thus 
the issues confronting society generally and specifically agriculture in 
the arid West, could be dismantled into discrete, solvable problems and 
then reassembled to create a rejuvenated rural society.^® 
While agreeing with the utility of science in agricultural 
improvement, James Hill found himself at odds with the majority at the 
8. Jardine was American secretary of agriculture from 1925-29; 
Gladys Beiker, et al. Century of Service; The First 100 Years of the United 
States Department of Agriculture (Washington, D. C.; U. S. Department of 
Agriculture, 1963), 45; Proceeding of the Treins-Missouri Drv Fanning 
Congress. 1907. 16-27, 32-35, 72-76, 126-129, 146-148. 
9. Fourth Drv Fcurmlng Congress Will Convene in Billings. Montana. U. 
S. A. October 26th. 27th and 28th. 1909. (Montema Board of Control, 1909). 
10. Charles E. Rosenberg, No Other Gods; On Science and American 
Social Thought (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), 12; 
Robert H. Wiebe, The Secirch for Order. 1877-1920 (New York; Hill eUid Wang, 
1967), 145-6; Margaret Rossiter, "The Organization of the Agricultural 
Sciences," in The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America. 1860-1920. 
ed. Alexandra Oleson and John Voss (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1979), 211-48. 
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conference regarding the nature of expertise. As with irrigation and land 
memagement, academics emd federal bureaucrats successfully established a 
neurrow, credential-based criteria for agricultural expertise, heavily 
reliemt on formal training. Hill, on the other heuid, subscribed to an 
organic view of farm development based on a symbiotic relationship between 
mein and leind. "The tillage of the soil is the most natural and desired^le 
occupation for man."^^ 
Aligning with Jefferson's vision of the yeoman feurmer, Hill believed 
in the expertise of experience and amorphous wisdom. As a gentleman fcunner 
Hill asserted his agricultural expertise and consistently refuted the 
primacy of steuidardized knowledge in agricultural development. Although he 
supported scientific fcirming emd looked to educational institutions to 
disseminate ideas and methods. Hill firmly believed that "what has to be 
taught is not abstruse." The growing dominance of professional 
agricultural experts undermined Hill's position, making expertise dependent 
on quantifiable credentials. 
Such conflicts were apparent at the 1907 congress when Heirdy Webster 
Ceunpbell's authority on dry farming received its first challenge. 
Campbell, a self-created agricultural expert like Hill, focused on 
intensive wheat culture with alternating summer fallow. At the Denver 
meeting, federal official Chilcott's paper on crop rotation as opposed to 
summer fallow and academic Jardine's emphasis on drought-resistant strains 
of plants offered a Progressive scientific alternative to Campbell's 
amateurism. As the boom of dry feunning spread and more scientists launched 
local experiments, many involved in the movement began to dismiss the 
Campbell System. Chilcott, Jsurdine, and others helped show that tillage 
systems had to be adapted to peirticuleir soil types, that rotation and crop 
veiriety enhemced the chances of profiteJaility, euid that larger acreages 
proved more profitable than 160 acres. 
The dethroning of Campbell represented more than em increased 
understanding of the complexities of dryland feunning. Campbell, a 
competent farmer turned publicist, symbolized ein increasingly impotent type 
11. Hill, Highways of Progress. 40. 
12. Ibid, 62. 
13. Mcury Wilma H. Hargreaves, Drv FamiTna in the Northern Great 
Plains. 1900-1925 (Ceunbridge: Heirveird University Press, 1957), 101-104. 
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of expert in the eyes of the dominant culture, an uneducated one. Federal 
officials cind academics aimed to undermine his position eind assert their 
own dominauice; their ease in executing this coup demonstrated the 
vulnereibility of experts like Campbell, emd of course Hill, who lay outside 
academe or government. 
The Great Northern did not have euiy official representatives at the 
Denver meeting, but, by 1909, the corporation demonstrated substemtial 
interest in dry feunning. Dry feirming Congress authorities approached the 
railroad to help orgsmize the meeting both administratively and 
fineuicially. Max Bass, the line's iimoigration agent, represented the Great 
Northern on the board of directors and agreed to contribute $1,500 for 
advertising and miscellaneous costs. 
The line also offered special rates to people traveling to and from 
the congress. General Traffic Manager Broughton expressed the corporate 
position when he noted that it was in the line's interest "to stir the 
people up and get as many as possible to attend this dry faunning congress. 
. . . There is nothing now going on in Montama that will do us more good 
thein the proper advancement of this dry feirming question."^® 
The same year James Hill donated one thousand dollars in prize money 
to the exhibits displayed at the International Dry Farming Exposition held 
in conjunction with the congress. The Hills wanted to promote interest in 
dry farming, but they specifically saw the donation as a way to publicize 
the farmlcinds along the railroad. Louis Hill insisted on exhibits from its 
territory: "It is easy enough to get a list of prizes, but it is also up 
to us to see that the people along our line meike exhibits. If they do not, 
the effect of the prizes is lost, as it will be taken for gramted that we 
have not einy crops to exhibit. 
In addition to promoting settlement and dry farming production, the 
management of the Great Northern saw the Fourth Dry Feunning Congress in 
14. Ibid, 63. 
15. L. W. Hill to John T. Burns, Secreteiry-Treasurer, Fourth Dry 
Feunnlng Congress in Billings, 4 May 1909; Broughton to L. W. Hill, 9 June 
1909, GNRP. 
16. L. W. Hill to Burns, 4 May 1909; Broughton to L. W. Hill, 9 June 
1909, GNRP.. 
17. Burns to Hill, 10 December 1909; L. W. Hill to Broughton, 24 
December 1909, GNRP. 
138 
Billings as a way to promote haulage along the line from the perspective of 
the terminal buyers. Louis Hill orgemized a lairge peirty of business and 
press people to accompany him to the congress on his private train. In a 
letter to one of the business men from Duluth he stated, "The real object 
of the trip is to identify our eastern terminal markets with the Montana 
territory."18 
The Hills also persuaded the exposition to offer special prizes for 
areas east of the Cascade mountains in Oregon to promote settlement in the 
Deschutes Valley. Their desire to make a good showing from the cu:ea was so 
great that they sent railroad agents to obtain display produce, paid 
farmers' entry fees, and subsidized traveling expenses. The Great 
Northern's officials viewed their involvement in the congress as a golden 
opportunity to effect changes that would boost settlement. The compeiny 
hoped that the meeting's publicity would pressure federal officials to 
accelerate the surveying process, especially for townships within eight or 
ten miles of the railroad. 
The Great Northern personnel also sought changes in terminology. 
Louis Hill believed that use of "airid," "semi-arid," and "dry fetrming" 
deterred settlement, giving "a seriously erroneous impression to 
prospective settlers" that western lands were marginal and difficult to 
feirm. This debate, begun in private, continued during the congress and 
became pivotal to the Great Northern's decision to disengage from future 
congresses. 
James J. Hill, by now chairmeui of the board of the Great Northern 
Railway, gave one of the opening addresses at Billings in 1909 eind made 
reference to the most contentious issue of the congress, its name- He 
said, "dry farming will fail, but intelligent farming, intelligent 
cultivation of the leuad will not fail." The following day the congress 
discussed the name change. Louis Hill aurgued that the concept of dry 
farming discouraged settlement and investment by association with euridity. 
"We cannot get the co-operation of the railroads or expect to get people to 
come out here if we class this as a dry feirming country." His main 
18. L. W. Hill to F. A. Patrick, 19 October 1909, GNRP. 
19. L. W. Hill to Richaurd Porter, 25 September 1909, GNRP. 
20. L. W. Hill to J. Smith, editor, Judith Gap, 18 October 1909, 
GNRP. 
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opponent, none other than Linfield, saw the term "dry fanning" as merely 
semantic aind not pejorative-
The debate ended unresolved, but the congress later revisited the 
question. This time the discussion was feur more acrimonious. Chilcott 
stated that "dry farming" represented a scientific term applying to 
agriculture in areas with less than 20 inches of rain per annum and that 
the congress' focus should be developing scientific methods to farm lands 
in these regions. He accused the Hills of trying to turn the congress into 
a colonization organization. Louis Hill did not address this charge. 
Instead he pointed out that people intimately interested in development of 
the region. Great Northern representatives and delegates riding with them, 
had attended with the expectation that the name would be changed. Louis 
threatened to discontinue involvement with the congress unless the change 
occurred. He also attacked the federal government for the scarcity of leind 
offices in Montana, claiming it demonstrated neglect of the state's best 
interests.^2 
Antagonism to railroad dominance at the conference was widespread. 
Before the vote, a Mr. Mordt of Oklahoma addressed the issue of railroad 
involvement emd the name of the congress. "I know the sentiment among the 
farmers- They aire not getting scared of this Dry Fsirming Congress. . . . 
If the railroads tell us they will not support us, let them go- We can get 
along without them-" With general sentiment opposed to the Hills and their 
attempts to flex railroad power, the vote reaffirmed the name "Dry Farming 
Congress."^3 
This complete defeat of the railroad in a relatively minor matter 
underscored the corporation's declining influence in agricultural issues-
By the early twentieth century Progressive experts from universities and 
government had cleeurly gained national ascendancy, if not universal feunaer 
trust. With little possibility of controlling proceedings, the Great 
Northern withdrew from the Dry Fetrming Congress. The following year it 
offered one thousand dollars of prizes for the exhibits at the exposition 
accompanying the meeting at Spokcuie, but no money for the congressional 
21. The Drv Farming Congress Bulletin. (Spokane, Wash.: Dry Farming 
Congress, 1910), 35, 54-56. 
22. Ibid, 102-106. 
23. Ibid, 107. 
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administration. The orgemization's officials refused the offer. Louis 
Hill still saw the congress as sufficiently importeuit that he sent 
observers, although not as delegates who would "bring forth the fact that 
the railroads were trying to run the meeting, as they stated last year-"24 
In subsequent years the line focused solely on the congress' 
exhibitions. The Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, smd the Chicago, 
Burlington, cind Quincy sent produce display cars to Tulsa in 1913, and 
Louis Hill mandated that Great Northern agents encourage settlers along the 
road to put together exhibits for the various expositions. The Hills 
recognized that they could not control the dry feirming congresses. Through 
exhibition they hoped to attract settler interest in the railroad's 
territory, while avoiding detrimental attacks which ensued from greater 
pcirticipation. 25 
The Great Northern's financial and organizational disassociation from 
the Dry FeLrming Congress steimned from the divergent aims of the many 
agencies involved. All parties understood that the debate over the name of 
the conference was really edjout the deeper purpose of the congress. As one 
Mr. Harcourt from Alberta noted, "this question [addresses] . . . whether 
this organization—this Congress—is to be an institution for the boosting 
of leuid or for the boosting of education." By msiking the decision to 
retain "dry farming" the congress sided with the USDA eind experiment 
stations. Delegates remained committed to boosterism, but they would 
proceed cautiously and rely on Progressive scientific information rather 
thsm simplistic propageinda. 
Unlike the break over the experiment stations, the Hills' rift with 
the dry farming congresses demonstrated a conventional emphasis on 
settlement promotion. This reflected the Hills' ownership of a number of 
different railroads. The work the Great Northern undertook with the 
Monteuia Agricultural College had been restricted to specific geographic 
locations, with the limited aim of persuading fcunners euid settlers along 
24. L. W. Hill to Deurius Miller, president of CB&Q, 8 September 
1910, GNRP. 
25. W. P. Kenney, General Traffic Manager, to Carl R. Gray, Second 
Vice President, 27 June 1912; Gray to Kenney, 29 November 1913; Miller to 
Jule M. Hannaford, president of Northern Pacific, 23 September 1913; 
Hannaford to Miller, 20 September 1913, GNRP. 
26. Dry Farming Congress Bulletin. 1910, 105-107. 
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the Great Northern to adopt dry faunning techniques to increase agricultural 
production. The dry fanning congresses, however, with its greater national 
visibility, was a means to increase settlement throughout the Hill lines. 
The Hills desired to utilize these forums in a broader fashion to benefit 
all their railroad properties in the northern Great Plains. They believed 
in scientific efficacy, but they weuited to channel scientific knowledge to 
aid their railroads. Working from the assumption that James Hill's 
expertise, resting on farming experience emd business acximen, should 
predominate, the Hills abandoned the congress when the majority rejected 
their opinions. 
By the start of 1910 the Great Northern had thus practically 
disassociated itself from all official scientific agencies dealing with dry 
farming in Montana. They had rescinded their support of the Montana 
Agricultural College's experiment stations, and the dispute over the neune 
"Dry Farming" effectively ended their involvement with the congress. Both 
squabbles exacerbated the existing rift between the railroad and the USDA, 
with arguments over conservation and western development souring relations 
with Milton Whitney of the Bureau of Soils and Chief Forester Gifford 
Pinchot. The break with the Office of Dryland Agriculture simply 
compounded the antagonism between the two institutions. 
Despite these institutional breaches, the Great Northern still 
recognized the importance of dry fanning for settlement and haulage 
development along its lines. As the Hills failed to control other agencies 
they decided to launch their own program of demonstration farms in 1910. 
Thomas Shaw of the Great Northern's Industrial Department supervised forty 
five-acre plots on private farms. The plan involved feirmers cultivating a 
five- to six-acre plot of their land under the direction of Thomas Shaw and 
keeping accurate records of the results. In return for this the Great 
Northern supplied the seed emd paid them ten dollars an acre. 
Shaw was a recognized authority on dryland feunning in Montana. He 
often appecired as a guest speciker for Fred S. Cooley, superintendent of the 
Feunners' Institutes in Montana. In the winter of 1909 he lectured in 
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thirty-five locations in forty days. He also wrote a regular "On the Feurm" 
column which msiny Montana papers ceirried.^^ 
Shaw shcired many of Campbell's ideas, but he approached dryland 
farming in a more sophisticated, scientific manner. Like Campbell, Shaw 
recognized the importance of subsoil packing and regular cultivation, but 
he believed that the details of soil cultivation depended on the needs of 
each particular soil type. Also similar to Campbell, and in opposition to 
some mainstreeim academics, Shaw advocated the settlement of small-scale 
farms. His association with James J. Hill certainly fostered this idea 
which stemmed, perhaps, from their mutual Canadian background. Hill 
continually promoted "the substitution of the small farm, thoroughly 
tilled, for the Icirge fcunn, with its weeds, its neglected corners, its 
abused soil and its thin product. 
Shaw's thought deviated most from Ccimpbell in his emphasis on crop 
rotation to supplement, amd even replace, summer fallow, and the use of 
drought-resistant strains of plants. Shaw also stressed the need for 
diversification through livestock to provide food and fertilizer for the 
farmer. All of these ideas Shaw shared with his employer and friend, James 
J. Hill, although it is impossible to determine whether the common bond was 
the reason for Shaw's hire or a consequence. 
To launch the Great Northern's private dryland feunning experiment 
program, Shaw visited a number of farms in the fall of 1909 to assess their 
potential as demonstration plots. In his report he highlighted the 
railroad's aims; "this Icind should be amply advertised to induce speedy 
settlement, and that means should be adopted to instruct the settlers in 
the principles and methods that underlie the successful handling of land 
with a light rainfall." To determine which farms would be useful for the 
Great Northern, Shaw applied five criteria; the current effectiveness of 
the farming; the lack of settlement in the vicinity; the proximity of the 
farm to a railroad station; the proximity of crops to the track for 
observation by passing trains; and the representativeness of the leind. 
27. Schedule, Fred S. Cooley, Superintendent of Montana Feirmers' 
Institutes, 1909, GNRP; Heirgreaves, Drv Farming. 180. 
28. Hill, Highways of Progress. 79-80; Heirgreaves, Drv Farming. 181-
182. 
29. Hill, Highwavs of Progress. 79-80; Hargreaves, Drv Feunaing. 181-
182. 
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Once again, the needs of the railroad colored the Great Northern's desire 
to improve agriculture through dry fzunuing techniques. In locating the 
demonstration plots, Shaw understood the need for visibility, both to 
encourage a change in production techniques and promote settlement.^® 
In addition to Shaw's recommendations, the railroad also contacted 
commercial clubs for names of suitable feunners. In this way the Great 
Northern ftirther linked itself to the boosterish rather than scientific 
side of dry fcirming. For many residents of Montana euid North Daikota, the 
appeal of the Great Northern demonstration fzurms was their practical 
emphasis. 0. P. N. Anderson of the North DeUcota Railroad Commission 
recognized this when he wrote to Louis Hill in Februeiry 1910: "Certain 
classes of our very good faunners . . . look with certain suspicion on 
almost anything proposed by a college professor. . . . The very fact that 
your people are suggesting certain things in the way of fcunning is to most 
. . . evidence that it is practical and will pay."^! 
Yet, despite this apparent break with academia, the railroad fully 
utilized university resources. It obtained seed for its demonstration 
farms from the universities of Minnesota and Wisconsin and employed 
Professor M. L. Wilson of the experiment station at Bozeman to work under 
Shaw. The Great Northern's demonstration farm program ultimately reflected 
Hill's desire to balcuice the practical and scientific in his definition of 
expertise.32 
The demonstration feirms started in the 1910 season with forty-five 
feirms enlisted in Montana. The next year, when the program extended into 
North Dakota, forty-two farms enrolled. By 1912 only twenty-five farms 
remained involved in Montana. After this, the program ceased in Montana, 
but continued in North Deikota under the auspices of another Great Northern 
agricultural expert, A. E. Chamberlain from South Dakota. 
30. Thomas O'Hanlon to L. W. Hill, 2 Februeiry 1910; Shaw to L. W. 
Hill, 1 October 1909, GNRP. 
31. O. P. N. Anderson, Office of Commissioners of Railroads, to L. 
W. Hill, 15 February 1910, GNRP. 
32. E. C. Leedy, general immigration agent, to L. W. Hill, 17 
Februeury 1910, GNRP. 
33. Hargreaves, Drv Farming, 170, 180; Shaw to L. W. Hill, 31 
December 1912; Leedy to Shaw, 23 Februeiry 1913, GNRP. 
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Despite the short-lived nature of the program, the demonstration 
plots succeeded in both agricultural production and stimulating settlement. 
In the fall of 1912 Shaw reported average crop figures for the twenty-five 
farms involved in the program. The totals compared favoraUDly to production 
levels of the St. Paul experiment station four years earlier (see Tables 1 
and 2) . In addition to small grains, the plots produced considerable 
amounts of hay (2.75 tons per acre), fodder corn (2.14 tons per acre), and 
alfalfa (1.62 tons per acre). 
Settlement increased under the influence of many dry farming boosters 
including the Great Northern program. Homestead acreage quadrupled in one 
year from about a million acres in 1909 to 4,732,807 acres in 1910, and 
Table 2. Averaged production on the Great Northern demonstration farms, 
1912 
Crop Yield in bushels per acre 
Winter wheat 30 
Durum wheat 19.14 
Winter rye 22 
Oats 72.14 
White barley 30 
FlelX 13.83 
Source: Shaw to L. W. Hill 31 December 1912, GNRP. 
remained over three million acres annually until 1917. In 1912 James Hill 
aided this settlement boom einnouncing during a speech in Havre, Montana, 
that family sized farms could prosper in northern Montema.^^ 
Hill's speech reinforced the flood of literature which heralded the 
efficacy of dryland feirming in conquering the semi-arid West. There were a 
few hesitant voices, usually those of academics, who suggested that more 
34. Dickmein, "James Jerome Hill," 176. 
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research was necessary and that recent rainfall had been abnormally high. 
Most parties ignored these gainsayers, and immigration to the Plains surged 
in the early twentieth century. By 1922, 22 percent of the state had been 
homesteaded, and most farmers followed the tillage cind rotation practices 
advocated by Campbell and Shaw.^^ 
By 1912 the railroad had moved from cui ambivalence regeurding dry 
farming embodied in the esirly agricultural ideology of James J. Hill, 
through attempted cooperation with various institutions promoting the 
movement, to developing a system ge£u:ed to the line's specific needs of 
production and settlement. Objecting to the Monteina Agricultural College's 
scientific caution in endorsing drylauid faunning emd the low production on 
cooperative experimental plots, the line severed connection with that 
institution in 1909. The same year James and Louis found themselves unable 
to manipulate the dry farming congress' ideology and direction and ended 
all official involvement. By 1910 the hieraurchy of the Great Northern had 
decided that the optimum way to promote dry feunning in Monteina was to 
launch their own demonstration farm program. This met with considerable 
short-term success.^ ® 
In response to the growing euitipathy between the railroad and 
institutional agricultural promotion on a federal and academic level, the 
Great Northern increasingly developed its own independent promotion 
program. As well as the dryland farm plots, Louis Hill also decided to 
increase corporate sponsorship of local fairs. Involvement in such a 
relatively small orgeinization gave the Hills considereible control. 
Pursuing this tactic, the Hills backed the National Apple Show in 
Spokane, Washington. In 1908 both the Northern Pacific £uid the Great 
Northern contributed one thousand dollars, emd James Hill personally gave 
one thousand dollcirs for the show £ind another one thousand for the best one 
hundred boxes of apples from the Wenatchee district. Louis also 
contributed five hundred dollcirs for the best fifty boxes of apples from 
along the Great Northern. This sponsorship lasted for six yeeurs but was 
not without problems. The first yeeir Louis acted as president of the show, 
35. Shaw to L. W. Hill, 31 December 1912, GNRP; Dickman, "James 
Jerome Hill," 167, 176; Scott, Railroad Development Programs, 35. 
36. Roy V. Scott, Railroad Development Pr-oryT-aTng in the Twentieth 
Century (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1985), 35. 
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and fcirmers in the Northern Pacific territory of the Yakima Valley claimed 
he had shown favoritism to Wenatchee entries. Accusations of bias were 
valid as Louis had issued detailed instructions concerning which areas 
along the Great Northern he wanted represented in James Hill's winning one 
hundred boxes of apples. Trying to quell the attacks, Louis suggested that 
Howeird Elliott, head of the Northern Pacific, serve as the next 
president. 
In addition to the National Apple Show, the railroad also awarded "a 
silver plated cup and several hundred ribbons to any county [fair] that 
asks for them." This policy proved considercibly cheaper than financing 
large specialized shows and intended to stimulate feunner interest in 
scientific agriculture. According to Louis, "there is nothing better than 
carrying on well arranged county fairs to encourage agriculture in these 
states." The Hills donated more eledaorate prizes to state fairs along the 
line and to the corn show at Omaha. The Great Northern exercised 
considercible control in such endeavors, specifying the categories for 
awards and expending considerable energy collecting champion specimens from 
their territory.^® 
Although appearing as grass-roots phenomena, such fairs were usually 
the product of powerful boosters trying to attract local settlement and 
link regional production with international markets. Viewed in this 
context, the Great Northern's participation was an attempt to coordinate 
its interests with other institutions. Two factors made this strategy more 
attractive tham other institutional involvement. First, fair associations 
were usually weak and thus easily dominated by wealthy benefactors. 
Second, fairs did not present a single ideological front. Because of their 
spatial and conceptual design, they were modular events where a variety of 
ideas could be expressed in conjunction. Money donated by Hill emd the 
railroad could target specific purposes, promotions, or prizes. At the 
same time, other funding could further a contradictory point-of-view. 
37. L. W. Hill to H. J. Neely, 11 November 1908; to E. F. C. Van 
Dissel, 12 June 1909; to M. J. Costello, 9 November 1909; Hamnaford to L. 
W. Hill, 30 April and 2 June 1914, GNRP. 
38. L. W. Hill to J. C. Stubbs, 12 August 1911; to Leedy, 19 June 
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Pzirkhouse, 23 August 1912; S. J. Ellison to Broughton, 4 December 1909, 
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Consensus and discussion was not required or encouraged. Thus the Hills 
maintained complete control over fair prizes and their inherent messages. 
This resulted in a degree of satisfaction that eluded them with other 
institutional cooperation.^ ® 
The Hills also sponsored the Better Farming Association in North 
Dakota both privately and corporately. This Association, financed by beuiks 
and railroads, aimed to improve farming practices through eui extension 
prograim. As £in organization funded by businesses, it upheld Hill's 
longheld belief that the interests of the corporations and the farmers were 
compliment£u:y not contradictory, but some fairmers disagreed. Many saw 
their problems as stemming from corporate greed rather than agricultural 
methods. 
Orgeinized agriculture, in the form of the American Society of Equity, 
opposed the Association and its links with the North Dakota Agricultural 
Experiment Station. Many farmers throughout the nation had consistently 
pointed to railroads and other agricultural businesses as the source of 
their financial difficulties rather than their own inefficiency. The 
farmers in North Dakota were especially extreme in this respect and 
resented links between their perceived enemies and the land grant 
institution ostensibly founded for their benefit. 
The president of the North Dakota Agricultural College, John Henry 
Worst, found himself caught in a struggle between businessmen, who often 
provided much needed funds to the college, and farmers, the college's 
constituency. The conflict festered until after James Hill's death when 
the Nonpartisan League gained control of North Dakota in November 1916, 
giving farmers a temporary ascendancy over business. Once again, the 
conflict surrounding the Better Farming Association saw Hill's agricultural 
expertise questioned, by farmers as well as academics. 
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In addition to expanding their sponsorship of agricultviral fairs, 
shows, and organizations, the Hills also extended corporate agricultural 
experimentation. By 1912 agricultural work in the industrial department 
had expanded, requiring a separate agricultural extension department 
responsible for experimentation as well as promotion. Much of this stemmed 
from Thomas Shaw's work on dry faurming.'^l 
The department conducted research into the maintenance of soil 
fertility rather than dryland feLcming. Intent on estciblishing 
demonstration farms along the Great Northern, James Hill hired Professor F. 
R. Crane from the Special Agricultural School in Menominee, Wisconsin. 
Crane selected five-acre plots on feirms beside the Great Northera. The 
owners agreed to farm according to Creme's instructions, and Crane provided 
seed, fertilizer, smut treatment, and eight dollars per acre. Farmers 
retained their rights to the produce. The program aimed to demonstrate how 
scientific agriculture increased production. 
The program was em apparent success. Good seed and careful farming 
improved the first yeeir's crop 40 percent over previous yields according to 
Hill. He then approached Dean Albert Woods, head of the University of 
Minnesota's agricultural school and college, and asked him for the use of 
the university facilities for soil analysis to determine fertilizer needs. 
When Woods declined. Hill converted the greenhouses at his St. Paul mansion 
into soil laboratories emd prepared for the 1912 growing season. In 1913 
the Great Northern shipped 150 to 200 pounds of soil to Hill's mansion from 
each of the 361 farms. By 1915 fcunners had enrolled 987 plots in the 
program. The opinions, if any, of Mary Hill and neighbors along Summit 
Avenue went unrecorded, and inside the converted greenhouses Crane and his 
assistant conducted a Vciriety of tests to determine the best fertilizers 
for the specific soil. Based on Crane's reports, farmers in 1914 and 1915 
purchased four hundred tons of fertilizer, all shipped via the Great 
Northern. 
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Woods' refusal to help with this demonstration farm project stung 
Hill deeply, and he expressed this discontent at a public banquet honoring 
his seventy-fourth birthday. Held at the St. Paul Auditorium on 16 
September 1912, the occasion was splendid. Banners draped the walls of the 
hall, while electric lights emblazoned the dates "1838" and "1912." The 
1,200 men and one woman (Mary Hill concealed in an alcove neeu: her husband) 
enjoyed a sumptuous meal while an orchestra, and Captain Sinclair of the 
Minneapolis police on the bagpipes, provided entertainment. After the 
feast, encomiim followed encomi.um as the business leaders arose to praise 
the man as much responsible for their prosperity as any. In the midst of 
this festive and self-congratulatory atmosphere. Pierce Butler called on 
Hill to maUce a speech. The short, stocky, grizzled-haired veteran of the 
commercial world stood up. 
As expected, the speech took listeners back to the early days of the 
Twin Cities, to a frontier town eind a small village at the falls of St. 
Anthony. As Hill spoke, however, his themes took an unexpected turn. He 
started to address the issues of soil conservation and the laws of nature, 
and, before his audience had a cheince to catch their breath, he launched 
into a virulent attack of the University of Minnesota's agricultural 
school. He vilified their education program, claiming that, "in the last 
twenty five years, the school has not been worth 25 cents to the state. 
In the following days newspapers covered the banquet. Hill's attack, 
and a subsequent letter war between Hill and Woods. Hill argued that the 
university had done nothing to benefit the farmers of Minnesota. He gave 
statistics showing the increased yield on the Great Northern's 
demonstration plots and concluded, "Somebody ought to have taught the 
farmer to do this long ago. It does not seem unreasoneible to assign the 
duty to the state agricultural college." In Hill's mind, the university 
had failed to benefit farmers, which was, after all, its primciry job as a 
land-grsint college. 
Correspondence, James J. Hill Papers, Jcunes J. Hill Library, St. Paul, 
Minn., (hereafter JJHP). 
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Attacks on the university-based agricultural education in fact had a 
long history. From the early 1870s, fanner groups expressed their concerns 
about the state of riiral America by criticizing various education 
institutions for not providing effective education for young farmers. The 
grounds for attack varied: too theoretical syllabi; undersubscribed 
courses; and encouraging farm boys to leave the feirm.'^® 
The University of Minnesota did not escape these attacks. In 1887 
the Grange eind the FeLrmers' Alliance claimed that "snobs and theorists" had 
diverted college funds for a theoretical euid experimental program which 
offered no practical help to feunners. They demanded that the legislature 
institute a separate agricultural college where practical farming could be 
taught via demonstration and hcmds-on experience. Cyrus Northrop, 
president of the University of Minnesota, prevented the establishment of a 
separate institution by founding the agricultural school on the St. Paul 
Ceunpus euid providing a practical education in basic agriculture and 
domestic science for farmers' children-^^ 
Thus Hill based his attacks on the university and his stress on 
demonstration farms in beliefs shared by feirmers' organizations. Despite 
fundamental differences over issues concerning railroad regulation, Hill, 
the Grange, and other fcirm groups sheired a deep suspicion of book learning. 
In each case suspicion stemmed directly from an unwillingness among some 
farmers to relinquish their claims to agricultural expertise to 
academicians. 
By the time of Hill's attack in 1912, however, most antagonism 
between farmers and universities had subsided into an uneasy truce. 
Although still suspicious of academics, fairmers had forced universities to 
embrace practical agricultural education. This compromise appeared on the 
national level with Hatch Act of 1887, which had estcdalished federal 
funding for experiment stations, amd on the regional level when state 
institutions implemented their own extension programs. While fcunners 
remained unpersuaded by scientists' claims of expertise, they did manage to 
46. See for example, James C. Carey, Kcmsas State Universitv 
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at least peirtially manipulate university education toweurd their own ends. 
Hill's attack on the agricultural school was, therefore, like many of his 
development strategies, outdated.'^® 
tifoods countered Hill's vituperance with charges of eunateurism. Woods 
claimed that the railroad magnate had failed to understand einything about 
agriculture or the university's mission. He stressed Hill's dependence on 
experts, including those from the university, and emphasized Hill's 
agricultural incompetence by citing the problems of drainage at Crookston 
and the failure of "Jim Hill Corn." He also asserted that the high yields 
from the Great Northern's demonstration farms resulted from Hill's largesse 
rather them improved farming: "Whether or not it is practicable for the 
average farmer to produce in his fzirm what Mr. Hill is cible to produce on 
five acres ... is a question that would have to be settled after knowing 
the amount of money and labor expended by Mr. Hill in securing the 
results." Woods tried to undermine Hill's position as an agricultural 
expert by reclassifying him as a rich amateur. 
James Hill's establishment of the largest private demonstration farm 
scheme in the United States promoting modern scientific methods by 
quantifying fertilizer needs, supposedly offered an alternative to 
universities. However, feirm orgauiizations had largely ceased their attacks 
on formal agricultural education by the turn of the century. They did not 
acquiesce to the ideology of the Country Life Movement or relinquish their 
claims of expertise to academics, but organizations such as the Greinge 
increasingly adopted a utiliteiriein approach toweird science. They 
incorporated information from agricultural scientists as pcirt of their data 
for decision-meiking, often weighing it on subjective criteria such as the 
personalities of extension agents.^® 
The demonstration program of the Great Northern and Hill's attack on 
the University of Minnesota highlighted his alienation from farming and 
educational trends of the time. Attacks on university education had 
48. Rosenberg, No Other Gods. 159-79. 
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dwindled in the new century with farmers attempting to utilize agricultural 
science for their own benefit. Additionally the credibility for railroad's 
demonstration program rested in Hill's agricultural expertise. This had 
proven problematic and outdated as early as the 1880s, emd, by the early 
twentieth century the concept of a gentlemem farmer was archaic. Therefore 
James Hill's program of demonstration feunns propounding modern, practical, 
scientific information failed because his claims to expertise had lost 
almost all validity among his audience. 
The last yeeurs of James J. Hill's official involvement with the Great 
Northern Railway marked the culmination of two decades of dissatisfaction 
with institutional agricultural development. As national movements to 
promote irrigation, conservation, euad dryland farming unfolded. Great 
Northern personnel, and especially the Hills, found themselves 
marginalized, their power undermined, and their expertise disputed. 
Consequently, the railroad gravitated toweurd independent agricultural 
programs. With the hiring of Creme, it inaugurated the agricultural 
department and pursued Hill's vision of effective agriculture. In meuiy 
ways this department reflected Hill's earlier endeavors as a gentleman 
fcunner, being closely guided by the needs of the Great Northern. That the 
department operated as peirt of a corporate entity was also significant. 
Even Hill realized the uselessness of promoting agriculture on the basis of 
his personal expertise, so he sought professional validation by allying 
academics with the railroad. Hill hoped to meld business and academic 
expertise. Although the depeirtment enjoyed some success in promoting 
fertilizers, the program foundered on Desui Woods' damning attack on Hill's 
amateurism. 
By 1912, when Jeimes Hill retired from the Great Northern's boeird of 
directors, his family and his railroad backed no agricultural enterprises 
on a federal level, and very few institutional enterprises on any level at 
all. Increasingly the railroad developed internal corporate mechanisms to 
stimulate agricultural improvement. This professional agricultural 
depeurtment, staffed by scientists with the same credentials as at 
universities, embodied a tacit acquiescence to academic standeirds of 
expertise. While James Hill lived, the creation of such a depeirtment 
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proved impossible. Refusing to remove himself from direct involvement or 
to admit academic superiority. Hill used the department to affirm his 
claims to expertise. Hill's very presence continually challenged and 
contested the information that the department tried to disseminate. 
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retirement and retreat, 1912-1916 
The election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912 heralded the ascension of corporate 
Progressive ideology on a federal level. Little interested in social 
reform, Wilson, with help from Gifford Pinchot's attorney, Louis Brandeis, 
gravitated toward a system of pro-business regulation. The creation of the 
Federal Reserve in 1913, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914, and the 
Federal Trade Commission in 1915 exemplified Wilson's belief in using 
government intervention to secure economic freedom. In the years before 
Americeui involvement in World War I, the nation witnessed a florescence of 
corporate efficiency, reform, and regulation. These trends moved America 
away from the lassiez-faire economic climate that had allowed the rise of 
industrial barons such as James J. Hill.^ 
Hill increasingly resembled a cultural dinosaur, mzurginalized in all 
areas. The triumph of the federal bureaucracy in the struggle to control 
western resources had firmly undermined those advocating states' rights. 
The West remained dominated by eastern capital and government until freed 
by the industrial demands of World War II. Hill's agricultural ideas, too, 
were out of sync with general trends. Agricultural mechanization 
encouraged the development of large-scale, monocrop farms. Most farmers 
could not afford to purchase steam tractors, which flourished between 1908 
and 1915, or gasoline engines. The farmers who could afford the new 
machines tended to be wealthier and possess great acreage. They could 
benefit from the heavy, unwieldy machines in ways small-scale farmers could 
not, and consequently, mechanization fostered agricultural economies of 
scale, especially on the open western Plains. The dryland feLnning wheat 
boom on the northern Great Plains flourished, especially as international 
demands grew during World War I. Profit and technology undermined romantic 
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attachment to Jeffersonian ideals, and farmers and businessmen alike 
fostered nascent agribusinesses.^ 
Actions of the Great Northern corporation compounded Hill's 
ideological isolation in the face of national agricultural trends. 
Although management continued to madce some concessions to the antiquated 
views of the railroad's founder, they modernized the line and its outlook, 
including the agricultural sphere. In 1912, at seventy-four. Hill resigned 
his position as chairman of the board of the Great Northern Railway. 
Although this marked the end of his official involvement with the line, he 
maintained an office in the railroad's headqucurters, which he utilized 
regularly until his death in 1916. He remained unofficially active in 
railroad business during his retirement, but day-to-day operations 
increasingly devolved on the new president, Carl R. Gray, and on Louis 
Hill, who replaced his father as chairman of the board. 
Meanwhile, the now-retired James Hill had time, once again, to 
increase his personal involvement with farming. Both the North Oaks and 
Humboldt estates received greater attention, and Hill never deviated from 
his favorite issues of diversification through dual-purpose cattle, soil 
conservation and fertility, and small-scale family farming. Hill also 
continued the grueling circuit of speeches he had established during his 
years as chairman, giving addresses at various county and state fairs 
throughout the territory of the Hill lines. Having forfeited claims to 
expertise by contemporary definitions, both through his own actions and 
national trends toward professionalism and terticu^r education. Hill 
reverted to his earlier position as a gentleman farmer. In doing so. Hill 
diverged from his own railway. The Great Northern finally embraced 
Progressive notions of expertise, while Hill retreated into antiquarian 
self-justification. 
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In Hill's cibsence, and under the auspices of Louis Hill and Ceirl 
Gray, the Great Northern's interest in agriculture declined euid beccune more 
mainstream. The railroad cibandoaed much of its demonstration and 
experimentation work, as well as cuiy claim to agricultural expertise. 
Although the agricultural extension depeurtment did continue, it mutated 
into a publicity department, employing academics to disseminate ideas 
developed elsewhere. The railway's involvement in the barberry eradication 
campaign to stop wheat rust from World War I into the 1950s exemplified 
this new strategy. Agents posted information on beirberry eradication, and 
the railroad lobbied for federal and state funding and reseeirch into the 
problem. Corporate experimental work was notably absent.^ 
Neither Louis Hill or Gray showed much interest in agriculture, and 
direction of the department from the head of the company's hierarchy 
dwindled. Louis also lost interest in funding farmer organizations, fairs, 
and shows. Instead, the railroad utilized its business and mairketing 
expertise to expand markets smd develop more efficient ways of shipping 
produce. After James J. Hill's death in 1916, Louis abandoned even a 
pretense of interest in agriculture and invested his energies instead in 
the development of tourism at Glacier National Peurk.'^ 
During the years after Hill's retirement as chairman in 1912, the 
Great Northern shifted its approach to agricultural development. Instead 
of trying to persuade farmers to alter methods, the agricultural department 
devised ways to increase profits from extant agriculture. This change in 
tactics aligned the railroad's agricultural policy with prevailing 
attitudes toward professionalism. The department eibandoned most of its 
experimental work and hired university professors to disseminate academic 
wisdom. The changes also marked the e±>eindonment of Hill's grand social 
vision. No longer would the Great Northern try to create a territory 
filled with small-scale farms run by Jeffersonian yeomen. Instead it 
focused on the narrow goal of corporate profit. 
In response to its frustrations with various state eind federal 
institutions, the Great Northern paid more attention to reaching feirmers 
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and settlers directly, returning, on a corporate level, to a method James 
Hill had tried and abandoned in the 1880s. At the instigation of General 
Manager W. P. Kenney and Fred S. Cooley, Superintendent of the Montana 
Farmers' Institute, the railroad joined with the Montaina Agricultural 
College in 1914 to coordinate a Better Farming train. The plans for the 
train demonstrated not only a change in the educational perspective of the 
corporation but also the growing influence of middle management in 
formulating railroad policy. Louis Hill and Carl Gray showed little 
interest in the train beyond costs. Similarly, when Kenney approached 
Louis Hill to discuss ein agreement with a number of railroads to 
discontinue agricultural trains, Louis replied, "You may do as your 
judgment seems best in this connection." Corporate concerns had already 
moved far from the central pursuits of James Hill.^ 
Through Cooley, the Great Northern also became more involved with 
their old antagonist, the Grange. As the Grange moved away from the 
political radicalism it had embraced in the 1870s, it beceime an ideal 
vehicle for reaching farmers. In January 1914 the railroad offered reduced 
rates to feurmers visiting the state grsinge meeting in Bozeman, Montana. 
Later that year Cooley recruited Thomas Shaw to be a keynote speaker at the 
state meeting for 1915. As with the agricultural trains, however, most 
speakers except Shaw were academics—not railroad employees.® 
Departmental agricultural endeavors also changed. In October 1911 
the Great Northern had hired A. E. Chamberlain, former superintendent of 
the Feirmers' Institutes in South Dakota and writer for The Dakota Farmer. 
as the development commissioner for its development department. Although 
Thomas Shaw continued to work for the railroad. Chamberlain's hire 
signposted a more institutional approach to agricultural development. 
Unlike Shaw, Chamberlain had little contact with Jeunes Hill beyond sending 
him copies of reports. Most of his orders came from his immediate 
superior, Kenney. Chamberlain displayed a level of business 
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professionalism lacking in Shaw. He neatly typed reports with clear 
subheadings, unlike Shaw's scrawled and rambling handwritten letters. As 
the department professionalized, the direction of corporate agricultural 
work grew increasingly removed from Jeimes Hill's control and ideological 
influence.^ 
Some of Chamberlain's development activities mirrored the 
agricultural and social engineering efforts of his predecessor eind co­
worker, Thomas Shaw eind of James Hill himself. Chamberlain not only 
advised growers on methods but encouraged certain ethnic groups to migrate 
to specific areas, such as "Danes and Hollanders into the Kootenai and 
Spokcme valleys." He also followed the circuit of county fairs and 
feirmers' meetings, giving speeches and judging livestock throughout the 
railroad's territory.® 
Despite the continuing presence of Great Northern personnel at local 
fairs, Louis Hill discontinued financial support in 1915. He asserted that 
the results no longer justified the expense. The same yeau:, the Great 
Northern in collaboration with the Northern Pacific, ended their support of 
the National Apple Show at Spokane. The event had "outlived its usefulness 
as a national event," and the railroads doubted "whether [they] . . . 
receive very much benefit from it." This financial retreat diminished the 
line's ability to broadcast corporate agricultural ideology. This was, 
perhaps, inevitable. Without the dynamic leadership of James J. Hill, the 
Great Northern moved away from agricultural ideology toward economic 
pragmatism.^ 
In significant ways Chamberlain's agricultural interests, and 
investment of time, represented a shcurp breaUc from the past. In his first 
year he divided his efforts between the Pacific Northwest and attending 
land shows in the East. The land shows were a new, efficient means of 
luring settlers and investors to western lands. Unlike regional events 
7. A. E. Chamberlain to L. W. Hill euid Kenney, 18 October 1911; to 
Hill, 8 January 1912; Chamberlain, "Report of Industrial Department, 
Janueiry 1, 1912," 1 January 1912; L. W. Hill to H. H. Parkhouse, 27 August 
1912; Thomas Shaw to L. W. Hill, 5 Februaury 1915, GNRP. 
8. Chamberlain, "Report of Industrial Department"; Chamberlain to 
Kenney, 13 December 1912, GNRP. 
9. L. W. Hill to James A. Murty, 3 June 1915; Jules Hannaford to L. 
W. Hill, 30 April 1914; Kenney to H. H. Peirkhouse, 13 October 1915, GNRP. 
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with the semi-altruistic function of promoting scientific agriculture, 
eastern ljuid shows were blatantly corporate phenomena, advertising western 
lamds to the largest possible audience. For the first time in the history 
of the Great Northern, its main agricultural endeavors had shifted 
geographically away from the northern tier.^® 
A dramatic change in the focus of the development department 
accompanied this geographical shift. Chamberlain directed his major 
efforts to ways the railroad itself could increase haulage. He showed 
special interest in increasing express shipments of fruit from the Pacific 
Northwest to the East. He believed that, by constructing cooling plants in 
western Washington and Oregon, fruits "that are now being ccinned or 
evaporated and shipped by freight, could and would be shipped by express." 
He also suggested that the railroad provide more cars for this type of 
shipment to silence complaints about insufficient numbers of cars and their 
"filthy and unfit condition." The Great Northern compared unfavorably to 
the Northern Pacific in the summer of 1912 in terms of icing cars, but the 
railroad could not meet farmer demand, and the problems of fruit car 
scarcity and poor maintenance continued. 
Instead of trying to persuade farmers to change and improve 
techniques. Chamberlain emphasized marketability of produce and methods for 
the line to maximize profits from perishaUale goods. This thirust marked a 
distinct break with the past. Not only did it represent a pragmatic rather 
than ideological stance; it also demonstrated a growing affinity between 
railroad personnel and prevailing notions of professionalism. Deferring to 
university and governmental expertise in the matter of agriculture. 
Chamberlain and others concentrated on issues of shipment, marketing, and 
business. This cheinge of focus meamt that the development department 
interacted with agricultural business organizations as much as with 
farmers. In keeping with Chamberlain's geographical interest in the 
Pacific Northwest, much of this interaction was with fruit organizations. 
10. Douglas Edweurds, "Exhibiting the Possibilities: Settlement 
Promotion and the Montsma State Fair," paper presented at the Western 
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The railroad aided the Commercial Club of Wenatchee by donating leind for a 
booth to exhibit local fruits eind produce. In addition, the line 
constantly attempted to maintain the number of refrigerator cars necessary 
to ship fruit cind fish east.^^ 
Unlike Shaw, and indeed unlike James Hill himself. Chamberlain 
deferred to established expertise in matters of agricultural 
experimentation and development. In early 1912 he wrote to the USDA for 
information regarding research on cooling plants in California. The USDA's 
experiments with pre-cooling soft fruits that summer had proved so 
successful that it agreed to lend the Great Northern three men to help 
disseminate information during the 1913 season. The USDA also planned to 
send officials to the Wenatchee Valley to instruct growers on optimum 
methods and time for harvesting apples for shipment. This use of a federal 
agency, and deference to outside knowledge and expertise, extended beyond 
issues of fruit. While visiting Washington, D.C. in 1912, Chamberlain met 
with SecretcLry of Agriculture Wilson who promised the assistance of a 
department representative for two months to travel through irrigation 
districts "trying to prevail on them [the fcirmers] to use less water and 
follow better systems of tillage." The corporate stress on mainstream 
expertise was evident even when discussing railroad personnel. In 1913 
Carl Gray boasted that the Great Northern employed "agricultural professors 
of national reputation." The acceptance of Progressive definitions of 
expertise had become all-prevailing.^^ 
Part of this increased deference to outside expertise involved the 
abandonment of independent experimentation and demonstration programs. 
Despite the apparent success of the dryland program, Louis wrote to Shaw in 
1913 that they should see if they had "reached a stage where the farmers 
will do the work themselves along the lines suggested by you without being 
paid to do so." Shaw rejected this suggestion. He saw more work necesseiry 
to achieve a fully successful system of dryland farming, he explained to 
Louis Hill the need to determine relative returns of winter wheat on corn 
12. W. F. Gwin to Gray, 12 June 1913; Kenney to Gray, 17 June eind 24 
November 1913; Gray to L. C. Oilman, 27 November 1913; Oilman to M. J. 
Costello, 19 December 1913; J. Gnaber to L. W. Hill, 9 euid 19 March 1914, 
GNRP. 
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land and summer fallow, the best method for growing alfalfa, aind the best 
way to increase moisture-retention of vegetadsle matter in the soil. Louis 
rejected this advice and terminated the demonstration feirms, although the 
railroad continued to encourage fcirmers to grow and exhibit dryland crops. 
Louis did not necessarily disagree with Shaw on the need for more 
experimental work, but he did believe that neither Shaw nor the railroad 
commcuided enough attention to make their agricultural endeavors 
significant. 
While Louis and Gray tried to constrain the Great Northern's 
agricultural promotion to economic issues and to align corporate ideology 
with the eeurly twentieth-century professional views of agriculture, James 
Hill remained a vocal euid formidable obstacle. Consequently, some remncints 
of the Great Northern's older programs instituted by Hill continued in 
deference to the "Empire Builder." Crane's soil experiments continued with 
some success until 1915 at least if judged by the amount of fertilizer 
shipped by the railroad. Dean Woods at the University of Minnesota, 
however, attacked the program as being amateurish. In the scientific 
parlance of the early twentieth-century, Creine did conduct experiments in a 
highly subjective manner. He failed to esteiblish controls, and thus, it 
remained uncleau: whether improved yields resulted from increased care in 
cultivation, good seed, or fertilizers. 
Crane had also highly unrealistic expectations of feunner ability and 
time to care for crops. He gave detailed instructions on how to grow, cut, 
store, and thresh grain, including cleaning the thresher out before and 
after threshing emd not threshing in the wind. As a result, farmers 
invested three to six times more labor to produce crops from experimental 
plots than for reguleu: field work. Also Crane carefully instructed farmers 
on how to report yields. They were to estimate ideal production from any 
swampy land or areas damaged crops, and add those estimates to the total. 
By the 1910s Creine's scientific methodology was outmoded. 
Increasingly scientists designed experiments that could be quantified by 
L. W. Hill to Shaw, 23 February 1913; Shaw to L. W. Hill, 31 
December 1912; Kenney to Gray, 27 June 1912, GNRP. 
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standard numerical measurements. By making their work reproducible, 
scientists upheld claims to objectivity. By using statistics they 
communicated in a language that the ever-increasing scientific community 
could understeuid and uphold. Crane and Hill's work, falling into an older 
scientific tradition of observation and multiple Vciriables, offered an easy 
target for professional scientists intent on defending their bailiwick.^® 
James Hill's influence in the Great Northern's agricultural progreun 
continued through the employment of Thomas Shaw. Shaw remained populcir 
among Plains farmers. He was in great demand as a speaker among farming 
groups eind other railroads, and he continued to write articles on the 
agricultural potential of the region which he distributed to papers 
throughout the nation. 
As with his mentor, Shaw's time as an expert was expiring. Louis 
Hill eind others in the railroad hierarchy worried about the information 
Shaw disseminated in speeches cuid print. Shaw's word was no longer seen as 
definitive by the media. In 1912 he sent an article to the Philadelphia 
Saturday Evening Post to correct some negative reports of dry farming which 
they had published a few weeks earlier. Although Shaw accompanied his 
corrections with a letter from Louis, the paper refused to print them 
saying, "We recognize Professor Shaw as an authority, but ... we believe 
that a great deal of dissapointment [sic] and injury has resulted from over 
enthusiastic representations." By March 1913 Louis had placed a careful 
watch on all of Shaw's reports, censoring those that, "are of such a nature 
that they would do us more harm them good if published." Shaw's reports 
consistently painted glowing agricultural pictures which stenuned from the 
antiquated agricultural ideology he shared with James Hill. Shaw himself 
recognized his archaic position. When the University of Minnesota's 
experiment station approached the railroad to request help in hauling 
several demonstration cars, Shaw anticipated that the only problem would be 
"that some of the people [professors] will not be quite in accordance with 
Mr. Hill's views on cattle." As a friend of James Hill's, Shaw continued 
16. Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Wnmhers; The Pursuit of 
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on the Great Northern's lecture circuit in 1915 suid 1916, but almost 
immediately after Hill's death, Louis retired the professor.^® 
In their relationship with external institutions both Hills displayed 
a lack of the new, faceless. Progressive professionalism increasingly 
adopted by the railway. Continuing their battle with the Bureau of 
Reclamation, they viewed themselves as altruistic defenders of western 
interests. Although ostensibly a proponent of Progressive efficiency, 
objectivity, and corporate streamlining, Louis's (and his father's) 
antagonism towaurd individuals within the Recleimation Service degenerated 
into a vindictive personal diatribe which the management of the Great 
Northern tried desperately to curtail. 
The Hills based their attacks on the Reclamation Service's 
incompetence and its failure to understand western needs. Having failed to 
initiate any action by badgering the Department of the Interior, Louis 
turned his attention in 1912 to President Taft's secretary, Charles Hilles. 
Concerned that the government had withdrawn twenty sections in northeastern 
Montana for irrigation purposes and that homesteaders were being prevented 
from using the land even for grazing, Louis argued that, "It is little 
things of this kind that amtagonize the West against the Departments in 
Washington. The Reclamation Department are not only proving themselves of 
little practical benefit to our portion of the west, but they seem to take 
every means of antagonizing the settlers. 
The main grounds for attack, however, remained the article 
purportedly written by Frederick Newell, head of the Reclamation Service, 
promoting irrigation works in Canada. Louis sent a copy to Hilles and 
claimed that "The people of the west feel that Mr. Newell is not treating 
them right and they hold this against President Taft." When Hilles took 
the matter up with the Secretary of the Interior, the issue came full 
circle having been brought up with Richeird Ballinger in 1910. Newell again 
18. L. W. Hill to M. R. Brown, 27 March 1913; to E. E. Faville, 
editor. Western Faunner. 19 December, 1916; to H. P. Smith, State College of 
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denied authorship, cind Louis Hill again tried to prove him a liar, 
assigning railroad personnel to track down the publication in Canadian 
Pacific literature. Despite his considerable effort, Louis failed to prove 
Newell's authorship.20 
Louis next portrayed Newell as unpatriotic, implying that he was to 
blame for the overspending of the Reclamation Service and its failure to 
complete projects. Louis sent information on the Service's shortcomings to 
the editor of the Great Falls Daily Tribune, one William Bole. Bole 
tactfully avoided Louis's plan, pointing out that the material would "tend 
to sccire away intended settlers on government irrigation projects, and that 
would not serve your purpose or mine.''^! 
In their continued antagonism toward Newell and the Reclamation 
Service, the Hills moved away from the interest of the Great Northern and 
revealed their increasingly anachronistic attitudes. This divergence 
appeared in James Hill's actions and speeches. More interested in 
agricultural development than his son. Hill railed publicly at government 
failure. In 1913 he attacked the Reclamation Service during a 
congressional heeiring. Hill contended that private irrigation projects in 
Canada had proved cheaper and more effective than those launched by the 
federal government. Hill focused on government inefficiency saying "I know 
that when private enterprises in Canada can sell the land and water for $30 
an acre and the water on reclamation projects in the United States cost S45 
an acre that there is some difference in the cost." Ironically, Frederick 
Newell, whom Louis Hill had been attacking for years for promoting Canadian 
irrigation, defended American irrigation. Newell asserted that Canadian 
projects were generally smaller and less well constructed than American 
projects, and so were cheaper, but not necessarily better. Secretary Lane 
finally judged that "the charges against the Reclamation Service have not 
been sustained."22 
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In this case, the position adopted by Hill countered the interests of 
the Great Northern. Attacking the expense of irrigation on the northern 
Great Plains and comparing it unfavoreibly to Cemadian projects was not 
calculated to increase settlement along the railroad. In retirement, James 
Hill had allowed his concerns for the future of American agriculture to 
eclipse his love of the Great Northern, while Louis's hatred of Newell 
colored his actions. 
Hill's failure to effect change at the congressional heeirings further 
demonstrated his declining political power. In frustration, both Hills 
continued to lambast the Reclamation Service. Admitting that "I am one of 
the strong critizers of that service," Louis detailed, in a public speech 
in Oregon, the whole case against Newell from the black tent shows, through 
the article promoting Ccinadian irrigation, to the failure to follow through 
on irrigation works in Montana. He also spelled out actions taken by 
himself to correct problems and obtain Newell's dismissal. Louis framed 
the personal and corporate struggle as a battle against tyranny; "That man 
Newell is like a Russian politician; if things dont [sic] go his way he 
fires somebody. He ties the can to anybody who opposes his theory and to 
be perfectly frank and to use good English, when you corner him he lies out 
of it. 
By 1913 the Hills had diverged so far from Great Northern policies 
with regeirds to the federal agency as to be an embarrassment. L. C. 
Gilman, Gray's assistant, had worked closely with Newell, engineers, and 
settlers to complete veurious irrigation projects in Montana and establish 
necessary railroad easements across projects. Gilman did this by lobbying 
and building constituencies, as had been the railroad's practice for years, 
and although he did not personally like Newell or approve of his neglect of 
the northern Great Plains, he did recognize the importance of staying on 
good terms with the msm. Thus, the Hills' virulent attacks against Newell 
and the Reclamation Service struck Gilman as short-sighted. He told Gray 
"harm rather them good is done by constant criticism of the Reclamation 
Service. While personally I am of the opinion that its personnel might be 
very materially improved, I think there is little likelihood that it will 
be, and if we wish to accomplish anything it will be necessetry to work with 
23. L. W. Hill speech in Oregon, 5 June 1913, GNRP. 
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the tools we have." Others concurred. The editor of the Great Falls Daily 
Tribune wired Gray that President Taft had received a copy of a "very 
caustic interview on stupidity of reclamation service by J. J. Hill. Such 
stuff is used by our enemies eind does harm it should stop.''^'^ 
Despite corporate attempts to circumvent the Hills's criticisms, they 
continued to exacerbate the situation and threaten the completion of 
irrigation projects in Monteina. H. N. Savage, engineer with the 
Reclamation Service in charge of the Sun eind Milk Rivers projects, wrote 
confidentially to Gilman that "The situation ... is very precarious. The 
chronic adverse criticisms of Messrs. James J. cuid L. W. Hill which has 
extended over a period of years has become a very serious obstacle and may 
be the determining factor" in the projects' completion. Gilman and Gray 
managed to circumvent the Hills's ill-effects and persuaded Secretary Lane 
to invest more reclamation time and money in the projects in northern 
Montana. 
James and Louis were not the only voices complaining about Frederick 
Newell. Many western politicians, settlers, eind newspapers attacked Newell 
for wasting money and for resisting attempts to ease the repayment burden 
on settlers. In 1914 these complaints culminated in Newell's firing. 
Although this must have provided immense satisfaction, the Hills remained 
silent and never claimed responsibility for the dismissal. Regardless of 
this long-demanded personnel change, the railroad men had no control over 
the Reclamation Service, its direction, or its employees. 
Having fought with farmers, the federal government, state 
universities, and booster groups. Hill found at the end of his life that 
even his own railroad had abcuidoned his vision of American agriculture. 
Shunned by others. Hill retreated into his original persona as an 
eighteenth-century gentleman fcirmer. He returned again to personal 
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experimentation, philanthropy, and influence investing his own estates with 
time eind money. Although his broad concerns of diversification through 
dual-purpose cattle and soil conservation had not changed, his methods did 
reveal the infiltration of some new ideas. 
Hill's estate Humboldt, in the Red River Valley, remained primarily a 
productive wheat farm. Under hired management, the farm continued to raise 
extensive crops. However, Hill faced problems with his traditional labor 
force; Canadiems. In 1915 the Sheriff arrived at the farm in the middle 
of hcurvest and "took away four . . . shockers." They were charged as 
illegal aliens, but Hill's manager asserted that the men had been working 
the Humboldt feunn without trouble for fifteen years. In writing to Hill 
for help, the farm manager added a desperate postscript, "Please act at 
once, as they have threatened to come again we may just as well let them 
have the crops." Hill turned to Minnesota Senator Knute Nelson for help. 
Nelson took the matter up with the Acting Secretary of Lahor, J. B. 
Densmore. The surrests had been sparked by the onset of war in Europe and 
Canada's position as a Commonwealth nation. The manager claimed that the 
men were Galatians and consequently refused work in Canada. Densmore, 
however, asserted that the deportations were ordered on the basis that 
"they were persons likely to become public charges at their time of entry." 
Despite Hill's protestations, the men were deported back to Ceuiada in 
September. 
Hill did not let the matter rest. He continued to use Knute Nelson 
to badger the Department of Labor. Hill asserted that immigration 
officials aimed to "meike fees" by bothering "a niunber of poor men who . . . 
eire trying to earn a living." Densmore corrected Hill by pointing out that 
the agents did not profit from arrests; he then closed the case and refused 
to make further inquiries. Thus by 1915, Hill's political influence had 
basically vanished. Without the muscle of the railroad, and with few 
federal connections. Hill found himself in the uncomfortable role of a 
private citizen, albeit a very rich one.^S 
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In addition to wheat fanning in the Red River Valley, Hill returned 
to using his personal farms to promote his agrarian vision. Having 
profited considercibly from the bonanza fcinning boom in the 1880s, Hill, in 
his seventies, decided to adapt his properties in the Red River Valley. 
Since the purchase of Humboldt, he had been selling the Icind off in small 
acreages, often equipped with new buildings to foster his vision of 
Jeffersonian yeomen. 
Hill also used both the Humboldt eind North Oaks fcirms to promote 
dual-purpose emd blooded stock. Three thousand acres of the Humboldt farm 
was known as the Northcote division. In September 1910 Hill sepeurated 
Northcote and placed it under the management of his youngest son, Walter. 
Walter Hill was a twenty-five-year-old reputed alcoholic, who was having 
trouble establishing himself. Walter told his father that he would like to 
try farming, so James gave him the project of turning the Northcote 
division into a huge cattle station.^9 
James Hill's plans for Northcote returned to his eeirly attempts at 
promoting agriculture. Walter would experiment with different kinds of 
cattle feeds and then inform farmers of profitable combinations. Hill also 
intended Northcote as a stock farm for breeding quality cattle. Both 
activities would help promote diversification through improvement and sale 
of available breeding stock. Thus, Hill once again tried to effect change 
through example. Under Walter, however, Northcote consistently lost money, 
undermining its efficacy as a demonstration farm.^^ 
It is unlikely that James Hill expected Northcote to maike a profit, 
so the substantial losses should not be automatically be blamed on Walter's 
bad mcuiagement. Stock breeding was expensive because of the high price of 
estaJDlishing a herd. In 1914, for example, the main expense for the farm 
was livestock purchases totaling $73,093.05. Separate from these costs was 
the building program Hill launched at Northcote in 1912 intending to equip 
the feirm with the necesseu^r buildings to make it a modern feed experiment 
station. By August of 1914, Hill had constructed a cattle barn, silos, a 
29. John J. Toomey to D. McCleary, superintendent of Humboldt, 14 
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root celleir, boarding house, power plant, dam, water system, twelve 
cottages, and hog house, costing $214,567.67.^^ 
Although officially handing the running of Northcote over to Walter, 
Hill characteristically remained involved. With the increasing tensions in 
Europe, legal problems arose in the United States over the use of 
commonwealth citizens, including Canadians, on Hill's farms. The problem 
began in 1913 when some of the imported cattle at Northcote developed a 
skin disease. Against Walter's wishes. Hill insisted on hiring a Canadian 
veterinaricui recommended by Shaw, again working through his subjective 
network. The veterinariem cured the cattle, but when Walter tried to hire 
him he ran into problems with the Immigration Bureau. In March 1914 James 
Hill wrote a long letter to Minnesota Senator Knute Nelson, asking him to 
intervene in the matter, but with no success.^2 
In the last yeeirs of his life, Hill resumed his educational endeavors 
in the Red River Valley but with no more success than earlier. Although 
Northcote did keep Walter occupied, it failed to persuade northern tier 
farmers of the importance of stock-raising. In the 1880s they had 
passively refuted Hill's claims to agricultural expertise. Thirtysome 
years later their perspective had not changed; in fact it had gained 
considerable ground from by Progressive ideology, and Hill never saw his 
plans for Northcote's development as a stock farm reach fruition. 
Hill's personal interest in livestock had regained momentum through 
association with Thomas Shaw. In addition to working for the railway and 
for the Northern Pacific, Shaw helped Hill with his personal agricultural 
endeavors. Like Hill, Shaw was convinced of the efficacy of dual-purpose 
cattle and, under his tutelage. Hill resumed his development of an 
effective breed. Shaw also helped reverse some of Hill's earlier ideas. 
Instead of steirting with basic beef cattle, such as shorthorns, and then 
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breeding them for increased milk quality euid yield, Shaw suggested working 
with dairy cattle to develop "good beef points. 
To build such a herd. Hill sent A. W. Shaw to Engleind in 1913 to buy 
cattle amd horses. The stock arrived in Quebec where problems curose with 
queurantine and tuberculin certification. A. W. Shaw eventually had to go 
to Washington, D.C. to sort out the problem. The stock remained in Quebec 
for a month while bureaucratic knots loosened. A. W. Shaw did not 
accompziny the cattle to North OcUcs, having accepted an assistant 
professorship at the University of Saskatcheweui. The next yeeir Thomas Shaw 
himself went to England to buy cattle and to hire cowheuids. He purchased 
fifty Shorthorn bulls costing $17,345. Only five of these stayed at North 
OeUcs; most were distributed along the lines of the Great Northern and 
Northern Pacific, with much more success than Hill's ecurlier distribution 
attempts. 
At the same time as Hill revived his interest in breeding cattle, he 
also resumed breeding other fcunn animals at North Oaks. New livestock 
registers detailed the purchase, breeding record, and death or sale for 
various breeds of pigs, sheep, and horses. By the time of his death. North 
Oeiks was once more a thriving stock tarm., breeding high quality stock 
availeible to the average farmer both through Hill' s distribution scheme and 
through stud service.^® 
Hill renewed his interest in experimentation. Despite his rejection 
of modern strictures on agricultural expertise. Hill had always supported 
the notion of scientific agriculture, and his internalization of changing 
scientific practices became appsurent in the work at North Oaiks. Unlike the 
experiments conducted in the 1880s, those in 1914 were more systematic with 
better record-keeping. The dairy steirted to keep weekly records of: pounds 
of milk received; average test of milk; pounds of cream received; average 
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test of cream; pounds of butterfat from cream; and pounds of butter made. 
Two months later the same records were started for grade as well as 
thoroughbred cows. The feunn experimented with different types of feed. 
The feirm superintendent proposed feeding milkers a mixture of oats, barley 
and cow peas after the grass died in the summer. Also Hill utilized Creuie 
of the Great Northern agricultural extension depcirtment at North Oaks. 
Crane's studies for the railroad involved fertilizer work, and he 
frequently used North Oeiks for testing-
For many years North Oaks had mainly been a family retreat, but, fay 
the time of Hill's retirement, his children had lost interest in the 
property, although this would change after his death. The farm did retain 
importance in providing supplies to the ever-expanding list of family 
residences. The farm also retained its intrinsic appeal for Hill and his 
wife Mary. When the original wood frame house burnt down in 1912, Hill 
replaced it with a large brick dwelling reminiscent of his mansion in St. 
Paul. He also built new greenhouses and spent $2,556.50 on ornamental 
landscaping. 
In these later years. North Oeiks regained importance as pairt of 
Hill's larger agricultural vision. When the railroad abemdoned its 
idiosyncratic farming development policies, adopting a more mainstream 
Progressive approach. Hill returned to his position as a gentleman feirmer 
utilizing North Oaks for experimentation and demonstration. 
By the time of his death Hill had come full circle in his attitudes 
about farm development. He had returned to using his personal farms as 
laboratories to explore his agricultural ideas, which he then disseminated 
through his speeches as well as through the philanthropic distribution of 
stock. This reversion was also apparent in his attitude toward 
agricultural development and education on a national level. 
Resuming action independent of the railroad Hill, in 1913, became 
chairman of the advisory committee of the National Soil Fertility League. 
Started in 1911, the League promoted agricultural education and was heavily 
37. Toomey to FinnemeUi, 3 February, 10 Meurch, and 17 April 1914; 
Crane to Toomey, 27 April 1914, North Oaks Papers, JJHP; Dickman, "James 
Jerome Hill," 129. 
38. R. H. Pinnow, geirdener, to Toomey, 17 Januciry 1914; Bill from 
Jewell Nursery Co., Lake City, 3 Meurch 1914 and from Hoyt Nursery Co., St. 
Paul, 10 April 1914, North Oaks Papers, JJHP. 
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funded by railroads. The advisory committee included William Taft, William 
J. Bryan, Cheirles Van Hise, W. D. Hoard, John H. Worst, eind Henry Wallace. 
The principal aim of the organization was the enactment of the Lever Bill 
or, as it became known, the Smith-Lever Act. This bill proposed to give 
federal support and structure to agricultural extension programs that had 
been inaugurated by various institutions at the turn of the century. 
Hill's attraction to the concept of extension stennned from his 
longstanding distrust of academic teaching. He and many others, felt that 
universities had neglected actual farming needs, postulated impractical 
systems, cind patronizing fcirmers. In 1908 Hill had lent his support to the 
Dolliver-Davis Bill, which proposed a system of federally funded 
agricultural high schools. Hill hoped the bill would offer more practical 
agricultural education, but it had not passed.^® 
Changing his focus to extension. Hill championed the same cause of 
education- In 1911 he financially supported the Better Farming Association 
in North Dakota, which instituted an extension program in that state. 
Through the Lever Bill, Hill hoped that new scientific methods of farming 
could be disseminated in a more realistic cind effective fashion on a 
national level. He wanted extension to address practical farming issues, 
being "impressed with the possibility of work done by the farmer on his own 
land with his own hands under the direction of some one who knows of his 
own practice and not of what he has been told or what he has read out of 
books or newspapers. 
This vision allied closely with Hill's ongoing belief in the efficacy 
of demonstration farms. It also showed Hill's disgust with official 
agricultural education, yet paradoxically, he believed that the federal 
government should remain responsible for this education. Such dichotomies 
had permeated his entire life. A believer in scientific and technological 
progress eind expertise, Hill nevertheless saw agricultural knowledge as 
39. Roy V. Scott, Railroad Development Programs in the Twentieth 
Century (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1985), 54; H. H. Gross to 
Hill, 29 October 1913, General Correspondence, JJHP; Roy V. Scott, The 
Rgluo^ant Farmer; The Rise of Agricultural Extension to 1914 (Urbana; 
University of Illinois Press, 1970). 
40. Letter from Willet Hays, 1 October 1908, UMA. Many of the 
components of the Dolliver-Davis Bill were embodied in the Smith-Hughes Act 
passed the year after Hill's death. 
41. Hill to Gross, 27 October 1913, General Correspondence, JJHP. 
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being gained through experience rather than formal teaching. By advocating 
a national extension service. Hill sought a middle ground where 
professionals could guide the experiential knowledge of feunners. 
Hill's support of federal extension revisited his eeurlier contention 
that university professors were not fulfilling their professional meuadate. 
Like many other "non-academics," he thought that productive farming could 
be guaranteed by individualized fertilizer prescriptions and good seed. 
University personnel should have provided this soil analysis and seed 
breeding, but instead they complained that these mundane demands of farmers 
for routine analyses cut into their research time. The Smith-Lever Act 
thus succeeded in straddling both camps. For those with Hill's perspective 
the act provided a type of agricultural education and support which 
universities were reluctant to supply. For university personnel and their 
colleagues in the Office of Experiment Stations, the act freed them for 
reseeirch, passing educational responsibilities to the extension service. 
James Hill's retirement from the boeird of the Great Northern Railway 
in 1912 meurked the culmination of his "great adventure" euid heralded his 
return to an earlier agricultural policy. With his retirement, the 
railroad gradually changed its development programs. Moving away from the 
social vision of Hill to a neirrower economic focus, it paid less attention 
to cheinging agricultural trends and more to maximizing profits from 
existing practices. The railroad's industrial department also increasingly 
mirrored university agricultural departments. As James Hill receded from 
everyday corporate affairs, the corporation began to accept Progressive 
notions of expertise and focus attention on academic and federal experts 
rather than the self-taught experts of Hill's day. 
Diverging from the railroad policy for the first time. Hill returned 
to his position as a gentleman farmer. Once again he used his farms for 
experimentation emd development, and his reputation as a teaching tool. A 
crusty old man, who had largely lost his political influence. Hill 
continued to berate agricultural practices and agencies with which he 
42. Charles Rosenberg, No Other Gods; On Science and American 
Social Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), 141-84. 
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disagreed. Popular as a speciker, he maintained a forum for his ideas, 
which became an increasing liability for the Great Northern-
The failure of the elderly Hill to assume the position of a wise 
philanthropist among the farmers of his territory was compounded by his 
loss of political influence. By World War I the "Empire Builder" had lost 
control of his empire, as international politics euid immigration 
regulations superseded his authority. 
Hill moved no closer to realizing his agraurian Eden. His vision of 
the Plains populated by Jeffersoniam yeomen, practicing scientific 
agriculture taught to them by fellow farmers employed by sympathetic 
universities eind federal bureaus, remained unattainable. A legend in his 
own lifetime, James Hill was valued as a character, a pioneer figure, cuad 
an empire builder, and his interest in fanning was well-known and 
appreciated. In terms of validity, however, he had become an anachronism 
and, when he died, the railroad made a consideraible effort to disassociate 
the corporation from his agricultural ventures. 
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"the voice of the northwest" ?1 
The verdict of historians regarding James Hill's agricultural endeavors has 
been incredibly vziried, but all have agreed that he had considereible 
impact, whether positive or negative, on fcirming practices in the territory 
of the Great Northern Railway. Joseph Gilpin Pyle, Hill's official 
biographer, claims that "The agricultural interest of the United States 
owes a lasting debt to the enthusiasm and the life-long labours of James J. 
Hill." Pyle portrays Hill as "a pioneer of conservation," talks of feirmers 
exposed to his ideas as "converts," and as a prime instigator in the 
development of formal agricultural education.^ 
Hill's later biographer, business historian Albro Martin, largely 
ignores his agricultural ventures. When he does address them, however, he 
does not question Hill's authority or the inherent validity of his 
agricultural vision.^ 
Martin leirgely left Hill's farming interests to his graduate student, 
Howard Leigh Dickman who, in 1977, finished his dissertation entitled, 
"James Jerome Hill and the Agricultural Development of the Northwest." 
Dickman, although acknowledging the failure of Hill's agricultural vision 
in the long term, never questions his influence on the major feirming 
movements of his time, irrigation, conservation, and dryland farming. 
This view is upheld by Roy V. Scott who states that "Hill's 
reputation as a developer of [agriculture in] the Northwest was well 
deserved" and who holds Hill largely responsible for the flood of dryland 
feurmers to Montana in the 1910s. In Michael P. Malone's new and readable 
biography of the railroad man, Malone portrays Hill as an influential 
"advocate of model demonstration farms" and as leaving an "enduring 
1. Roy V. Scott, Railroad Development Programs in the Twentieth 
Centurv (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1985), 35. 
2. Joseph Gilpin Pyle, The Life of jaitiog .t. Hill. Volume II (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1917), 232-49, 362, 365, 368. 
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legac[y]" from his "imperial promotion of modern agriculture across the 
breadth of his domain."^ 
Historians critical of Hill's agricultural involvement also give 
credence to his influence. Montana historian, Joseph Kinsey Howeurd, blames 
Hill for the huge influx of settlers into Montana, claiming dry feirmland. 
He argues that Hill was thus responsible for the extent of the subsequent 
disaster, when a period of low rainfall from 1917 to 1922 resulted in the 
bursting of the dryland farming bubble and the bcinkruptcies of thousands of 
homesteaders.^ 
This historiographical tradition leaves us with two questions; to 
what extent did Hill's agricultural vision become a reality, and how 
influential was Hill on agricultural change during his lifetime? 
James Jerome Hill believed in the necessity to populate the northern 
tier with small-scale yeomen farmers. These farmers, he envisioned, 
whether on reclaimed land or dryland, would practice diversified, 
efficient, scientific agriculture. Their work would be governed by basic, 
accessible principles, with agricultural experiment stations providing 
support in the form of soil analysis and continued experimentation. 
Hill had a variety of intertwined reasons for establishment of this 
dense rural settlement. Like others during the Progressive era, he saw 
migration to the farm as one of the solutions to urban decay and political 
corruption. The Country Life Movement and the Back-to-the-Land movements 
among others, based this view in the Jeffersonian ideal of country life. 
Independent farm life provided the most natural setting for man euid, as 
such, the best training for active democratic participation. 
As well as providing a solution to the nation's urban and political 
problems, aui increased farm population, according to Hill, would meet the 
growing food needs of the nation. Calculating Americem population growth 
on the basis of the incredibly high immigration figures at the turn of the 
century smd worried sibout the decline in productivity of the nation's 
5. Roy V. Scott, Railroad Development Programs in the Twentieth 
Century ((Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1985), 8, 35; Michael P. 
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soils. Hill predicted a time when the food supply would prove insufficient. 
The steady migration of rural people to the cities heightened this worry. 
Only by reversing this migration and returning to intensive, diversified 
agriculture, could America avoid becoming dependent on other nations for 
its food. 
Hill visited his concerns and solutions in many speeches. In 1913, 
he succinctly summarized his agreirian philosophy. "The chcuige to a more 
intensive system, smaller farms, less ground pleuated to wheat, more to 
coarse grains emd to forage plants, the keeping of cattle, the higher 
cultivation of the grain-producing area by soil study, fertilization, 
better tillage eind all the methods included in modern scientific 
agriculture, will create a revolution in farm industry cuid at least double 
present yields and profits."^ 
Hill combined his Jeffersonian agrarianism and Malthusian pessimism 
with the fundamental pragmatism of a successful businessman. Recognizing 
early on that the territory of his railroad was most suited to agricultural 
production he wanted it as densely settled as possible to maximize haulage 
both ways along the lines. 
Hill was not alone in his concerns for rural America nor in his 
prescriptions. Many social critics identified the flight to the cities as 
one of the key problems confronting America, undermining democracy, and 
increasing crime and moral degradation. This fear manifested itself on a 
federal level with Theodore Roosevelt's Country Life Commission. Many also 
tried to rebuild the Jeffersonian yeoman. The back-to-the-land movement 
fostered exactly the same kind of dense, rural settlement as Hill 
envisioned. 
Economic and technological factors ultimately thwarted these 
reformers. Mechanization, hybridization, fertilizers, and pesticides 
increased the treuasition to agricultural economies of scale. Monocropping 
remained feasible and populeu:, and rural labor needs diminished. Instead 
of regaining a place in the national economy, small-scale feimily feirms 
found it hfurd to survive. The labor, released from these faunns amd from 
technological replacement, continued to flow to the cities. 
7. James J. Hill speech, "Great Northern Origins euid Growth," 1913, 
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LWHP). 
178 
Although concern about Americein rural life would continue into the 
19903, the idea that the Jeffersonijin yeoman had to be upheld to save the 
nation had wemed by the time of Hill's death. With the trauisition of 
America to gui urbsin nation, as indicated by the census of 1920, those 
struggling with Icorge-scale social reform focused their attention on the 
problems of the cities. The federal government continued to articulate a 
desire to save the family farm until the late 1960s, after which it 
increasingly treated rural poverty as problem of welfsure rather than 
fcunning, but governmental support of agricultural economies of scale 
countered this appcurent concern. Gradually the attention paid to reforming 
rural life metamorphosed from a need to uphold the nation's democratic 
spirit to a patronizing concern for the underdog. As ectrly as 1956 with 
Eisenhower's soil-bank pleui, some government officials had shifted to the 
belief that the best cure for rural ills was indeed to move the surplus 
population to the cities.® 
Hill's Malthusieui vision of a nation unable to feed itself was more 
idiosyncratic than his desire for a densely populated countryside, but 
proved no less false. America's food production continued to grow, helped 
by science and technology. At the seime time, the immigration rate, on 
which Hill had grounded his pessimism, declined sharply with legal 
restrictions and the advent of World War I. The Great Northern, Hill's 
fundamental concern, continued to make considerable profit from 
agricultural haulage, which remained one-third of its business until after 
World War II.^ 
In fact, the problem which confronted American food production in the 
twentieth century reversed Hill's predictions. From the rural depression 
of the 1920s on, the nation suffered from chronic overproduction. Farmers 
compensated for low prices by increasing productivity, which, in turn, 
further depressed prices. The federal government made various attempts to 
cure this problem from Henry A. Wallace's directed plowing under of crops 
and slaughter of hogs, to price supports euid purchase of feunn surplus. 
But, despite the development of a global economy, the problem remains. 
8. Gilbert C. Fite, American Farmers; The New Minority 
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Hill's vision of an densely settled rural America failed to become 
reality. But perhaps it is unfair to judge his influence, or lack of it, 
on the basis of the developments of American agriculture after his death. 
This returns us to our second question: to what extent Hill facilitated 
agricultural change during his lifetime, both on an institutional cuid 
grassroots level. 
Some evidence suggests that Hill had substantial influence on 
farmers. He was in great demand as a speaker, and local officials remarked 
on his expertise in introductions. Private letters testified to the 
effectiveness of Hill's images. In 1902 EdwEird Tuck told him, "it looks as 
though you know more about the farmers' business than the farmer does 
himself. 
Other evidence points to considerably less success. Hill and his 
railroad did not escape attack from the Veirious fsirmers' movements, such as 
the Grange, that swept the nation in the late nineteenth century. From 
1882 to the end of the decade, Hill stayed in St. Paul when the legislature 
was in session to oppose passage of grfinger laws. Toward the end of his 
life, the Great Northern faced opposition from the Nonpartisam League in 
North DeUcota. In both cases, the farmers rebelled against railroad 
dominance in the state's economy. All of Hill's rhetoric about being one 
of the feirmers did not prevent attacks on the Great Northern. 
Another way of assessing Hill's influence is the extent to which 
farmers adopted the systems he promoted. Probably dryland farming was the 
most successful idea he advocated. Favored by all railroads on the Great 
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Plains, it also received approval from the experiment stations of the Great 
Plain states and the USDA. This general endorsement of the principles of 
dryland farming make it impossible to q-iantify Hill's influence, but also 
make it certain that it was feir from unilateral. 
Similarly, successful irrigation hinged on factors other than Hill's 
advocacy. Consistent failure of private and state irrigation schemes made 
federal involvement necessary. Certainly, the National Irrigation 
Association, which included Hill among others, launched a useful lobbying 
campaign, but the impetus toweird governmental involvement was already 
extcint. The limits on the association's influence became apparent with 
their subsequent failure to modify the homesteading laws. 
Hill's disillusionment with the Reclamation Service emd his attempts 
to alter its irrigation priorities and its personnel met with continual 
failure. Without strong public opinion and a structured lobbying 
mechanism, his institutional influence completely dissipated. Similarly, 
despite his hopes after being invited to the Governors' Conference on 
conservation at the White House, Hill soon realized that he would have no 
success in cheinging the direction and aims of the national conservation 
movement. 
Even phileuithropy on a grand scale failed to alter farming practices 
as Hill wished. Believing that livestock would supplement farm income and 
provide valuable meuiure. Hill advocated the breeding of good quality 
animals to provide substantial quantities of milk as well as high quality 
meat. To this end, he gave purebred imported bulls to farm&ra along his 
line in the 1880s. 
Hill's efforts failed as farmers throughout the Great Northern's 
territory refused to diversify. Reluctant to invest the time necessary to 
maintain quality stock, they usually slaughtered or sold the livestock Hill 
donated. Although some farmers continued to keep scr\ab cattle for home 
consumption, a concerted interest in mixed feirming never materialized.^^ 
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Hill understood that his influence proved less effective than he 
wished. Although his speeches celebrated fsinners as the salt of the eeirth, 
he privately expressed exasperation, complaining about their resistance to 
scientific agriculture and stating that "Minnesota farmers have never shown 
a disposition as a whole to help themselves. 
Hill, himself, implicitly recognized his failure to influence 
agricultural chemge. For the last thirty-eight years of his life he 
adopted a wide remge of methods to try to influence fsunning practices. As 
each method failed in turn, he altered his approach, adopting new 
strategies. 
His key problem was how to establish himself as an authority to be 
followed. Initially he addressed the farming population directly, working 
from the position of a gentlemsm farmer. Finding this ineffective and 
costly, he shifted to creating alliances with other institutions, hoping to 
thus gain the authority necessary to effect change. This proved effective 
for a brief period leading up to the Newlands Act of 1902. The eeirly 
twentieth century saw this policy breaking down as the allied institutions 
moved in directions amtagonistic to Hill's beliefs and goals and he found 
that he lacked any control. As the allieinces disintegrated. Hill 
estciblished his own agricultural institution within the corporation of the 
Great Northern to give his ideas credence. However, fanners clearly 
perceived the vested interest of the Development Depeirtment, and cooperated 
or otherwise based on information received from other sources. Finally, as 
the meinagement of the Great Northern began to alienate themselves from 
Hill's ideas eind mission, the old man resorted to isolation, resuming his 
role of gentleman farmer. 
Hill's quest for agricultural authority proved elusive not because of 
his own inadequacies but because of the chamging nature of expertise during 
his lifetime. Involved in a national struggle for the right to dictate the 
future of American agriculture. Hill ended up on the losing side with the 
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fanners. The laurels went to the academics eind bureaucrats of the federal 
government. 
Hill supported the idea of expertise in agriculture, but he opposed 
the ncurrowing of the term "expert." While never denying the importance of 
agricultural scientists and their institutions, he believed that farming 
expertise could also come through experience, thus qualifying himself and 
other faunners as experts. The science necesseiry for good feunning was. Hill 
thought, easily within the reach of feirmers. "It is true that the best 
methods of soil treatment and crop growing are scientific; but they require 
only that form of popular science which is within the comprehension and use 
of the uneducated man." He thought that most of the principles necessary 
to improve agricultural production in the United States were self-evident 
and could be learnt by euiy observeint, heirdworking farmer.^® 
In addition, he agreed with fsirmer criticism that the universities 
often indulged in theoretical and impractical work. His willingness to 
criticize these institutions vjiried during his life. While never 
dismissing them altogether, he certainly pointed out the limits of their 
help in practical agricultural development, especially when feeling 
thwarted by universities or their personnel in implementing his vision. In 
1911, for example, when finsmcing the Better Farming Association's aims to 
provided a system of extension agents in North Dakota, Hill offered this 
patronizing view of university education. "Now, I do not want to take a 
shingle off the roof of an agricultural college in the world. I feel 
kindly toward them. I do wish that in place of putting on their spectacles 
and looking wise and talking in scientific terms eind giving you the 
botanical names of plants and telling you they originated in some distant 
island of the sea, that they would get down emd tell you what you can do on 
your own fcunn where you live."^^ 
His actions and speeches reflected this dichotomy; while praising the 
work of agricultural scientists, he consistently attacked agricultural 
educators for their failure to convey simple improvements to the farming 
population emd for their resistemce to expertise gained through farming. 
Hill's agricultural isolation by the time of his death in 1916 demonstrated 
16. James J. Hill speech, "The Mother of All Industry," 1912, LWHP. 
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the triumph of a narrow definition of "expertise," and the alienation of 
fanners from primacy within their own profession. 
By 1916 it was clear that the academicians and their political 
cohorts at the United States Department of Agriculture had seized control 
of the development of American agriculture. In capitulation. Hill's 
successors established a railroad agricultural depeirtment modeled after the 
university system, staffed it with academics, and fired the remnants of 
Hill's praetorian gueurd-
It would be wrong to assert that Hill had no influence over 
agricultural change. He was an intelligent and rich man whose railroad was 
significant enough to guarantee him at least em audience for his opinions. 
However, Hill's influence proved minimal. Changes in the conceptualization 
of agricultural authority during the Progressive era left Hill chasing an 
illusive expertise. Although supporting some successful movements. Hill 
consistently failed to implement change without additional endorsement of 
experts whether from the government or academe. 
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